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Editorial 
Kurt W. Rothschild’s Life and Work1 
„... three ‘roots’ – love and respect for economic theory as an impressive 
analytical instrument, dynamic perspectives as an important key to an 
understanding of socio-political developments, and a problem-orientated 
approach in view of the economic and social ills of society – have remained the 
‘prime movers’ of my work.“ (Rothschild, 1992A: 473) 
At least for a quarter of a century before his death in autumn 2010 Kurt W. Rothschild had 
been the unquestionable doyen of economics in Austria. He was an outstanding and original 
economic thinker whose voluminous work is of rare quality and versatility. However, his 
lasting and inspiring influence on generations of economists is not only due to his scientific 
performance and his important interdisciplinary contributions which outreached economics by 
taking into account of widely neglected factors, such as strategic behaviour, power, history 
and ethics. But, it was also due to his modest and upright character which made of him a 
devoted academic teacher, an influential empirical researcher and policy adviser, as well as a 
highly respected speaker in public forums.  
Kurt W. Rothschild was born on October 21
st
 1914 in Vienna and died on November 15
th
 
2010. He was the son of Ernst Rothschild, a salesman, and his wife Philippine. In 1933 Kurt 
W. Rothschild finished secondary grammar school and entered the University of Vienna to 
study law. His first choice would have been to become a physicist but that would have taken 
too much time. Due to the need to contribute to the family budget and the poor labour market 
conditions at the time he turned to study law with a prospect of wider job opportunities.  
There existed no Social Science faculty at Austrian universities at that time. However, 
economics was an important part of the legal studies curriculum. Kurt W.  Rothschild (1992: 
472-3) was soon captured by this subject; on the one hand, he was attracted by the ‘beauties’ 
of analytical reasoning in economic theory but, on the other hand, his interest was also 
kindled from a political angle. Since already in grammar school he became acquainted with 
Karl Marx and the Austro-Marxist thinkers through his contact with the Socialist Youth 
                                            
1 Large parts of this editorial rely on Altzinger (2011). 
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Movement. Moreover, there was also the stimulating atmosphere of Vienna in the inter-war 
period: First, from an economic point of view, the bleak economic perspectives, i. e. 
extremely high unemployment and poverty in these years of depression, as well as a deeply 
divided and unstable political environment, provided a strong challenge to take side even 
when you came from an apolitical family background as Kurt W.  Rothschild did. Second, on 
the cultural side, Vienna had to offer a rich spectrum of activities and highly influential 
debates in the fields of psychology and sociology, the “Viennese Circle” of Philosophers, 
Austro-Marxism and Austrian Economics (Rothschild, 1999:3). Third, as political action is 
concerned, there was the policy of “Red Vienna”: The Viennese Social Democrats used their 
majority in the City Council and pursued an active municipal policy against the background 
of a hostile federal government by financing public housing and social and educational 
institutions through redistributive taxation (e. g. luxuries). 
These were important years for Kurt W.  Rothschild as he made clear in an autobiographical 
paper (1999: 3):  
„I learned to see the world and its economic aspects not just as a harmonious 
progress of mankind (which so obviously it was not) but as a dynamic process 
of interacting interests and conflicts, of power and exploitation … This 
experience supported a viewpoint that in economic, political and social affairs 
things do not just “happen” and are not predetermined by “iron economic 
necessities” (as the opponents of the Viennese experiment continually argued). 
It has remained as a permanent reminder that activism and interventionism are 
possible and useful when conditions are regarded as unjust or undesirable, 
particularly in regard to basic human needs and extreme inequalities.“ 
It was this period in which he developed his great ambition to at least attempt to tackle social 
and economic problems. Although he pursued a tremendously wide range of topics during his 
life-long research effort he focused rather strongly on topics relevant for the whole society 
like unemployment or the distribution of income, wealth and economic and political power. 
Most of Rothschild’s political and social interests were formed during these economically and 
politically awful times of high unemployment, enormous poverty and the abrupt ending of a 
democratically elected government (which happened in Austria in 1934). 
At the time when he finished his legal studies in 1938 Hitler invaded Austria. Thus, 
Rothschild as a Jew had to leave the country as soon as possible. He nearly never spoke about 
this tragic period of his life. Only in a biographical documentation in autumn 2009 on the 
occasion of his 95
th
 birthday his wife Valerie told the interviewer that also Rothschild himself 
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had to do “floor cleaning” in 1938 in order to survive. He also never mentioned that his 
mother, who remained in Vienna, died in a concentration camp. Today, it seems almost 
inconceivable that a man who was pushed out of the country and to whom any appropriate 
academic job was refused after his return to Austria in 1947 for a very long time, neither ever 
accused anybody in Austria for his personal experiences nor refused to work hard for the 
country's reconstruction after World War II. For him it was just natural to make his 
contribution – seemingly regardless of what happened to him during all those years. 
In August 1938 – after legal ways to emigrate were denied – Kurt and Valerie Rothschild fled 
through Switzerland to Scotland, where he was granted a scholarship. He studied Economics 
and Political Philosophy at Glasgow University (1938-1940) and continued as Lecturer till 
1947. The years in Scotland probably were the most formative ones for Rothschild’s entire 
life. And this mainly in two respects. Firstly, in Scotland he discovered an entirely new world 
of economic thinking. And secondly, he was involved in a kind of democratic society which 
for an Austrian was hardly imaginable. Rothschild was introduced to the Keynesian ideas for 
the first time by studying the General Theory at Bale in Switzerland on his three-month stop 
on the way to Glasgow. He did tell his story on that many times. “Filled with the basics of 
Austrian-type micro-economic behaviourism I just couldn’t make head of tails of what I 
found in Keynes’ book” (Rothschild 1991, 6f.). For him it was just luck to discover at that 
time also the “Introduction to the Theory of Employment” by Joan Robinson. Otherwise he 
probably would have withdrawn from the study of economics. It was in particular Robinson's 
problem-oriented approach which was an “Eye- and brain-Opener” for Rothschild and 
permitted him “a far closer link between the intellectual adventure of economic theorizing and 
the social and socialist questions of the time than I could have found in my Wien days” 
(Rothschild 1991, 7).  
The second and certainly not less important experience of Rothschild’s years in Scotland was 
the complete “openness” both at the university and in society.  
„In Scotland I found democratic attitudes which had grown in centuries of 
democratic institutions … This openness towards other opinions and the 
readiness to cooperate with “other” sides when the situation seems opportune 
impressed me and has not only left its marks on my view of politics and 
political action but probably also contributed to the eclectic leanings in 
theoretical  matters.“ (Rothschild 1999, 5f.) 
Rothschild’s theoretical work in general is a form of creative eclecticism, drawing on 
neoclassical analysis where it is sensible and relevant (mainly short-term microeconomics) 
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but always investigating in its weaknesses (King 1994, 29f.). Rothschild always used different 
theories for different specific analyses. He never refrained to use neoclassical tools where 
they were applicable. However, he also always mentioned their weaknesses. Rothschild had a 
striking tolerance and openness to various theoretical approaches. His eclectic approach 
always tried to see what different theories have to offer and to analyse their strength and 
weaknesses. For example, Rothschild did not refrain from using utility theory for the analysis 
of micro-economic, short-run mechanisms of current economic activities on the one side, and 
Marxism-like approaches for the analysis of long-term dynamics of the socio-economic 
interplay of power and interests on the other (Rothschild 2002, 2004B). Besides this kind of 
eclectic theorizing there was one additional point which characterizes Rothschild’s 
methodological approach: the factor of complexity.  
„I believe (and, of course, there are others who think the same way) that 
economics, like other social sciences, cannot be a “hard” science comparable to 
mechanics or other highly developed branches of the natural sciences. The 
extreme complexity of the social world as well as its dynamic, the poor quality 
of empirical data, and the difficulties of experimenting make any attempt at 
reaching high levels of “exactness” futile, if one aims at more than just the 
construction of ‘logical’ models.“ (Rothschild 1991, 12) 
In 1947 Rothschild left the Glasgow University and returned to Vienna. He was already a 
highly respected economist with a number of important publications. Among others he 
published several papers in the most prestigious economic journal of that time ‘The Economic 
Journal’ (edited by John M. Keynes), such as “A Note on Advertising” (1942), “The Small 
Nation and World Trade” (1944) and his most influential paper “Price Theory and Oligopoly” 
(1947). But, despite of his reputation, like so many who returned after the war to help 
rebuilding the ruined intellectual infrastructure of the country, he was met with little support. 
Due to the narrowness of those people who managed the Austrian universities at that time 
(and many of them already since 1938 or before) and due to his Jewish roots he did not get an 
academic post. However, he could find a job at the Austrian Institute of Economic Research 
as a senior research economist. Interestingly, he was supported for this position by a 
recommendation from the later Nobel laureate August von Hayek (one of the founders of 
WIFO), who certainly did not support Rothschild’s economic point of view.  
At WIFO Rothschild found a rather stimulating environment with a young team of economist 
who was strongly devoted to applied empirical research. Among others also Josef Steindl 
returned to Austria in 1950 and enriched the institute. Work at WIFO was rather strenuous 
since they were only few people and each of them had to write a report nearly every month 
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for WIFO’s monthly bulletin. In addition, Rothschild managed to publish a great number of 
highly regarded articles on Income Distribution, Wage Policy and Foreign Trade in these 
years as well as his “Theory of Wages” in 1954, which was of lasting influence on 
generations of economists. During that work at WIFO Rothschild detected “a healthy 
scepticism regarding the quality of data and a respect for good empirical work, even if it were 
‘merely’ descriptive” (Rothschild 1991, 9). 
In 1966 Rothschild was invited to become a “founding father” of the newly established 
University in Linz where a Faculty of Social and Economics Sciences was established and an 
entirely new curriculum in economics was introduced and had to be drawn up. Since 
Rothschild always had had strong ambitions in academic teaching and research he accepted 
this offer. However, he never completely left WIFO where he worked as a consultant from 
1966 until the end of his life. In Linz he had the advantage to develop the curricula in 
economics mainly by himself and with his colleagues. Hence he could apply his long-lasting 
experiences in economics starting from the Austrian School to Keynesian economics and 
much more than that. He emphasized in particular a strong interdisciplinary approach and 
managed an enormous teaching load. Similar to Glasgow and WIFO, he had to work rather 
hard since much of the new teaching stuff had to be completely reorganized. Reading his 
autobiographical notes concerning that time one is reminded once again of the “Scottish 
belief” that you made your own way in life and progress through hard work and education. As 
many anecdotes from colleagues and pupils of Rothschild testify he never shied back from 
hard work (e.g. Nowotny 2011). 
Rothschild’s enormous teaching load at Glasgow during the 1940s and again at Linz for the 
new curricula during the late 1960s had one common denominator. In both cases (as well as 
in several other cases) he used this challenge for producing either text books or papers. At 
least four of his text books were outcomes of his lectures either at universities or shortly 
thereafter (Rothschild 1954, 1981, 1988, 1992B). This output-oriented work is an 
extraordinary characteristic of Rothschild and is underlined by the long list of publications of 
books and articles in renowned journals during this period of intensive teaching and 
thereafter; to mention just a few books of rather diverse subjects: “Arbeitslose: Gibt’s die?” 
(1990), “Ethik und Wirtschaftstheorie” (1992B), “Die politischen Visionen großer 
Ökonomen” (2004A).  
Rothschild was not only open-minded in his research he was also open-minded throughout his 
live. He liked to discuss new developments in economics - theoretically, empirically and 
politically - with colleagues and students alike. At the University of Linz such discussions 
took place during the meanwhile well-known “Rothschild Coffee” which was an after-lunch 
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meeting at the department. Whenever you met Rothschild one of his first questions always 
was “What are you working on actually?” And instantly a stimulating and encouraging 
discussion was established. He was interested into nearly everyone’s topic of research and one 
could always learn quite a lot in the stimulating conversations with him. 
Conference in Memory of Kurt W. Rothschild
2
 
On December 1
st
 and 2
nd
, 2011 the Austrian National Bank (OeNB) jointly with the 
University of Economics, Vienna, the Austrian Economic Research Institute (WIFO) and the 
University of Linz organised a conference to commemorate the 1st anniversary of Kurt 
Rothschild’s death and honour his personality and contributions to economics. 
We would like to thank all institutions who provided financial support for this conference, in 
particular the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB), the Austrian Institute of Economic 
Research (WIFO), the Chamber of Labour (AK), the Chamber of Commerce (WKÖ), the 
University of Linz and the University of Economics and Business, Vienna, the Office of the 
Federal Chancellor and the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economy, Family and 
Youth. 
This volume presents the papers that were given at this conference held at the headquarters of 
the Austrian National Bank. Nearly all of the speakers not only know Rothschild’s writings 
quite extensively, but most of them were students, colleagues and/or close friends to him. The 
conference was organized in three sessions. 
In the first session Ewald Nowotny, the Governor of the National Bank who started his career 
as Rothschild’s Assistant, colleague and friend later on, positioned Rothschild between main 
stream and critical economics and described him as “fascinating, but also challenging, even 
strict university teacher” who saw in the merit principle an important guiding principle of 
particular importance for students from an underprivileged background. Since they cannot 
draw on family relations and social networks but have to rely on their academic 
achievements.  
                                            
2 The conference has been organized by Wilfried Altzinger from the University of Economics and 
Business, Vienna (WU), Alois Guger from the Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO), and 
Peter Mooslechner from the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB). 
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John King (La Trobe University, Victoria, Australia) reviewed Rothschild’s biography and 
his impact on economics by drawing on his wide knowledge of the history of economics, 
professional interviews and personal reminiscences of Rothschild. Since King has edited a 
book of selected essays of Rothschild (1995) and conducted two long lasting interviews with 
him (1995, 2009) there are not many who know Rothschild and his work better than him. 
King summarizes Rothschild’s contributions as ‘An inspiration to generations of economists’. 
The second session
3
 dealt with the topics of unemployment, distribution and financial 
markets. Amit Bhaduri (Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi, India) started with the 
remarkable notion that Rothschild’s paper on ‘Price theory and oligopoly’ (1947) “has 
influenced his thinking ever since”. In particular the open-ended nature Rothschild’s 
explanation concerning the price setting problem under oligopoly made a strong impression 
on him, he explained. Such outspoken appreciations have been heard not only at this 
conference but could be read also in papers of non-participating economists (Harcourt, G.C., 
2011). In his paper Bhaduri discusses the relation between wages, profits and economic 
growth where he provides theoretical proof that the liberalization of the financial markets 
does have a profound influence on this setting. 
The paper by Falkinger (University Zürich, Switzerland) addresses some fundamental 
problems of economic power, political power and the financial system. He develops a fully-
fledged general-equilibrium model with some remarkable extensions in particular concerning 
uncertainty in financial markets and its severe macro-economic consequences. He concludes 
that regaining the primacy of policy in the regulation of financial markets requires two things: 
a clearly focused goal and global political leadership. 
During the third session both micro and marco economic issues have been investigated. This 
session gives also evidence of the broad range of topics Kurt W. Rothschild has investigated. 
Heinz Kurz (University of Graz, Austria) presented convincingly Rothschild’s multi-
paradigmatic approach to economics and his position within the Austrian school of 
economists. In particular, Kurz discusses one of Rothschild’s main issues, ‘power in 
economics’, with respect to Smith, Ricardo, Marx and Keynes as well as the Austrian 
economists Menger, Böhm-Bawerk and Schumpeter. Interestingly, he characterizes the 
Austrian School of Economics as a rather heterogeneous but rebellious species, and Kurt W. 
                                            
3 Each of the papers in der 2nd and 3rd session has had also a discussant. These papers will not be 
commented on in this introduction but are published later on. 
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Rothschild, he added, is no exception to this rule. Kurz describes Rothschild as an eclectic 
who picked up from the different economic traditions what he considered to be sound and 
helpful. 
Harry Bloch (Curtin University, Perth, Australia) and Mita Bhattacharya (Monash University, 
Australia) focus on the seminal paper of Rothschild on ‘Price theory and oligopoly’ which has 
been published in 1947, more than 65 years ago. Nevertheless, the main arguments of this 
paper are still valid and important today. The paper provides an instructive summary of the 
arguments of oligopoly and its impact on prices via many different channels, such as 
advertising, price rigidities, barriers of entry and in particular by their strong economic power. 
Oligopoly can be explained as a struggle for position, which requires an analysis that is much 
more than the application of an elegant profit-maximising calculus. In particular, it requires 
further examination of power, which remains a key element of the economy. 
Finally, Jürgen Kromphardt (Technische Universität, Berlin, Germany) summarizes 
Rothschild’s main contributions on labour market theory, wages and prices and growth 
theory. This paper provides a broad overview of quite many contributions of Kurt W. 
Rothschild in these fields and discusses the issues rather instructively. He summarises 
Rothschild’s readings as a persistent integration of psychological, sociological and 
institutional factors in the economic analysis. 
Additionally to his contributions to the academia Rothschild has also written and discussed 
quite many papers for and with policy advisers and politicians alike. These contributions of 
him have been discussed and reflected by a panel of six: two of them represent the main 
organizations of the Austrian social partnership, the Chamber of Labour (Günther Chaloupek)  
and the Chamber of Commerce (Christoph Leitl); two of them represent institutions which 
were (and still are) involved in the discussion on economic perspectives quite intensively, the 
Austrian National Bank (Peter Mooslechner) and the Austrian Institute for Economic 
Research (Karl Aiginger); the final two reflect opinions about Rothschild’s policy advises 
from the perspectives of academics (Herbert Walther, University of Economics, Vienna  and 
Hans Brunner; University of Linz). All of them have been involved in many discussions with 
Kurt W. Rothschild on economic issues and therefore provide an excellent view of his 
arguing and reflections in such situations.  
Finally, we would like to emphasize that due to a broader dissemination of Rothschild’s 
research output to students and interested people alike we have established a webpage for 
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Kurt W. Rothschild (http://www.kurt-rothschild.at/)
4
. On this website we provide a full 
account of Rothschild’s numerous scientific contributions. There you can choose your 
preferred topics out of 42 books, 183 refereed journal papers, 174 contributions to books and 
146 book reviews. Moreover, we present photos, films and radio broadcasts about and with 
Rothschild. You will also find several of his talks at universities and public discussions. 
Additionally, there are numerous interviews with Kurt Rothschild on this website. 
To give a brief résumé about Rothschild’s main ambitions we want to close this introduction 
with a final quote by him. 
„Problem-orientation and relevance seemed to me right from the beginning as a 
desirable aim for the (individual and societal) research effort as a whole, 
though this label cannot and need not be characteristic for every single piece of 
research. Basic research, experiments with new ideas, trials in different 
directions without narrow restrictions from practical viewpoints are necessary, 
if our knowledge is to expand. But the ultimate subordination of the activities 
to relevant and humanistic ends should be – in my opinion – an essential aspect 
of professional ethics and should never be lost completely from sight.“ 
(Rothschild 1991, 8) 
We hope that the contributions in this book will give justice to these demands. 
Wilfried Altzinger – Alois Guger – Peter Mooslechner – Ewald Nowotny 
  
                                            
4 This large workload has been accomplished by David Ifkovits, Christof Brandtner, Matthias Nocker 
and Fritz Luther whose work we gratefully acknowledge. 
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It was never Kurt Rothschild’s aim to leave behind an economic school of thought as his 
legacy. Such academic imperialism, that is, the adherence to a structure of a "wise teacher" 
versus "admiring students," stood in stark contrast to his open-mindedness and his belief in 
non-hierarchical discourse. Thanks to his far-reaching scientific research and publications, his 
extensive and active involvement in education, and not least his impressive personality, he 
still turned out to have a lasting influence on a good many people. I gladly confess that I am 
one of them. Like many others, I was fascinated not only by the content of his scientific work, 
but also by his methodology of clear and extensive analysis and the extraordinary 
combination of clear social and personal convictions on the one hand and thoughtful tolerance 
on the other hand. In this way, Kurt Rothschild was a source of inspiration and a role model 
rather than a “teacher”– the epitome of a devoted scientist and caring individual who fully 
embraced his social responsibility. I am therefore very grateful that we had the opportunity to 
pay homage to this inspiring figure in an in-depth symposium, the results of which are 
published in this volume. 
Several contributors, including myself, have provided a detailed picture of the different points 
in Kurt Rothschild's life in difficult times. In this brief introduction, I will therefore touch 
upon three aspects which, having worked with Kurt Rothschild, I view as typical of his 
thinking and which profoundly influenced my own development. 
The economy as a succession of disequilibria 
Back in 1969, when I was an assistant to Professor Rothschild at the University of Linz, 
young and enthusiastic about my field of research, I once made a presentation claiming that, 
thanks to modern economic theory, policymakers finally had an instrument to avoid deep 
crises and likened this to the successful eradication of epidemics. Having listened to my 
presentation, Rothschild congratulated me, with mild irony, on my sense of optimism. "A 
capitalist economy is always a succession of disequilibria, there will always be crises." This 
remark reflected his general skepticism about thinking in equilibrium models, an approach 
central to neo-classical theories, and, more specifically, about extending the Keynesian 
perspective toward Kalecki and Minsky (see also K.W. Rothschild, 1981). One of the most 
important lessons I learned from working with Kurt Rothschild is that "relevant" economic 
research must always be based on empirical and, in particular, economic-historical 
perspectives. I am sorry to say that it took the recent economic and financial crisis to move 
this approach back into the limelight (at least in the Anglo-Saxon world), a fact that is 
impressively documented by the perhaps most influential article on the financial crisis by 
Reinhardt and Rogoff (2009). 
  
17 
 
Rothschild between mainstream and critical economics 
A broad-minded thinker like Rothschild is impossible to pigeonhole. I remember a lecture by 
the great Keynesian economist Joan Robinson at the University of Linz. Over dinner 
following the lecture, Robinson sternly lectured Kurt Rothschild for lacking loyalty to left-
Keynesian principles, which he took in stride with friendly tolerance. Rothschild was indeed 
highly critical of the modern "orthodox" school of economic thought or "mainstream 
economics" as it is often dubbed. This does not mean that he was blind to new ideas, however. 
He did acknowledge progress in the development of theory and empirical economic research, 
advocating and showing tolerance for the different schools and branches of economics. 
Modern economics, by contrast, is fostering a kind of methodological monoculture; diversity 
no longer seems to be valued or desired. Kurt Rothschild was aware that there is such a thing 
as mainstream economics, even if it is not marked by absolute homogeneity. Mainstream 
economics may be characterized by methodological individualism and an associated 
microfoundation that uses the sum of the behaviors of agents maximizing utility. These are 
elements inherent in the two prevailing mainstream schools, the neo-classical school and the 
neo-Keynesian school. 
So while Kurt Rothschild acknowledged the existence of a mainstream, he was not happy 
with the expression "heterodox." The mere fact that adjectives such as "orthodox" and 
"heterodox" were being applied to economics seemed odd to him. He once remarked that 
Google produced almost 50,000 hits for the query "heterodox economics," while "heterodox 
sociology" or "heterodox psychology" yielded only a handful of results. Rothschild did not 
consider it adequate that a paradigm or a theoretical construct should be given such a 
predominant position. As an advocate of tolerance, Rothschild felt that today's mainstream 
economics lacked the diversity the field needs to be able to explain reality in its actual 
complexity. Theoretical concepts are always limited in their scope; this is obviously also true 
of today’s mainstream theories: " […] I'm against the term 'heterodoxy', because you can't 
have a theory that explains everything. Economics is so complex that you need several 
different theories to explain different situations. You need pluralism, and Joan Robinson's 
'box of tools'." […] "You have many theories – neoclassical, Keynesian, institutionalist, and 
so on. They are all honourable theories, and all of them are important." (Rothschild and King, 
2009). Rothschild also critically remarked that mainstream economics defied methodological 
pluralism; that it was a closed system working on the assumption that every opinion outside 
the system (the "rest") was in opposition. Rothschild, by contrast, was willing to accept parts 
of orthodox concepts and to use them as starting points for developing something new by 
adapting them. 
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The only thing he strictly rejected was declaring any approach absolute. For all these reasons 
it is difficult to tag Rothschild's work (Marshallian? Keynesian? post-Keynesian?). Kurt 
Rothschild repeatedly criticized the illusory notion that theoretical approaches are truly exact, 
challenging their exaggerated claim of precision and universal validity. Gunther Tichy 
succinctly characterized Rothschild's approach like this: "It is better to ask an important 
question than to answer an irrelevant one" and "It is better to get an answer to a question 
vaguely right than precisely wrong" (see also the foreword in Buchegger et al., 1990). 
The merit principle and social balance 
Kurt Rothschild was a fascinating but also challenging, even strict, university teacher, who 
also profoundly influenced his co-workers and assistants, not least through his impeccable 
ethical standards as a scientist. He viewed the promotion of the merit principle at the 
academic level in a broader social context. I remember discussing a specific case with him, in 
regard to which he explained that providing students with a clear merits-based framework and 
judging their performance solely on their academic achievements was particularly important 
for students from socially disadvantaged backgrounds. If schools and universities fail to 
implement clear performance-based standards, their graduates’ careers will be primarily 
determined by social associations and networks rather than academic achievement, which puts 
students from poorer families at a disadvantage. Thanks to Kurt Rothschild, promoting the 
merit principle and embracing social equality came to be the guiding philosophy of both 
teachers and students during the pioneer years of the economics program at the University of 
Linz. I did not fully realize this until later when I learned how different things can be during 
my work at a different institution. 
It is not only the great scientist Kurt Rothschild that we – a large circle of students, friends 
and colleagues – gratefully remember today, but also a man that was sincere and kind – as 
was his insightful and perceptive wife Vally. I consider myself very fortunate for having 
known and learned from them. 
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Introduction 
I should like to begin on a personal note. I only met Kurt twice (in 1993 and 2007), but I was 
introduced to his work very much earlier. As an undergraduate student of Philosophy, Politics 
and Economics in Oxford in the mid-1960s my economics tutor was the brilliant, wayward 
labour economist John Corina. He was a great admirer of Kurt’s, and made me read his 
marvellous Theory of Wages (Rothschild 1954). I learned a great deal from this book, which 
is both a textbook and a thought-provoking treatise. Corina also introduced me to what is 
probably Kurt’s best-known article, on the theory of oligopoly (Rothschild 1947). This made 
a great impression on me, as it had some years earlier on my friend and compatriot Geoff 
Harcourt, who describes it as the ‘most influential article I read as an undergraduate…It has 
influenced my thinking ever since’. Harcourt continues: ‘In my fourth-year honours 
dissertation I tried to introduce Rothschild’s oligopolists as the principal decision-makers in 
the economy into the model of The General Theory, to see if this affected the analysis of the 
systemic behaviour of capitalism. These themes run through much of my work ever since’ 
(Harcourt 2011, p. 120). 
I shall return to this paper shortly, as it has some remarkably prescient comments on the 
methodology of economic theory and (in particular) on its inescapably multi-disciplinary 
nature. In the early stages of my own academic career I learned much from Kurt’s subsequent 
books and articles, not least from the magnificent edited volume on Power in Economics 
(Rothschild 1971), which posed many more important questions than it was able to answer – a 
defining characteristic, I think, of Kurt’s intellectual legacy as a whole. Then, in the early 
1990s, when my research interests became focussed on the history of Post Keynesian 
macroeconomics, Kurt was an important source of information and, above all, of ideas.  I 
visited him in his comfortable but modest apartment in the Döblinger Hauptstrasse in Vienna, 
on a brilliant, icy day in January 1993 and had a long conversation with him, exploring his 
views on economic theory, methodology and policy (King 1995). I found him to be friendly, 
unassuming and extremely helpful, but also to be a man of strong opinions and firm beliefs, 
many of which I shared. When I last saw him, in November 2007, he reminded me that he had 
moved since our previous meeting from the third floor to the first floor of the building, since 
his wife could no longer manage the stairs (the Habsburg-era lift seemed much more daunting 
to me). It was a privilege to have known him, and also a real pleasure. I am very grateful to 
Wilfried Altzinger for these photographs of Kurt, taken in 2009. If I look anything like this in 
31 years time I shall be a very happy old man! 
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Panel Discussion at Kurt W. Rothschild’s 95th Birthday; Kurt W. Rothschild, Oskar Grünwald, Heinz 
Kienzl, Wolfgang Wolte (f.l.t.r.) 
The end of the Rothschild story came soon after, with his death on 15 November 2010. It 
began, as it ended, in Vienna, where Kurt was born on 21 October 1914. He was not part of 
the Rothschild banking dynasty, but instead grew up in relatively humble circumstances in 
what he described as a basically non-political family (Rothschild 2006b, p. 37). He studied 
law and economics at the University of Vienna, where he learned much about marginal utility 
theory but very little about any other branch of economic analysis. Of his teacher, the 
brilliant, opportunistic Hans Mayer, he later recalled: ‘I don’t know if I ever heard him say the 
word “unemployment”’ (ibid., p. 39). Kurt’s early education in real-world economics came 
from outside academia, with his involvement in the socialist youth movement and his first 
contacts with the Austro-Marxism of Otto Bauer and Karl Renner. ‘Without reading “Das 
Kapital” (let alone understanding it!)’, he later wrote, ‘I learned to see the world and its 
economic aspects not just as a harmonious progress of mankind (which so obviously it was 
not) but as a dynamic process of interacting interests and conflicts, of power and exploitation’ 
(Rothschild 1999, p. 3). 
As a Jewish socialist, Kurt was no longer safe in Austria after the Anschluss, and so in 
September 1938 he fled with his wife to Switzerland (his mother, who remained in Vienna, 
died in a concentration camp during the war). In Basle he taught himself macroeconomics, 
using (at the suggestion of Alec Cairncross) Joan Robinson’s Introduction to the Theory of 
Employment (Robinson 1937) as a point of entry to Keynes’s otherwise impenetrable General 
Theory. Kurt arrived in Glasgow in December 1938, worked very hard, and graduated in 
political economy and political philosophy in the summer of 1940. He was then interned as an 
enemy alien, spending several weeks in ‘a huge and desolate former textile mill in 
Lancashire’ (Rothschild 1991, p. 7). Here he attended lectures in economics by another 
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Austrian exile, Josef Steindl, who introduced him to the economics of Michał Kalecki (and 
also became a close friend).  
On his release, Kurt returned to the University of Glasgow as assistant lecturer in economics 
and began to publish on Keynesian theory and on the economics of imperfect competition. 
His nine years in Scotland had a big influence on his outlook on the world. In sharp contrast 
with the polarised and confrontational politics of interwar Austria, he found ‘democratic 
attitudes which had grown in centuries of democratic institutions’, and ‘an openness towards 
other opinions and the readiness to cooperate with “other sides” when the situation seems 
opportune’. The essential decency of the Scots – to borrow George Orwell’s famous 
description of the English –‘not only left its marks on my views on politics and political 
action but probably also contributed to [my] eclectic leanings in theoretical matters’ 
(Rothschild 1999, pp. 5-6; cf. Altzinger 2011a, p. 18).  
When he returned to Austria in 1947 Kurt was unable to obtain a lecturing job. De-
Nazification never went very far in Austria, and the universities remained in the hands of the 
same conservative bureaucracy that had controlled them during the Hitler years. When he 
heard that Steindl had been refused a PhD, ostensibly because his thesis had been written in 
English, he thought to himself, ‘They can get stuffed!’ (Rothschild and Graber 2009). Instead 
of a university job he found work (with the assistance of Friedrich von Hayek) as a research 
economist at the Austrian Institute for Business Cycle Research, today renamed the Austrian 
Institute of Economic Research (WIFO), and remained there for almost two decades. Here he 
specialised in labour economics and international trade, and continued to publish prolifically 
in both English and German. His work on the theory of wages and employment is discussed in 
some detail by Elisabeth Springler (2011a, 2011b) and by Herbert Walther (2011). 
In 1966 Kurt was appointed foundation professor of economics at the University of Linz, 
where he taught until his retirement in 1985; he retained his links with WIFO until his death. 
Among his colleagues in Linz were two who are with us today: Kazimierz Laski, who had 
worked with Kalecki in Poland, and Ewald Nowotny, today head of the Austrian National 
Bank. Kurt was an inspiration to generations of heterodox economists, beginning with 
Corina’s and Harcourt’s generation, and then mine, through his many students from his days 
in Linz, right down to the young heterodox economists of the twenty-first century, some of 
whom I am delighted to see in the audience tonight. He published in every area of the 
discipline, from microeconomic theory through the history of economic thought and 
economic philosophy to questions of macroeconomic theory and policy. A lifelong social 
democrat and Keynesian, he was also a consistent advocate of pluralism in economics and a 
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perceptive and penetrating critic of neoliberalism: in Austria, within the European Union, and 
globally.  
His unpretentious, eclectic but probing scepticism can be detected in all his economic 
writings, including the books on wages and on power in economics that I have already 
mentioned, and the sadly-neglected Economics and Ethics (1993a). Two volumes of his 
collected essays appeared in English in 1993 and 1995, the latter containing a reasonably 
complete list of his published work in English down to that date (Rothschild 1993b, 1995). 
The final Rothschild bibliography includes 42 books, 183 journal articles, 174 book chapters 
and 146 book reviews (Brandtner 2011). Kurt’s own reflections on his life and work can be 
found in my 1993 conversation with him (King 1995, chapter 15) and in a number of 
autobiographical essays and interviews (for example, Rothschild 1991, 1999, 2006a, 2006b). 
There are two German-language Festschrifte. The first, edited by Laski, Nowotny and Egon 
Matzner, honoured Kurt together with Josef Steindl, while the second was dedicated 
exclusively to Kurt (Laski, Matzner and Nowotny 1979; Matzner and Nowotny 1994). Shortly 
after his death two journals published symposia in his honour: Empirica (38:1, February 
2011) in English, and Kurswechsel (2/2011) in German. 
The Case for Pluralism 
I want to explore five themes in Kurt’s work. They are distinct, but as we shall see they are 
also closely inter-linked. The first and most important is his commitment to pluralism in 
economics, which was exemplified by his own involvement in (at least) three heterodox 
traditions – institutionalism, (Post) Keynesianism and Marxism – together with a willingness 
to use mainstream economics when he thought that it was helpful. This final trait sometimes 
got him into trouble. He recalled how one summer, when Joan Robinson was teaching at the 
Arbeiterkammer in Vienna, they went for a walk and she asked him whether he had ever 
really used a neoclassical production function. When he answered in the affirmative, ‘she 
cried out as if I had committed a murder: “How could you?”’. Kurt was unapologetic: ‘Yes, I 
can, whenever it helps me to answer a specific question. I have nothing against it in principle’ 
(Rothschild 2006b, p. 39).  
Kurt’s eclecticism and tolerance of competing perspectives on economics reflected his belief 
that: 
‘…a plurality of paradigms in economics and in the social sciences in general is 
not only an obvious fact but also a necessary and desirable phenomenon in a 
very complex and continually changing subject where abstract general theories 
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(and abstract they have to be) can only cover a comparatively narrow and 
extremely simplified section of the totality of interdependent connections and 
developments.’ (Rothschild 1999, p. 5) 
The subject matter of economics, he argued, is much more complex than that of physics (the 
great physicist Max Planck is said to have come to exactly the same conclusion). ‘So, it is not 
possible in economics to develop general theories as in the natural sciences. We need to study 
and to draw on many theories, including past ones’ (Rothschild 2006a, p. 11). Respect for the 
history of economic thought was therefore a continuing theme in Kurt’s work, and he insisted 
that introductory lectures in micro and macro ‘should be supplemented with the study of the 
history of economic theory’ (ibid., p. 13). 
So too was respect for mainstream economic theory. ‘I think that neoclassical theories, like 
other theories, are an essential part of economic knowledge. One should know these things’ 
(ibid., p. 12). His objections to the mainstream centred on its growing intolerance. In my 2007 
interview he described ‘the present situation in economics’ as ‘unlike that in any other 
science. Look up “Heterodox Economics” and “Dissenting Economics” on Google. You get 
49,900 hits. If you ask for “Heterodox Sociology” or “Heterodox Psychology” you get five or 
six. You have a mainstream in other disciplines, too, but there isn’t this idea that there’s one 
special theory’ (Rothschild and King 2009, p. 151). This conclusion was recently confirmed 
in an excellent collective volume on the postwar history of the social sciences edited by two 
economists, Roger Backhouse and Philippe Fontaine (2010). The chapters on psychology, 
sociology, political science, social anthropology and human geography, each written by an 
authority on the discipline, reveal that economics is the only social science not to be diverse, 
pluralistic and tolerant of dissent. In similar vein the head of the Department of Politics and 
International Relations at Oxford University recently described his department in these terms: 
‘We are self-avowedly pluralist in our teaching and research with enough of us to operate on 
the “zoo principle” – two of everything’ (Whitefield 2011, p. 4). I doubt whether the same 
could be said in 2014 of any economics department, anywhere in the world. 
To a large extent, Kurt believed, the intolerance of academic economists was a matter of 
ideology, since this ‘one special theory’, at least in its more vulgar versions, ‘offers strong 
ideological support for people who want a free market. That means…the ruling capitalist 
interests’. He identified an additional factor: ‘once a mainstream has become established and 
people have been brought up in this tradition and have invested an enormous amount of 
mental energy in it, then they have “sunk costs” [here he used the English term] because they 
have so much invested in it’ (Rothschild 2006b, p. 41). The stubborn insistence by the great 
majority of mainstream macroeconomists on intellectual ‘business as usual’ in the wake of the 
  
26 
 
Global Financial Crisis has confirmed the continuing and malign importance of these sunk 
costs. 
The mainstream insistence that only mathematical models and deductive reasoning counted as 
economic science, Kurt argued, was ‘nonsense. You have many theories – neoclassical, 
Keynesian, institutionalist, and so on. They are all honourable theories, and all of them are 
important’ (Rothschild and King 2009, p. 152). Kurt’s interest in institutionalism was closely 
connected to his long-term focus on the role of power in economics, which will be my second 
theme. His Keynesianism reflected his early study of the General Theory, his support for 
broadly Keynesian macroeconomic policy and – the point that I especially want to emphasise, 
because it dovetails with my own current research interests – his insistence on the relative 
autonomy of macroeconomics and his opposition to the mainstream dogma that 
macroeconomic theory must have RARE microfoundations, modelled on the supposed 
behaviour of a representative agent with rational expectations. This will be my third theme. 
First, though, something more needs to be said about Kurt’s attitude towards Marxism. He 
was never a dogmatic Marxist, and he took very little interest in doctrinal issues like the 
labour theory of value or the falling rate of profit, but he did appreciate Marx’s broad 
approach to the study of capitalist society. The influence of the (similarly undogmatic) 
Austro-Marxists on the young Rothschild has already been mentioned, and I shall discuss his 
attitude towards the Marxian principle of historical materialism later on. He praised Marx for 
having ‘moved the distribution problem in an unequal society into the center of his analysis 
and with it the question of economic and political power’. But Marxian economics had proved 
unable to exert much influence over the course of mainstream economics, ‘partly because of 
weaknesses and shortcomings in its analytical apparatus in relation to several microeconomic 
processes which can be adequately treated in neoclassical and other models, and partly and 
predominantly for ideological reasons’ (Rothschild 2002, p. 437). 
Power in Economics 
This leads me directly into my second theme, Kurt’s analysis of the neglect of power in 
mainstream theory, which he believed to be related to its failure to see economics as a social 
science. Kurt always believed in the value of multidisciplinary work in economics. These 
concerns were apparent as early as 1947, when, in ‘Price Theory and Oligopoly’, he combined 
a critique of marginalism with serious reservations concerning the ability of game theory to 
deal with complex strategic problems and a refusal to stop at economics, narrowly defined. 
The big oligopolists, he noted, ‘have the power to change the market situation by their own 
political action…the gap that divides selling expenditure from political activities is 
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methodologically much smaller than the one that divides the former from production costs 
proper’ (Rothschild 1947, pp. 317-8). Both fascism and imperialism must be regarded as 
consequences of oligopoly, and ‘[t]he inclusion of these “non-economic” elements is essential 
for a full explanation of oligopoly behaviour and price’ (ibid., p. 319; original stress deleted). 
Reading these remarkable passages again, almost two-thirds of a century after they were 
published, I was struck by the thought that here was a book waiting to be written. Then I 
realised that it had been, by Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy (1966). The influence of Kurt’s 
article on their analysis of Monopoly Capital is an intriguing, unsolved (and possibly now 
unsolvable) mystery. Possibly it went via his friend Josef Steindl, whose Maturity and 
Stagnation in American Capitalism (Steindl 1952) was well regarded by Baran and Sweezy; 
Sweezy arranged for it to be reissued by Monthly Review Press, with a substantial new 
introduction by Steindl (Steindl 1976). 
Incidentally, this is not the only instance where Kurt identified a really significant problem 
but failed to follow it up, leaving others to write the influential papers and books that he had 
foreshadowed. Heinz Kurz will talk tomorrow about Kurt’s re-discovery of ‘efficiency wage 
theory’ many years before Joseph Stiglitz took the credit for it. I want to say something 
briefly about another important theoretical issue. In 1945 Kurt published a brief article on 
‘Wages and Risk-Bearing’, questioning the mainstream economists’ assumption that only 
entrepreneurs have to cope with risk and uncertainty, which are (of course) an inescapable 
element of working-class life. It seems to have been almost half a century before he returned 
to this theme, at least in his English-language work, in a short paper written for the newly 
established heterodox journal Review of Political Economy (Rothschild 1945, 1990). As 
Gunther Tichy reminds us, Kurt believed that it was more important to ask important 
questions than to answer unimportant ones (Tichy 2011). As with power and efficiency 
wages, so with risk: Kurt was less successful than one might have hoped in answering them. 
There is a parallel with Baran and Sweezy: the importance of risk in the lives of all classes in 
capitalist society was the central theme of the sociologist Ulrich Beck’s best-selling book, 
Risk Society (Beck 1992), which has given rise to a considerable critical literature.   
Kurt himself did return to the question of power from time to time. I have already mentioned 
the influential 1971 Power in Economics. Thirty years later, he criticised the way in which the 
discussion of power in mainstream economics was  
‘… almost completely restricted to a narrowly defined economically 
hyphenated power, in particular monopoly power and bargaining power in 
goods and labor markets. This means it is restricted to specific and immediately 
market- and price-relevant power phenomena which can be easily endogenized 
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into a theory of competitive markets as deviations from perfect competition. 
But many power phenomena reaching beyond the immediate price formation 
processes are connected with the economic sphere. Power can be and is used 
for fighting for profitable positions in the market and for maintaining them, for 
influencing the framework which determines the working of market 
mechanisms, and power is also important as an aim of economic activity.’ 
(Rothschild 2002, p. 433) 
This narrow focus, he believed, was the result of ‘deliberate strategies to remove power 
questions to a subordinate position for inner-theoretical reasons’ (ibid., p. 437). First, the 
growing mathematisation of economics had proved unsuitable for modelling power. Second, 
this increasing formalism had ‘led to a certain isolation of economics which in turn has 
promoted further mathematical inbreeding’, restricting its ability to deal not only with power 
but also with such other important issues as bounded rationality, fairness and solidarity. ‘Not 
only is there a reluctance to accept important insights from other social sciences, there exists 
also an economic arrogance expressed in “economic imperialism” which urges the other 
social sciences to copy the methods of neoclassical economics because it alone is declared to 
be “scientific”’ (ibid., p. 438).  
There was, he noted, an element of reflexivity here: the ideological preference of powerful 
wealthy interests for a neoclassical theory that did not look too deeply into the sources and 
ramifications of their own power reinforced the neglect of power by mainstream theorists, not 
least by channelling research funds their way. ‘New Political Economists’ who treated 
politicians as self-centred utility maximisers should themselves be regarded as ‘utility-
maximizers looking (exclusively?!) for a maximum of prestige and career 
opportunities…Extremely formulated one could say that societal power promotes the study of 
models of powerless societies’ (ibid., p. 440). Once again, the prescience of these 
observations has been repeatedly demonstrated by the origins, course and aftermath (thus far) 
of the Global Financial Crisis, in which the enormous political power of high finance has been 
obvious to everyone – with the exception of the great majority of mainstream 
macroeconomists (but see Johnson and Kwak 2010). Keynes’s biographer Robert Skidelsky 
recently devoted an entire blog to attacking ‘the cocksure drumbeat of the Money Power’ 
(Skidelsky 2011), a term that he will have encountered in the writings of Major Douglas, of 
Social Credit fame,  and later in the oratory of the English fascist leader, Oswald Mosley. We 
have not heard the last of the Money Power. 
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The Autonomy of Macroeconomics 
Kurt’s insistence on the multidisciplinary nature of economics leads me into my third theme, 
his rejection of the microfoundations dogma in mainstream macroeconomics and his 
insistence on the relative autonomy of macroeconomics (Walther 2011, pp. 35-8). Even if one 
accepted in principle the need for microfoundations – which he did not – there was no sound 
reason for restricting them to models that relied on the assumption of homo economicus. ‘It is 
interesting’, he observed, ‘that normally no demand is made for a further foundation of these 
assumptions by making use of newer results of psychology, sociology, and organization 
theory’, which cast serious doubt on ‘the primitive hypothesis of optimizing behavior’ 
(Rothschild 1988, p. 19).  
But the principle itself was false. Micro- and macro-theories are ‘partial theories with 
restricted and different research programs’. They ‘overlap insofar as both of them deal with 
the global economy, but they are different as regards the problems and perspectives which 
each of them stresses’ (ibid., p. 13). Thus: 
‘One could also try to build bridges between the two approaches or even to 
construct some combinations in more compact super-theories. But there can be 
no justification for a hierarchical stipulation that (Keynesian or other) macro-
theories require a microeconomic foundation to obtain full validity. One could 
just as well demand a macroeconomic foundation for microeconomics, when 
the latter finds it difficult to fit macroeconomic realities into its own 
framework.’ (ibid., p. 14) 
Insistence on the need for microfoundations ignored both the fallacy of composition and ‘the 
dependence of individual actions on the social environment’ (ibid., p. 14). These two 
important principles are at the core of the book-length argument against The 
Microfoundations Delusion that I have been working on this autumn as a guest of Heinz Kurz 
and his colleagues at the University of Graz (King 2012). 
Kurt himself was not convinced by the mainstream complaint that Keynesian 
macroeconomists tended to rely on ad hoc assumptions. In new areas of research, ‘where one 
meets many “white spots” and has to experiment with soft hypotheses’, ad hocery is ‘not a 
theoretical weakness but can be …a necessary element in the difficult stage of developing 
new theories or extending old ones’ (ibid., p. 17). This was true in the natural sciences no less 
than in macroeconomics. Kurt might have noted here that anti-Keynesian macroeconomists 
are themselves quite shameless in their use of ad hoc assumptions when it suits them. 
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Representative agent models, to take an obvious example, make sense only on the assumption 
of ‘Gorman preferences’ (Acemoglu 2009, pp. 149-55), which are needed in order to render 
income effects insignificant. It is hard to imagine anything more ‘ad hoc’ than this, but we 
can try. The Dynamic Stochastic General Equilbrium models favoured by the mainstream 
impose a transversality (or ‘No Ponzi’) condition that eliminates (i) the possibility of default, 
and hence (ii) the fear of default (since these are agents with rational expectations, who know 
the correct model and therefore also know that there is no possibility of default), and hence 
(iii) the need for money, since if your promise to pay is ‘as good as gold’, it would be 
pointless for me to demand gold (or any other form of money) from you. The third ad hoc 
assumption is the unobtrusive postulate of ‘complete financial markets’ that is smuggled into 
Michael Woodford’s magisterial Interest and Prices (Woodford 2003, p. 64), which means 
that all possible future states of the world are known probabilistically and can be insured 
against: this eliminates uncertainty, and hence the need for money and finance. It does, 
however, pose a question that Plato might have recognized: not ‘who will guard the 
guardians?’, but ‘who will insure the insurance companies?’ (The AIG bailout in 2008 
supplied the answer: the state, as insurer of last resort). As Yanis Varoufakis, Joseph Halevi 
and Nicholas Theocarakis (2011) have shown, in economic theory it is a simple matter to 
have either complexity or truth, but it is difficult (if not impossible) to have both. 
Similar objections applied, Kurt maintained, to the mainstream insistence that 
microeconomics and macroeconomics must be theoretically consistent. He insisted that, on 
the contrary, ‘[p]erfect consistency between micro- and macro-theories is at present possibly 
unattainable in view of [our] limited knowledge, different research targets, aggregation 
problems, and the like’. In fact consistency between neoclassical microeconomics and 
Keynesian macroeconomic theory was probably ‘not even desirable’, because the former 
would rule out any serious discussion of the problems posed by uncertainty, time and money 
(ibid., p. 20). Be that as it may, a ‘comprehensive economic theory covering all important 
economic events seems hardly feasible’ (ibid., p. 13). Kurt would have welcomed the 
important new text that I cited above by Varoufakis, Halevi and Theocarakis (2011), which 
has at its core the ‘radical indeterminacy’ of capitalism and the impossibility of a logically 
consistent, mathematical economic theory of capitalist reality. 
The Modest Economist 
This introduces my fourth theme, which is Kurt’s own personal and intellectual modesty. This 
has quite rightly been stressed by Altzinger in his obituary and by Tichy in his discussion of 
Kurt’s seven principles of commonsense economics (Altzinger 2011a; Tichy 2011). Kurt 
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himself always emphasised that our ability to know, and to predict, is limited. Economics, he 
believed, was inevitably a soft science, which  
‘…cannot be a ‘hard’ science comparable to mechanics or other highly 
developed branches of the natural sciences. The extreme complexity of the 
social world as well as its dynamic, the poor quality of empirical data, and the 
difficulties of experimenting make any attempt at reaching high levels of 
exactness futile, if one aims at more than just the construction of ‘logical’ 
models.’ (Rothschild 1991, p. 12, cited by Altzinger 2011a, p. 19) 
This made him keen on analytical compromises, tolerant (as we have seen) of ad hocery, and 
also suspicious of any attempt to provide an over-arching ‘theory of everything’.  
In addition to colouring his attitude towards mainstream economics, it was also reflected in 
his attitude to the Marxian principle of historical materialism (HM). As he said, in an email 
criticising my own work: 
‘…one can get the impression – in spite of your modifying remarks – that HM 
has unique consequences and tends towards the establishment of the ‘best’ 
conditions for the development of the opportunities provided by the productive 
forces. I always regarded HM above all as the decisive antidote to the views 
that the big historical events and changes are due to the influence of eminent 
individuals, of new ideas, of cultural clashes etc. I viewed HM as providing a 
(perhaps small) corridor within which a limited number of viable (but not 
necessarily optimal) economic structures can exist. Within this corridor other 
factors can play a role so that differences can exist and persist. There can be 
several capitalisms and/or different socialisms (or something else). There will 
normally be a tendency towards similarities because science and technology is 
universal and because there is a tendency to copy hegemonic and successful 
cases. But HM cannot explain all the remaining differences, which may also be 
interesting (‘Vive la difference!’). All this is also in your book, but it is 
somehow suppressed in the beginning.’ (Personal communication, 4 September 
2008) 
This, I think, is fair criticism of the book that I wrote with Mike Howard attempting to 
provide a historical materialist explanation of the rise of neoliberalism (Howard and King 
2008). We probably did exaggerate the determining power of the forces of production. On 
reflection, I think that Kurt’s metaphor of the corridor is particularly apt: broad historical 
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tendencies are perhaps predictable in Marxian terms, but particular individual, group and even 
national idiosyncrasies are probably not. 
Politics and Economic Policy 
This leads me to my fifth and final theme in his work, which is politics and economic policy. 
Kurt had a lifelong commitment to social democracy, which led him to ponder the policy 
implications of Keynesian macroeconomic theory and, in the final decades of his life, to 
mount a systematic critique of neoliberalism. He was also deeply interested in the relationship 
between economics and ethics, a vast subject area that I shall be teaching in for the very first 
time in the second half of 2012; I expect to make considerable use of his book (Rothschild 
1993a). On this question, too, he was critical of the mainstream position, as defended by the 
Melbourne economist Yew-Kwang Ng: 
‘The choice of subjective welfarism as a standard has, of course, a long and 
useful tradition in economic theory as a framework and as an axiom for 
decision-making. But there is no reason to regard it as the only possible basis 
for social choice and ethical valuation. Quite apart from social interlinkages via 
external effects, prisoners’ dilemma situations etc, which may necessitate 
collective action there is no reason why ethical considerations should not 
introduce general values, interpersonal comparisons etc. which go beyond 
individual welfarism.’ (Rothschild 1989, p. 258) 
I remember once attending a seminar presentation by Ng and asking him at the end whether 
he felt any sympathy for John Stuart Mill’s distinction between higher and lower pleasures. 
He replied dismissively, in Benthamite vein, that he saw no reason to distinguish between 
poetry and pushpin, but I was not sure that I believed him. Kurt would certainly have 
disagreed, and he was also critical, at an even more fundamental level, of the utilitarian 
emphasis on subjective welfare. ‘While preferences of the individual are given highest 
weight’, he objected, ‘there is one preference which they are not permitted to have: a 
preference for non-market transactions’. Economists could legitimately offer advice on 
‘economic efficiency’, he agreed. ‘But are they supposed to talk people out of other modes of 
decision and action?’ (ibid., p. 259). 
 Kurt’s own approach to these questions was always based on ‘the hope that with a 
better understanding of the economic mechanisms a contribution to a more satisfactory 
economic and social society could be achieved’ (Rothschild 1999, p. 4). Growing up in ‘Red 
Vienna’, he learned early in life that the world was characterised not by harmonious progress 
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but (in words that I have already quoted) by ‘a dynamic process of interacting interests and 
conflicts, of power and exploitation’. At the same time, the achievements of the Austrian 
social democrats in the 1920s  
‘…remained as a permanent reminder that activism and intervention are 
possible and useful when conditions are regarded as unjust or undesirable, 
particularly in regard to basic human needs and extreme inequalities. This was 
a perspective which I could to some extent detect again in the post-war years. It 
inspired the idea of the welfare state, but is being lost in the present neoliberal 
climate.’ (ibid., p. 3) 
In his last English-language article Kurt documented his concerns, using simple descriptive 
statistics on growth rates, inflation and unemployment to demonstrate that the performance of 
the OECD economies had not improved significantly in the era of neoliberalism, as advocates 
of free market capitalism often claimed (Rothschild 2009). This conclusion has, of course, 
again been reinforced by the ‘Great Recession’ that began in 2008. 
 
Bruno-Kreisky-Award for the ‘Political Book’, 2009                             
© Helga Allmer 
Concluding Remarks 
As the photographs confirm, Kurt remained fit and active almost until the end, and he 
continued to write and argue on theoretical and policy issues. His last book, Wie Wirtschaft 
die Welt bewegt: die grossen ökonomischen Modelle auf dem Prüfstand (How Economics 
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Makes the World Go Round: The Great Economic Models Put to the Test), co-authored with 
the journalist Hans Bürger, was published in the year before his death (Bürger and Rothschild 
2009). His final interview in English appeared in Review of Political Economy in January 
2009 (King and Rothschild 2009). In the interview, which took place in November 2007, just 
before the onset of the Global Financial Crisis, Kurt declared himself to be unimpressed by 
the long period of prosperity that the world had enjoyed since 1992: ‘I would say that it’s not 
really a boom, but rather an absence of recessions. Unemployment has been consistently 
higher than it was in the 1960s and 1970s. So it’s wrong to describe the last 15 years as a 
boom’. He was equally unconvinced by talk of a ‘Great Moderation’: ‘The so-called “big 
success” of the European Union consisted in getting rid of inflation. But Thatcher had already 
done that in the United Kingdom. If you only have one target, you can always meet it’ 
(Rothschild and King 2009, p. 145).  
Kurt’s 95th birthday was marked by two events. The first was a symposium arranged by the 
economic policy think tank Arbeitsgemeinschaft für wissenschaftliche Wirtschaftspolitik 
(Foundation for Scientific Economic Policy, WIWIPOL), and the second was an international 
conference on ‘The Aftermath of the Financial Crisis’, hosted jointly by the Austrian National 
Bank and by WIFO (the proceedings of the latter were published in the journal Empirica, as I 
have already  noted); Kurt participated actively in both events. Austrian public radio also 
broadcast an hour-long documentary on his life and work. At the same time the Vienna daily 
newspaper Der Standard published the text of a lengthy conversation that he had with the 
journalist Renate Graber in which he talked about his life and career, and also about the 
Global Financial Crisis and its consequences. While he expressed strong views on the need 
for tighter regulation of financial markets Kurt was, as ever, modest and undogmatic in his 
prognosis.  
‘Are you optimistic or pessimistic for the future?’, Graber asked him. ‘Every scientist’, he 
replied, ‘assuming that economists are scientists, says that you have to be sceptical. Normally 
we construct scenarios that are more or less probable. But right now we are in an entirely new 
situation, for which we have only inadequate economic theories and models’. These doubts 
extended well beyond economics. Kurt concluded the interview by reflecting ruefully on the 
dismal state of political discourse in contemporary Austria: ‘You know, when I was young 
there was an awful reactionary upper class and a working class, part of which wanted a 
different world. Today it’s almost the other way round. We have a very critical intellectual 
upper class, but due to changed economic circumstances there is no broad lower class that 
wants a different, a better world’ (Rothschild and Graber 2009; cf. Rothschild and King 2009, 
pp. 147-8).  
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Ten years earlier he had reflected on the life experience of someone born in pre-1914 
Bratislava, who had been a citizen of Austro-Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Germany, 
Czechoslovakia again, and finally Slovakia, without ever leaving his native city. Much the 
same could be said of his own life, Kurt concluded, and in particular of his relationship with 
Keynesian theory and policy. ‘I could be a conformist with ruling tendencies then and have 
become a dissenter now. But I have never left Bratislava’ (Rothschild 1999, p. 7). 
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I am among a few in this conference who was neither a student nor a colleague of Professor 
Kurt Rothschild; at least not directly. And yet, indirectly I was both! 
My first introduction to Rothschild was as an undergraduate student, when in Calcutta I read 
his well known article, ‘Price theory and oligopoly’ published originally in the Economic 
Journal in 1947. That Journal was not available in our undergraduate college library. I 
happened to read it rather accidentally in a volume of ‘Readings in Price Theory’. That article 
was an exhaustive characterization of various oligopolistic situations without the mathematics 
of game theory and industrial organization, now a fashionable branch of research. It showed 
how price setting under oligopoly could take place in different ways, and there were several 
almost equally plausible models of oligopoly. The open-ended nature of the price setting 
problem under oligopoly made an impression on me as a beginner. Everything we had read so 
far in undergraduate textbooks of microeconomics was logically determinate and predictable. 
From Rothschild I learnt for the first time the important lesson as to how economic problems 
could become indeterminate. I do not know whether it was the intended message of the 
article, but it seemed to me that the core of this problem of indeterminacy was the variety of 
ways in which economic power can manifest itself in different contexts, somewhat like a fluid 
which takes the form of the container.  
Rothschild was fascinated with the problem of economic power throughout his professional 
life as any economist really should be.  (Philosopher Bertrand Russell said somewhere he 
found the study of economics singularly uninteresting because it did not deal with power). 
Rothschild considered from different angles, both through his own writing and that of others, 
various aspects of power, its economic, ethical and policy dimensions (e.g. Rothschild ed, 
1971, 1993).   
In his writings Rothschild emphasized less the other source of indeterminacy or one might use 
better the expression “unknowability” inherent in economics which is radical uncertainty 
about the future. Years later, I began to appreciate its importance in connection with Keynes’ 
monetary theory as a student and researcher in Cambridge, England. It is typical of many 
economists to pretend that neither economic power nor uncertainty is a serious matter; the 
serious matter is only to get along with econometrics and model building! Fortunately Kurt 
Rothschild was not one of them. 
On a generous interpretation, economics like geology or evolutionary biology is a body of 
knowledge which does not predict. We cannot predict exactly when a volcano would erupt, an 
earthquake would occur or the extinction of a species would happen (Although Darwin made 
some startlingly accurate predictions about the characteristics of species in Madagascar island 
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without ever having visited it). However, somewhat like these subjects, economics can 
explain many of the necessary conditions needed for an event to occur. Nevertheless, this is 
far from prediction, because the conditions must be sufficient in history or in nature for an 
event actually to occur. For example, it was not difficult for many particularly in the 
Keynesian tradition to see that the U.S was heading for a crisis driven by asset price bubble 
and rising debt. However, it was not possible to predict when it would occur. Indeed, the quip 
that military generals are better at analyzing the past battle than in fighting the present one, 
fits economists even better.  
If Rothschild was my early teacher about the role of economic power, he also became in a 
sense my colleague. I joined the Economics Faculty in Linz for a brief period in 1986 at the 
invitation of Professor Laski, and learnt that I had the job that had fallen vacant due to the 
retirement of Professor Rothschild. We met professionally for the first time in 1986 and our 
professional contacts matured gradually into friendship over the years when I visited Vienna. 
Interestingly, we discussed politics frequently, the influence of political power and ideology 
on economic policies at times and rather rarely economic theory. Some typical topics of 
conversation as I recall now were, the rise of the Right in Austrian politics, social democratic 
ideology and European Union, and why the majority in India remain so desperately poor after 
so many years of political independence despite a democratic form of government. 
Our interests in economic theory overlapped to a considerable extent due to the similarity in 
our political outlook. And yet, although we were often interested in a similar range of issues, 
our analytical approach often differed. Rothschild believed in being comprehensive. He was 
intellectually generous to different points of view in his erudite and many sided explanations 
of problems like unemployment and distribution of income. I am afraid I was intellectually 
less tolerant, and believed that understanding such problems mean a few core propositions 
and without them no meaningful understanding is possible. At times we argued about whether 
one should teach various approaches or discriminate and present in greater detail what one 
considers the more valid approach. I recall Rothschild telling me that it might be better to 
leave the task of discriminating to the students after they understand different approaches. It 
seems to me it made his teaching academically rich but at times less convincing because it 
was more of an academic exercise, less connected with his personal political views.   
In his theoretical framework Rothschild remained closest to a left wing Keynesian, who 
liberally used concepts especially from Marx, Weber and Marshal to enrich his own analysis.  
His abiding interest in the role of economic power inclined him to examine class and personal 
distribution of income from various micro and macro economic (and ethical) angles. He 
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considered the problem of wage determination along with income and employment 
determination (Rothschild, 1965). 
One of the novel aspects of Keynesianism was to claim that, the demand for labour and 
employment are determined by aggregate demand in the commodity market, and the state of 
the labour market and the wage rate have a relatively less important role to play. Contrary to 
conventional neo-classical teaching (Professor Pigou as Keynes’ special target), high or low 
wage are the outcomes, not the causes of unemployment. It reminds me of a saying of the 
1960s among the poor Afro American families in the Deep South of the United States: 
“Whether a big steak (high wage) will be cooked for dinner (available) in the kitchen (labour 
market) is not decided in the kitchen”.  
As is well known, Keynes himself tried to reconcile the role of the labour market and profit 
maximization with his theory of employment determination in the product market by bringing 
in money illusion on the part of the workers. This made real wage rate an endogenously 
determined variable. The first round of Monetarist attack on Keynes was led by Friedman 
(1968) precisely on this point. He claimed that persistent money illusion on the part of the 
workers is an untenable assumption so that the Phillips curve becomes vertical in the long run.  
Rothschild had little sympathy for this line of reasoning and, had considered money illusion in 
influencing the level of aggregate demand along the line the real balance or wealth effect of 
Pigou and Patinkin (Rothschild 1957; 1965). 
The debate on the role of the labour market in employment determination has returned in a 
different way through some recent textbook versions as the aggregate AD-AS (aggregate 
demand and supply) analysis. The idea is to represent like in any other market, the problem of 
wage and income determination simultaneously through the intersection of demand and 
supply curves. In a collaborative work with Professors Laski and Riese (1999a, 1999b) we 
showed (among other authors) why this construction used in many textbooks is analytically 
flawed. It cannot define any adjustment process out of equilibrium to carry the main message 
of the market place as an equilibrating mechanism. The comforting thought that the market 
mechanism operates in the aggregate to clear the labour market and determine income and 
wage simultaneously is unacceptable economic reasoning (unless like some extremists in 
rational expectation theory one believes that markets are never out of equilibrium). The basic 
reason is simple. The firms as agents of production can follow either the rule of maximizing 
profit and determine employment with real wage rate given as a parameter (the typical neo-
classical version) or produce a level of output to meet market demand at given prices and 
money wages (the Keynesian version). However, as agents of production they cannot follow 
both the rules simultaneously once out of the equilibrium state (i.e. where AD-AS intersect). 
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Because only at that point by assumption both profit maximization and commodity market 
clearing are satisfied. The aggregate AD-AS analysis was confused with the microeconomic 
demand supply analysis because, in the latter analysis demanders as buyers are postulated to 
be different from suppliers as sellers. However in aggregate AD-AS analysis they are the 
same agent, namely the firm, and the micro framework that the two agents react differently to 
the price signal is no longer applicable, nor is the condition of separation of income of buyers 
and of sellers satisfied. Variations in the wage rate received by households as sellers of labour 
service affect aggregate demand of consumers through purchasing power and investment 
demand of firms (through capacity utilization and profitability). By linking price variation 
with income variation this creates a powerful income effect to vitiate the stability property of 
the price mechanism, as has long been recognized in multi-market General Equilibrium 
Theory.  
Malinvaud tried to rescue this type of analysis in the multi-market context by separating 
Classical from Keynesian unemployment (Malinvaud 1977). He tried to establish that 
Classical unemployment is caused by too high a real wage rate which restricts employment 
and production below the level of aggregate demand. Thus excess demand in the commodity 
market coexists with unemployment. On the other hand, at low real wage rate, aggregate 
demand is too low in relation to the profit maximizing level of output and employment, 
aggregate demand becomes the binding constraint resulting in excess supply in the 
commodity but excess demand in the labour market to attribute unemployment a Keynesian 
character. The separation between Classical and Keynesian unemployment raises several 
problems pointed out almost immediately by Kahn (1978) and Rothschild (1978). A gross 
logical flaw, as I argued (Bhaduri, 1983) arises from not taking into account fully the same 
income effect. Profit maximization as the neo-classical principle guiding firms would affect 
investment due to variations in the level of real wage, not merely by consumption of 
households. Consequently effective demand might vary in such a way as to result in multiple 
equilibria. It would no longer be possible to link unambiguously Classical employment with 
high and Keynesian unemployment with low wage. Indeed, Classical unemployment may 
occur both at relatively high and at low wage, with Keynesian unemployment ruling in the 
intermediate range. As a result the classification becomes useless. 
In the Keynesian scheme the class distribution of income impacts on aggregate demand and 
generate an income effect with different implication. Variation in redistribution of income in 
favour of profit would reduce aggregate consumption expenditure and raise saving because 
less is consumed out of profit than out of wage income. It would also impact simultaneously 
on investment through the accelerator like effect of capacity utilization as well, while higher 
profitability (profit margin) would stimulate investment. In real life they would operate with 
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different time lags, consumption is likely to react faster than investment. This allows for a 
different type of generalization of the Keynesian theory. In a closed economy redistribution of 
income between profits and wages affects aggregate demand through two different channels. 
Depending on the relative magnitudes of the stimulating effect of a higher profit share on 
investment and its depressing effect on lower consumption expenditure due to redistribution 
in favour of profit income two alternative possibilities emerge for demand-led expansion. The 
case dominated by greater consumption expenditure due to higher real wages and lower profit 
share is called consumption or wage-led, whereas the case dominated by higher investment 
expenditure due to higher profit share and lower real wages is termed as profit-led. In a profit-
led regime, the stimulating effect of profit share on investment dominates, but in a wage led 
regime the opposite holds. However the emergence of these two regimes requires the 
convergence of the one-variable income adjustment through the multiplier process to be stable 
which in turn requires saving to be more responsive than investment to changes in income 
provided we treat income distribution or real wage  as an exogenous variable (Bhaduri and 
Marglin, 1990).  
This raises problems.  In contrast to neo-classical theory, the real wage rate is not an 
exogenous but an endogenous variable which is the outcome of employment and income 
determination. It is influenced by money wage price level interdependence, money illusion as 
well as money wage relativities of different industries. Keynes denied the real wage rate a 
causal role in determining income.  Hence it seems problematic to treat the real wage rate or 
the distribution of income as an exogenous variable to which both consumption and 
investment respond in the Keynesian scheme to distinguish between profit and wage led 
regimes. On the other hand, if the real wage rate is treated as endogenous variable governed 
by the interdependence between the price level and the money wage rate, the profit share 
should be treated as an endogenous variable. 
A solution lies in Kalecki’s formulation.  As an independent discoverer of the principle of 
effective demand (1933/1971) he had postulated cost-determined mark-up pricing that 
resolves the issue. In the simplest case of a closed economy without imported raw materials 
and complications of natural resource pricing, the general price level of manufactured goods 
is postulated as determined by a constant percentage mark up on unit wage cost. So long as 
the proportional mark up is constant price and money wage move proportionately. With unit 
cost nearly insensitive to the level of production due to presence of excess capacity within the 
relevant range, it conforms to approximate profit maximization (Bhaduri and Falkinger, 1990) 
and ‘satisfying behaviour’ under incomplete information (Simon, 1979). This view of price 
setting has also found considerable empirical support.  
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Under mark up pricing a simple positive relation holds between mark up and aggregate profit 
share. And, by linking profit share to the degree of monopoly one could bring in market 
power to explain profit share. However it does not take our analysis much farther, because 
one needs to explain the determinants of market power or the degree of monopoly through 
various factors like elasticity of demand, market concentration, asymmetry in information, 
entry and exit from market under imperfect capital market etc. Some of these issues were 
explored while examining economic power by Rothschild both in the context of wage 
determination in the labour market and price determination in the product market. 
An alternative explanation was provided by Keynes (1930) and reformulated by Kaldor 
(1956) to combine the multiplier analysis with money illusion on the part of the workers to 
suggest that for a given level of output (full employment) an excess of investment over saving 
would be met by savings generated by redistribution of income in favour of profits due to the 
price level increasing more than the money wage rate. We therefore have the multiplier 
mechanism put to work in two ways to equate investment with saving. Below full 
employment, higher investment results in a higher level of income which raises saving as a 
proportion of income in the Kahn-Keynes multiplier. At full employment with given real 
income, it raises the level of saving from higher profit share through redistribution of income.  
Separating the working of the multiplier below and above full employment in this way has 
several problematic aspects. First, when full employment is introduced as a postulate, it leaves 
open the question of what maintains full employment. Second, the assumption of money 
illusion on the part of the workers implies lower real wage despite full employment. Finally, 
there is at best an ill defined full employment zone. The tight separation between an 
adjustment process working exclusively through capacity utilization below full employment 
level and, only through price- money wage interaction at full employment is overdrawn. 
However, it is possible to rescue the argument about the dual role of the multiplier in 
determining output on the one hand and class distribution of income on the other in its proper 
dynamic context without either the postulate of full employment or money illusion (Bhaduri, 
2007). A higher level of demand raises capacity utilization and saving. Through disparate 
movement of price and money wage, it may either increase (forced saving by workers) or 
decrease (profit squeeze on capitalists) the level of saving. Both these processes distributional 
change and income level adjustment operate simultaneously through the same imbalance 
between investment and saving, but they operate at different speeds. So long as the speed with 
which saving rising in the process exceeds the speed at which saving falls due to say profit 
squeeze, the income generation process set in motion by the multiplier process would 
converge. Thus neither the assumption of forced saving by workers nor that of full 
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employment is necessary. It is even possible to consider more complex (non-linear) dynamics 
due to varying speeds of adjustment.  It is plausible to argue that adjustment of capacity 
utilization slows down but price and wage movement respond faster as full employment is 
approached. However, formal analysis would require greater specification about the precise 
nature of the non-linearities involved. 
Keynes’ theory was set in the context of his time. The economy was assumed to be closed like 
in our discussion so far, and he assumed considerable control by the central bank over 
national money supply. Some of these assumptions were deliberate to emphasize the 
importance of national economic policy. With globalization and financialization, the context 
has undoubtedly changed. And yet, like other powerful theories, its basic message laid out in 
the principle of effective demand remains valid. That basic message that exogenous increase 
in expenditure, sets up positive adjustments in income has been given a conservative twist in 
recent decades. Income inequality has been allowed to increase in almost all OECD countries, 
most spectacularly in the United States. Starting with tax cut mostly for top income brackets 
which was justified as a stimulant to the incentive to invest, the rising income of the very rich 
contributed not so much to real investment but to demand for esoteric financial assets with 
high returns from capital gains. It was met through securitization and reassembling 
collateralized debt obligations (CDO) of loans and housing mortgages. Liberalized markets 
imposed little supervision and, the credit rating agencies went along, but the vast system of 
shadow banking that developed along with it had no lender of last resorts, only mutual private 
insurance arrangements (derivates and swaps).     
Rising capital gains drove a bubble economy which can be characterized briefly from a 
Keynesian angle.  It takes two to tango. Increasing the value of assets and capital gains (G) 
create a positive wealth effect for borrowers who borrow against the rising value of their 
wealth to increase their consumption (C) and purchase of financial assets. Banks and other 
financial firms as lenders experience improved balance sheets and, become more eager to 
lend. As a result capital gains stimulate consumption expenditure through borrowing while 
rising repayment obligations on the accumulating debt might counter this slowly over time 
(Bhaduri, Laski, and Riese, 2006). A simple consumption function captures it in the form: 
(1)         C = C(Y, G, D), CY > 0, CG > 0, and CD < 0. 
The signs of the relevant partial derivatives show consumption C depend positively on income 
Y and capital gains G, but negatively on the inherited stock of debt D.  
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The effect of an asset market boom on real investment is more complex. In so far as expected 
capital gains lure investment away from the real to the financial sector, it can be captured by 
Keynes’ ‘two price theory’ comparing acquisition price (P) of an asset in the stock market 
with its replacement price (R). For our present purpose, we may define acquisition as 
purchase of existing assets in the secondary market which merely transfers ownership without 
creating new assets. In this sense all second hand transactions are not real investment 
(Scitovsky, 1994). This idea of comparing acquisition with the “construction cost” of real 
investment was reformulated in Tobin’s (1969) q-theory in a competitive market while 
Minsky (1975) treated it more realistically by incorporating expectations about capital gains. 
Under highly simplified static expectation postulating actual capital gains (G) is extrapolated 
as expected capital gains (G
+
), we restate a revised q-theory as, 
(2)       q = [(P-G
+
)/R] = [(P-G)/R], assuming G
+
 = G 
In equation (2), the acquired asset is assumed to be readily resalable in the stock market with 
the expected level of capital gain reducing the acquisition price P for the investor. As a result 
capital gains increase the attractiveness of acquisition in relation to real investment, and tend 
to divert funds from real to acquisition investment. Lending institutions with their improved 
balance sheets under capital gains are also more willing to lend. Consequently, financial 
conditions are more favourable for all types of investment and the total volume of investment 
is higher, but its composition moves against real investment under capital gains. To keep this 
exposition simple we assume given interest rate and postulate a demand function for real 
investment (I) as, 
(3)    I = I(Y, G, D), IY > 0, IG < 0, ID < 0 
In equation (3) real investment is influenced positively by income (or capacity utilization) 
through the acceleration like effect, negatively by capital gains in line with the ‘two price 
theory of investment’ postulated in (2), while the repayment obligations on the stock of debt 
depress both consumption and investment. Undoubtedly this investment demand equation is 
oversimplified. It leaves out in particular the fact that both real and financial investments are 
encouraged by easier availability of credit which in turn is stimulated by capital gains. 
Therefore equation (3) captures the composition effect on total investment, and assumes for 
simplicity it is sufficiently strong to make real investment respond negatively to capital gains.  
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In general expected capital gains attract capital inflow from abroad in various domestic assets 
and create a capital account surplus in the balance of payments. If the overall balance of 
payments is kept constantly balanced, this would have its counterpart in current account 
deficit. While this is merely an accounting convention, the economic mechanism through 
which capital gains (G) lead to this compensating current account deficit can take several 
routes classified broadly as price and income effect. Thus the inflow on the capital account 
might create a ‘price effect’ through appreciation of the exchange rate which in turn 
stimulates imports and depresses exports to affect adversely current account balance. The 
expansion of income (Y) usually raises demand for imports, and this income effect reduces 
current account balance, whereas a higher level of accumulated debt (D) depresses directly 
the current account balance through negative factor income flows. These effects on the 
current account (B) are summarized as,  
(4)            B = B (G, Y, D), BG 
< 0, BY < 0, BD < 0. 
In a typical Keynesian short period we consider first the equilibrium of only the flow 
variables, taking the stock of debt (D) as given. Saving (S) investment equality determines 
income (Y) in a laissez faire open economy in this short period. From (2), (3) and (4), 
(5)           [Y - C(Y, G, D)] = S(Y, G, D) = I(Y, G, D) + B(Y, G, D).  
With the inherited stock of debt D treated as a given parameter, total differentiation and 
rearrangement of terms in (5) yields. 
(6)  (dY/dG) = [IG+BG-SG]/[SY-IY-BY]              [(-) + (-) - (-)] / [(+) - (+) - (-)] 
The usual condition for the convergence of the Keynesian income adjustment process in the 
single variable closed economy namely, SY > IY is sufficient for rendering the denominator of 
(6) positive (since BY < 0). Therefore the sign of the numerator determines the sign of the 
slope of Y with respect to G. From (6), higher capital gains have the effect of expanding 
aggregate demand through depressing savings and stimulating consumption, i.e. SG < 0. Since 
a higher level of higher capital gains reduces the relative attractiveness of real compared to 
financial investment (IG < 0) while increasing deficit on current account by attracting funds on 
capital account (BG < 0), the numerator in (6) will be positive if the depressive effects of real 
investment and current account balance outweigh the stimulating effect of capital gains 
through lower saving on aggregate demand. In that case aggregate demand and income 
expand with higher capital gains yielding, (dY/dG > 0). In the opposite case, the numerator in 
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(6) is negative and (dY/dG) < 0. Diagram 1 explains the emergence of two regimes through 
the locus of investment saving equality or the IS curve determining income, at different levels 
of capital gains.  
 
Figure 1: Emergence of Two Regimes through Saving Investment Interaction 
The saving curve shifts downwards, say from S0 to S1 (or S2) as higher capital gains 
stimulates consumption to depress saving. The real investment plus current account curve (I0 
+ B0) also shifts downwards to (I1 + B1) as a result of the negative impact of higher capital 
gains. The intersection point between the two shifting curves trace out a saving investment 
equilibrium or IS locus in an open economy with the level of capital gains operating as a shift 
parameter. Depending on the extent of shifts in the two curves, the new equilibrium can lie 
ether to the right (expansion) or left (contraction) of income at higher capital gains. As shown 
by the numerator of equation (6), the sign of slope of the IS curve is determined by the 
relative strength of the shift in the investment and saving curve caused by variations in the 
level of capital gains.  
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It is natural to characterize the positive relation between income and capital gains, (dY/dG) > 
0 as a consumption-led regime where the stimulating effect of capital gains on consumption 
outweighs its depressing effect on real investment and current account. However, in the 
opposite case the depressive effect of capital gains on real investment and current account 
dominates making the economy investment led with (dY/dG) < 0.  
An interesting implication of this analysis follows immediately. The relation between the 
health of the real economy and that of the stock market is generally ambiguous until the 
nature of the regime is identified. In the consumption led regime, asset price rises (falls) with 
rising (failing) income and economic activity. However, the situation is reversed in the 
investment led regime. Asset price rises (falls) while income falls (rises) in the investment led 
regime. In a more comprehensive analysis it should be possible to include dynamic feedbacks 
like rising asset prices diverting further investment away from the real to the financial sector. 
It is also possible to show in this model how the resulting weakening of credit standards (e.g. 
sub-prime lending) by raising the default on loans creates pressure for ‘funding’ as the margin 
contracts in the financial markets to create a dramatic financial collapse leading to deep and 
lasting recession in the real economy. However, such extensions of the Keynesian analysis 
require introducing endogenous money and the internal liquidity requirement of the financial 
sector to meet default (Bhaduri 2011). These extensions lie beyond the scope of the present 
paper.    
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The influential paper by Bhaduri and Marglin from 1990 discussed the relation between class 
distribution of income and economic growth in a neo kaleckian way. It showed that there are 
two possible growth regimes: a profit led regime in which higher profits lead to stronger 
investment and GDP, and a wage-led regime in which higher wages increase consumption 
and output. 
The Bhaduri-Marglin model has been the starting point of a series of papers in Austria. Kurt 
Rothschild, interestingly,  discussed aspects of this model as far back as 1985 in a paper 
published in Wirtschaftspolitische Blätter, titled „Lohnpolitik und Beschäftigung. Einige 
theoretische Bemerkungen.“ 
In recent years Engelbert Stockhammer, Özlem Onaran, Stefan Ederer and others discussed 
the relationship between the functional distribution of income and economic development for 
European economies. The most important outcome of these papers was the following 
conclusion: high openess of an economy, as for instance typical for Austria, increases the 
tendencies for a profit-led regime. 
In the Euro area in the last decades two models of economic developement have been 
emerging: 
1. A first group of countries has been characterised by the emergence of speculative 
bubbles in liberalized financial and real estate markets: This has been the case in Spain 
or Ireland, but also in the UK. The bubbles have been accompanied by an enormous 
increase in private debt levels. This pushed internal demand, increased nominal unit 
labour costs as well as unit profit costs. And it has been leading to rising deficits in the 
current account balance. 
2. In a second group of countries unit labour costs have been declining in real terms. 
Internal demand has been exceptionally weak. Exports on the other hand have been 
rising and the surplus in the current account increased; this has been typical for 
Germany, the Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries and Austria. In Germany 
exports in real terms have nearly doubled in the last decade, while private 
consumption has been stagnant. 
Both models turned out to be not sustainable: 
- In the group of deficit countries, after the burst of the bubble a deep recession 
followed. This was accompanied by a tremendous increase in budget deficits and 
unemployment rates.  
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- The countries with current account surpluses contributed considerably to the 
imbalances within the Euro area. The rising export surplus has been invested in 
foreign financial markets. This strategy therefore played a major part in the emergence 
of the financial crisis. 
Interestingly in both groups of economies wage shares have been falling considerably. This 
points towards a prisoner´s dilemma situation within the internal market of the EU. The 
European economy is more or less closed. Exports of goods and services account for less than 
20 percent of GDP. 80 percent of goods and services produced within the European Union are 
also consumed within the internal market. The member countries, however, are exposed to a 
high and increasing openeness of their economies within the internal market. Even Germany, 
the largest economy, exports nearly half of the goods and services it produces. The individual 
countries therefore rely on wage restraint, hoping for a profit-led regime of growth. However, 
the EU as a whole is characterised by a wage-led regime due to its closed character. For the 
Union as a whole, the profit-led strategy of the individual member countries therefore leads to 
a decline in welfare and employment. 
In recent papers, Prof. Bhaduri has been adapting the Bhaduri/Marglin model to the context of 
globalization and finanzialisation, the world of volatile asset prices and financial bubbles. In 
this world the increase in profit income and capital gains does increase investment as well. 
But here higher profits lead only temporarily to higher investment in real assets, but primarily 
to investment in financial assets. So the bubble is fueled even further. The profit-led type of 
economic development on which most of the European economies rely is part of the bubble 
economy. 
We are now in a situation were the bubble has burst, with tremendously rising unemployment 
and a long lasting recession. The number of unemployed has been increasing by 9 million 
since early 2008. In 19 out of 28 member countries of the European Union the youth 
unemployment rate is higher than 20 percent. In Greece and Spain it is even exceeding the 
level of 50 percent. And the trend of unemployment is still not pointing downwards.  
It is striking that the problem of unemployment is not even on the agenda of european 
economic politics. EU economic policy is focusing exclusively on the reduction of budget 
deficits. Due to this one-sided policy orientation, GDP is declining, unemployment is rising 
and therefore budgetary goals cannot be reached either. 
During the bubble and its burst neoclassical economics was not able to contribute 
appropriately to economic analysis. Policy recommendations on the EU as well as on the 
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national level, however, are still given in a neoclassical way. This comes up, for example, in 
the EU´s „six pack“ and „fiscal pact“ where restrictive fiscal policy is recommended as an 
answer to cyclically determined budget deficits. 
What to do? How to stabilize an unstable, financialised economy? 
Many economists have been pointing to the fact that the redistribution of income and 
especially of wealth has to be part of the way out of this crisis. Redistribution leads to an 
increase of disposable income for social groups with high marginal rates of consumption. It 
therefore lowers saving rates in a sustainable way and leads towards a consumption and 
demand-led growth regime. So we are back at the issues Michal Kalecki, John Maynard 
Keynes and also Kurt Rothschild were interested in. 
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1. Introduction 
Is economics a powerful discipline because it provides clever instruments to make money? 
Sometimes it looks so and some people think so. I do not. The historical rise of economics to 
a leading academic field, that over the last centuries has attracted many of the most talented 
and motivated people, is based on its nature as a science of men. Political Economy or 
Economics "is on the one side a study of wealth; and on the other, and more important side, a 
part of the study of man", as Alfred Marshall says us in the first paragraph of the Principles of 
Economics. Its power stems from the involvement in the analysis of the desires of people and 
how the means to satisfy them can be improved. "Bettering our condition" is the main goal, 
Adam Smith tells us in the Theory of Moral Sentiments. And he makes clear in the Wealth of 
Nations that this is no ego trip. "No society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the 
far greater part of the members are poor and miserable." (Smith, 1776, Vol. 1, p. 88).   
Many others - often with quite different political values like Karl Marx, John Maynard 
Keynes or Michal Kalecki - shared the view that economics has a mission in contributing to 
the bettering of life of the broad mass of people. To free workers from exploitation, to spare 
people from macroeconomic crises and guarantee full employment to them, to establish a fair 
distribution of income. A most important figure among them is of course Kurt W. Rothschild. 
I could almost summarize my claim by saying: The power of economics as a discipline lies 
for me in dealing with the "Rothschild-questions" about how to contribute to a "better" world. 
It is based on "the hope that with a better understanding of the economic mechanisms a 
contribution to a more satisfactory economic and social society could be achieved" 
(Rothschild, 1999, p.4).   
There is another set of "Rothschild-questions" which is crucial for making economics a 
powerful scientific discipline. As emphasized by Rothschild from his article on "Price Theory 
and Oligopoly" (Rothschild, 1947) onward, we must bring market imperfections and 
economic power - "the rare birds of economic theory" (Rothschild, 2002, p. 433) - back into 
core economics. They must be acknowledged as basic features of reality and accounted for in 
economic analysis to make economics a relevant force in society. Finally, there is the 
"Rothschild conviction" that policy can make a difference, "that activism and interventionism 
are possible and useful when conditions are regarded as unjust or undesirable, particularly in 
regard to basic human needs and extreme inequalities" (Rothschild, 1999, p. 3).   
With this paper I wish to contribute to the em-powering of economics by addressing some 
fundamental problems of economic power, political power and the financial system which 
many people are worried about today. In my view, they are related to new forms of power-
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play and imperfections which require some daring changes in political and economic thinking 
and action.  
2. Power 
"Macht bedeutet die Chance, innerhalb einer sozialen Beziehung den eigenen Willen auch 
gegen Widerstreben durchzusetzen gleichviel woraus diese Chance beruht." (Weber, 2002, 
p. 711)  
As an economist one might say, power is the possibility to influence the outcome of a system 
of interactions. What is the basis of such possibilities?  
2.1 The basis of power 
Under an economic perspective, the outcomes of interactions in the economic and political 
system are determined by desires and opportunities.   
The opportunities are given by resource endowments, technology and organization, but also 
by the rules of the game (the order). In an uncertain world the determinants of opportunities 
may change. They depend on which state of the world is realized. In the jargon of modern 
economics the set of all possible states of the world,  , and the probability    with which a 
specific state     is realized, are often called "nature" to express that ( ,  ) are given 
exogenously and beyond the control of economic agents. However, for understanding what 
happens in modern financial markets we must not refuse to see that   and   can be 
influenced. I therefore prefer to address (   ) by the more neutral word uncertainty structure.   
Realistically, all determinants of interactions described above are potential sources of power. 
Thus we have the following forms:   ) Controlling allocation of substantial amounts of 
resources. This gives to an agent market power to influence the equilibrium allocation of 
goods   ) and prices   ) and thereby also the distribution of income, among other things.    ) 
Shaping technology and the organization of work. While traditionally technology was 
considered as given, the new growth theory has emphasized endogenous technological change 
including its implication for the distribution of income and wealth (see, for instance, the 
ample literature on skill-biased technical change). In a similar way the organization of work 
can impact on people in a powerful way. For instance, it can affect their employability as I 
tried to show some times ago (Falkinger, 2002).     ) Setting the rules of the game. In 
Rothschild’s (2002) words: "influencing the framework which determines the working of 
market mechanisms" (p. 433). The division of power between policy, which defines and 
enforces the rules, and economic agents, who are playing according to the rules, may be 
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formally true but substantial power arises from the fact that rules are manipulated, influenced 
by lobbying activities, ignored or circumvented, in particular in irregular times.    ) 
Influencing desires and mind-setting. For instance, "by ’immunising’ consumers more and 
more against rival invasion through massive advertising" (Rothschild 1947, p. 315). 
Persuasive advertising is one source of power. In view of the flood of information, including 
informative advertising, a new form of power becomes crucial: Focusing the perception set of 
people for instance by prominent positioning in the media. Moreover, in particular in times of 
uncertainties, there is room for what is called expectation or belief management.   ) Finally, 
as already mentioned, there is the possibility to affect the uncertainty structure.   
Traditionally, the economic debate about economic power, for instance in competition policy 
or the theory of regulation, focuses on market power in the allocation of resources (type (i)), 
taking everything else - technology, economic and political order, preferences and uncertainty 
structure - as exogenously given. Partly this is a technical assumption, motivated by modesty 
or specialization in the division of labour between disciplines. However, as stressed by 
Rothschild many times, it often goes beyond that and turns into an ideological position. An 
example to which Rothschild (2002, p. 437) refers is the view prominently expressed by 
Böhm-Bawerk (1914), that in the long-run the will of economic agents or states to exert 
power or to influence economic outcomes are irrelevant, and only the power of economic 
laws prevail.
2
 Or, take in particular the so-called neoclassical production and distribution 
theory, according to which factor shares are determined by the factors’ elasticities of 
production.
3
 My own view is that technology plays indeed an important role in determining 
the distribution of market income which cannot be easily overcome by policy intervention. 
However, technology is not given by nature but rather results from investment decisions. 
Thus, though it is technology that determines the distribution, it is not nature but investment. 
While the awareness about the endogeneity of the technology and thereby the distribution of 
income has been substantially increased, at least in the growth and development literature, the 
                                            
2 In the words of Böhm-Bawerk, "daß ebenso wie die Gesetze des rein natürlichen Geschehens sich 
unabhängig von Menschenwillen und Menschensatzung in unabänderlicher Folge vollziehen, es auch 
im ökonomischen Leben Gesetze gebe, gegen die der Menschenwille, und sei es auch der mächtige 
Staatswille, ohnmächtig bleibt; daß auch durch künstliche Eingriffe gesellschaftlicher Gewalten der 
Strom des wirtschaftlichen Geschehens sich nicht aus gewissen Bahnen herausdrängen lasse, in die ihn 
die Macht ökonomischer Gesetze gebieterisch zwinge" (p. 205). In particular: "auch in den Preis- und 
Verteilungsfragen wirkt die ’Macht’ offenbar nicht außerhalb oder gegen, sondern innerhalb und 
durch Erfüllung der ökonomischen Preisgesetze" (Böhm-Bawerk, 1914, p. 215). 
3 See Guger (2011) for a discussion of Rothschild’s contribution to the theory of wages. 
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possibility that rules of the game, desires or uncertainty structure are products of economic 
actions is no familiar item on the agenda of economic research.   
I think the main problems of current crises have ultimately to do with power of the form 
described in     ) to   ). I will focus in the rest of this section on the "power-play" about the 
economic and political order (in section 2.2) and then turn to a more formal analysis of some 
basic aspects of man-made uncertainty structures (section 3) and to the power-play between 
citizens and financial gamblers (section 4).
4
 As outlined, the uncertainty structure has two 
components: the set   of states of the world", and the probabilities,  , of these states. That   
can be influenced and powerfully exploited has recently pointed out by Magill, Quinzii and 
Rochet (2011). They show that, under complete financial markets, investment decisions 
which maximize the shareholder value lead to a distortion of   and thus to an inefficient 
equilibrium outcome. My attempt in section 3 leaves   untouched and focuses on variations 
of   (by purposeful creation of states of the world).   
One general remark on economic power is in order before turning to its interaction with 
political power. Rules of the game and uncertainty structure belong to the framework of the 
economic system, and are not factors within the system. This has two implications: First, they 
may be less vulnerable to influences from powerful economic agents in regular times, but 
they certainly are in fundamental crises. Secondly, agents need "systemic position" to exert 
pressure on the system. The economic basis of a systemic role is to be a provider of key 
factors of production to all industries. Basic industries, energy or the transport sector are 
relevant examples in history. But in present days, the financial sector is clearly the most 
salient one.  
  
                                            
4 Control of perception and expectation management are closely related to the uncertainty structure, 
since they determine which states of the world people have in mind and what are their beliefs about 
the realization of states. But it clearly goes beyond that and would require a systematic integration of 
media and mass communication in economic equilibrium analysis. See Falkinger (2007, 2008) for an 
attempt to go into this direction. 
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2.2 Political power and the power of policy 
To assess the power of policy, in particular in comparison with the power of economic agents, 
we must evaluate the economic basis of this power along the determinants of power outlined 
in section 2.1.   
Many discussions about the primacy of policy or the loss of this primacy seem to have the 
following framework in mind. In a kind of natural division of power, "nature" determines 
resources, technology and uncertainty structure; policy decides about the economic order; and 
economic subjects play within the possibilities given by nature and the rules set by policy. 
Such views are clearly naive. And any attempts to contain the current crisis by appealing to 
the primacy of policy along these lines are doomed to fail. As discussed previously, "nature" 
as well as the "economic order" are substantially influenced by economic forces.
5
 This does 
not mean, however, that compared to powerful economic agents policy is powerless in 
principle. Not at all. Before explaining this in more detail I have to define the words "policy" 
and "political power" more clearly. Since any power has an economic basis it doesn’t make 
sense to speak of political power as opposed to economic power. What does make sense, 
however, is to speak of political agents in contrast to economic agents. Both types of agents 
can have control over economic resources and thus can exert economic power in a 
conventional sense. Moreover, political as well as economic agents can influence policy and 
have thus political power. I therefore restrict in the further discussion the word "political 
power" to the capacity to define the rules of the game, the economic and political order. In 
contrast, I use "policy" to refer to a "business" or a "sector" - the public or political sector, run 
by political agents like "governments". Thus, the "power of policy" is the power of states, 
governments, the public sector, which has to be clearly distinguished from "political power" 
in the sense of effective rule and order setting. How powerful is "policy"?   
(i) A first fact to notice is that policy has big economic power. It controls a large share of 
economic resources. The public sector share in industrialized market economies is between 
roughly 30 percent and 60 percent. Thus, no private sector has comparable economic power in 
influencing the allocation of economic resources and thus the distribution of market income.
6
 
                                            
5 In Rothschild’s (1947) words "firms become active agents which have the power to change those 
very market factors" on which conventional notions of price formation in markets rely (p. 304). 
Therefore, "the separation of the economic from the political must necessarily result in a very 
incomplete picture" (p. 317). 
6 I am not talking about redistribution by taxes and transfers here, but about the fact that the demand 
for resources by the public sector affects equilibrium prices, in particular the factor prices. 
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Thus even without redistributive taxes and transfer, policy is the most powerful economic 
agent in a conventional sense.   
(ii) Clearly, policy has also political power. In a formal sense, this is trivial because policy has 
monopoly rights in establishing legal rules and enforcing them. While it is naive to believe 
that this de jure monopoly automatically materializes in de facto power, the fact that formally 
rule-setting is the business of the political sector gives to policy an advantage over the private 
sector in the power play about rules and order, at least in ordinary times. However, if 
economic power is very concentrated or in deep crises the picture may become blurred. For 
instance, policy may be tempted to collude with the wealthy elite or is confronted with 
oligarchic pressure and more effective threats from system-relevant agents.   
(iii) As emphasized at the end of section 2.1, for the de facto power in influencing the rules of 
the game the systemic position of an agent is relevant. Economically, an agent or an industry 
has a powerful position in the system if it provides key inputs to all the other agents and 
industries. The financial sector is the typical example. But despite the overwhelming role of 
financial services for households, firms and states, one should not forget that the political 
sector produces by far the broadest range of crucial inputs to economic activities, in particular 
by providing the legal and the monetary system.
7
 Without this system, there is no deal, in 
particular no financial intertemporal transaction. Hence, policy has also a power advantage by 
its systemic position even though it has no monopoly as a system-relevant player.  
In sum, I do not share the view that the political sector is poor and helpless vis-à-vis some 
economic demons out there. Policy has a very strong basis for power, also from the point of 
view of de facto power. So why is the primacy of policy an issue? Turning means of power 
into effective power requires - like any other production process - effective organization and 
management of the means. In this respect, policy has currently clear handicaps compared to 
strong private players. Some of them are inherent to policy; others could be overcome in 
principle.   
(i) Modern companies think strategically and pursue their goals by top down leadership. Their 
goals are very focused with clear priority to increase the value of the firm for its owners. 
Clearly, policy is a very different business. The goals have many dimensions and instead of 
support by usually a few shareholders the support by the citizens is required. Technically 
                                            
7 There are of course many other public goods which serve as intermediate inputs for private 
activities: Infrastructure, basic research but also public security and social stability. 
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speaking, aggregation of political preferences is much more complex than aggregating 
preferences over money. Thus, in this respect policy has an inherent handicap. This means, to 
the extent in which private agents enter the field of policy they face the same handicaps. 
Issues like corporate social responsibility or the discussion about shareholders vs. 
stakeholders may serve as an example.
8
 The lesson to be learned from this is in my view the 
following: Whoever wants to exert political power in crises must define some prime goal and 
seek some basic consensus on it. "If you only have one target, you can always meet it." 
Rothschild (2009, p. 145) meant this sentence as a critic of admirers of policies which brought 
down inflation - at the cost of other goals. In my view, however, in a serious situation, policy 
must focus on one goal and clearly communicate this goal - to the people, to get their support, 
and to the market, in order to effectively obtain control, and to stabilize the economic system 
such that then other urgent goals can be solved. I will describe below what the prime goal 
should be in my opion.   
(ii) Modern companies act globally, whereas policy is organized locally. This handicap of 
policy is not inherent to policy. The range of political organization units has changed often 
throughout history. The organization in the form of national states is not given by "nature", 
but can be changed. The second lesson to be learned is this: If we want to guarantee the 
primacy of policy in setting rules of the game, one has to bring the range of policy in line with 
the most powerful private agents. In my view, this does not mean that we have to wait for a 
world government. To some extent frictionless global mobility is more a threat than reality. 
Also a global player needs reliable support by powerful national governments or existing 
international organizations. Even if only the one or the other of them withdraw this support, 
the global player is substantially hurt.  
What does this mean in practice, here and now?  
  
                                            
8 See Franck (2011) for critical reflections on these notions in the light of a realistic picture of the 
governance problem of modern companies. 
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2.3 Disorder in the financial system and regulation 
My view on the current situation is as follows: We have a serious crisis which requires 
extraordinary measures. The crisis is for me not confined to some specific events in the 
financial markets in 2011 or 200x, but consists in the fact that over the last twentyfive years 
or so the financial system got out of order. This applies also to specific current cases like the 
crisis of Greece. Neither would Greece have been able to build up the huge debt, if the 
international financial industry would not have been reckless, nor would the restructuring of 
Greece be detrimental if the European banking sector were sound.  
The basic structure of the disorder is this: The mass of consumers and producers need some 
set of financial services and products (everyday payments, insurance, saving for durable 
goods and for old age, credits and equity funds for investment etc.). Technically, the 
households require financial products to bring their stream of income in line with the stream 
of life-time consumption. Priority lies on the stream of necessary and convenient goods, and 
what they fear most is the downward risk, in particular when getting older. See Binswanger 
(2004) for a rigorous model of loss-aversion in an OLG-equilibrium model of saving. See also 
Binswanger, 2007, for an application to pension systems. Therefore a stable banking and 
insurance system is vital for society. In the last decades, supported by economics and politics, 
a huge wave of so-called financial innovations has inflated the set of financial products and 
services provided by the financial industry. In theory, these financial innovations help to 
complete markets and allow ensuring risks which were uninsured so far. This may be true for 
some innovations and good for the one or the other agent who is exposed to specific risks. But 
more importantly, the innovations create new risks, in particular also for those who do not 
need these products in the first place. This has generated kind of a progressive inflation of 
financial products and transactions. Technically, this means that the uncertainty structure of 
the economy changes fundamentally, namelyby an inflation of the set of states of the world. It 
is the purpose of section 3 to show this more rigorously in a general equilibrium model with 
asset markets. In section 4, I consider the relationship between financial innovations and the 
return-risk structure of the financial system from a more aggregate perspective. The bottom 
line is that the means employed to generate high returns created negative externalities in the 
form of social risks.   
The prime goal of policy therefore must be to bring the financial system in order. A minimum 
action required is to separate investment banking from the banking sector for ordinary people 
and business, and that states and public funds, in particular pension funds do only engage with 
ordinary financial business. Ultimately, however, I doubt that putting the investment banking 
sector in quarantine is sufficient. Given the experience of the last twenty-five years, ordinary 
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people and firms, states and public communities, pension funds and ordinary banks will be 
tempted to try the gamble again if they see that some have become very rich in quarantine. 
"No man of spirit will consent to remain poor if he believes his betters to have gained their 
goods by lucky gamblings." (Keynes 1923, p. 24). Therefore, a stricter form of regulation 
may be needed for a credible and sustainable solution. In other industries we accept that 
potentially dangerous products have to be tested and go through some admission process 
before being supplied to the market. In a similar way, financial products which potentially 
affect the financial system should not be admitted to the market before the general 
equilibrium or macroeconomic effects are understood.
9
 Since financial innovations have the 
purpose to complete markets the proof has to be conducted in an incomplete market model. 
Moreover, because potentially dangerous products for the system affect in particular also 
producers and ordinary people, the model must include a production sector and ex ante 
heterogeneity of wealth of consumers. Return regulation could be an alternative measure. As 
argued in section 4, putting a cap or a progressive tax on the average return of financial agents 
(banks, funds and their managers etc.) would have a similar effect, since the extra-ordinary 
high returns are related to the boom of financial innovations which at the same time has 
produced extraordinary risks for the system.
10
   
One may argue that such policies would be quasi equivalent to closing down the investment 
banking and hedge funds industry, since a big fraction of derivatives and other products with 
high leverage do not pass the test. Well, all the worse if this is true. It proves that the system 
has got out of order and regulation is required. In a certain sense, the outlined proposal is 
nothing more than taking seriously recent initiatives of corporate social responsibility in 
business and finance. Some leading business schools and finance institutions even refer to the 
Hypocratic Oath in this context. Now, "nihil nocere" is an ideal which if interpreted strictly 
requires too much in an uncertain world in which nobody is perfect. But establishing 
procedures and regulations, which require careful examination of potential damages and side 
effects, and rule out products and treatments which potentially lead to epidemic damage or 
                                            
9 The need for approval of financial products by a Financial Products Safety Commission was also 
stressed in the Commission of Experts of the President of the UN General Assembly on Reforms of 
the International Monetary and Financial System (Stiglitz, 2009). See also Crotty and Epstein (2009 
a,b). 
10 Keynes (1923) pointed out a more general socio-economic point. "The economic doctrine of 
normal profits, vaguely apprehended by everyone, is a necessary condition for the justification of 
capitalism." (p. 24) 
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whose social benefits are small compared to the system risks, is surely sound and good 
practice.   
The financial sector is a global business. Is it realistic, that the outlined goal to bring the 
financial system in order by strong regulations can actually be achieved? I don’t know the 
future, but one should keep in mind that global leadership, and action on a clearly and 
narrowly defined goal does not require a global government. In my view, it is not unthinkable 
that the US, Europe or China - and possibly the one or the other big economy - alone or in 
combination - take a bold step of regulation that changes the global game. The wide-spread 
opinion among ordinary people but also business leaders, that something goes fundamentally 
wrong with the financial system, provides a strong political basis for such a step. If the 
established governments won’t do it other political forces will emerge. So at least the hope or 
rather the warning of Keynes in his Tract on Monetary Reform in the aftermath of the First 
World War: "Experience shows with great certainty that the active part of the community will 
not submit in the long-run to pay too much to vested interests, and, if the necessary 
adjustment is not made in one way, it will be made in another ..." (Keynes, 1923, p. 58).  
3 Risk creation and inflation of financial innovations 
In this section I try to formulate the role of an inflated uncertainty structure in an equilibrium 
model with asset markets. I do this in the standard framework of general equilibrium theory. 
In a first step the benchmark model of a perfect economy with asset markets is presented. 
Then I consider the following deviation from this benchmark: Some agents shift into an 
environment in which the set of states of the world is inflated by blowing states up in a 
multiple of uncertain states. Pari passu with this multiplication of states the asset markets are 
inflated by financial innovations which provide "insurance" for the new risks. In this 
otherwise ideal world, the inflation of the uncertainty structure generates two things: Business 
opportunities for the financial sector and transaction costs for consumers and firms.  
Before turning to the detailled analysis I want to make a few general remarks. The first 
remark regards the role of financial innovations. In theory, financial innovations emerge 
because markets are incomplete. The missing of markets for states of the world of which we 
know that they may happen with a certain probability in the future creates a demand for 
financial products to "insure" these states. Therefore, financial innovations are rightly 
considered to be a good thing. In practice, however, apart from such true financial innovations 
there are other financial products for which it is hard to see which missing market they 
actually insure. If a new product just replicates the insurance function of already existing 
products, we have a useless product with a price that conveys no new information. This brings 
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me to my second remark. Inflation in the conventional sense of a change of the general price 
level of goods and services is considered to be costly because people have difficulties to 
disentangle changes in the price level from changes in relative prices. Thus, inflation distorts 
the quality of relative prices as signals conveying information about the scarcity relationships 
in the economy. I think that the inflation of financial innovations and the flood of prices for 
new financial products generates much more confusion about relative prices and thus the true 
economic scarcity relations than a change in the price level. In an ideal world with perfect and 
complete markets this could not be, but the reality is that a price of a financial product is noise 
if we do not know which missing market is completed by the product and how it affects the 
equilibrium of the system.  
My final remark is a comment on method. I do not think that the standard general equilibrium 
framework mirrors reality. For instance, there is always an unknown future - true uncertainty 
as it was called by Keynes and others, which does not boil down to a risky state of nature and 
a certain probability of realisation. But I also do not see a constructive alternative to the 
standard model, in which I could express my argument in a rigorous way. Given this state of 
our discipline, my approach in this section is the following. There is an uncertain world of 
economic fundamentals. Some of the uncertain economic fundamentals can be modelled as 
risky states with probabilities assigned. This is set  . The risky states in   can be "insured" by 
financial products as explained by general equilibrium theory. Moreover, not all uncertainties 
of the world are exogenous economic fundamentals. On the one hand, there are random 
processes in nature, which do not interfer with any eocnomomic action. On the other hand, 
there are random proecesses which are created by economic agents. This gives room for risk 
exposition and financial innovations even if markets with respect to set   are complete. By 
choosing this methodological approach I want to make sure that the far-reaching policy 
conclusions which follow are based on a firmly established theoretical ground. There are also 
true uncertainties of which I know nothing. The only way in which I can account for this 
unknowables is to keep in mind that my model is incomplete.  
3.1 General equilibrium with asset markets: Baseline model 
As benchmark I consider a simple perfect market economy with complete markets and 
rational agents (as outlined, for instance in Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green, 1995, 
Chapter 19).  
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3.1.1 Fundamentals 
The economy is characterized by a set   {        } of states of the world each of which 
occurs with probability    ∑      . There is one good (income) and a set   of agents who 
are endowed with     units of the good,                . The goal of the agents is to 
maximize expected utility  
(1)     ∑  
 
      )   
where    is a concave utility function and     denotes the quantity of the good consumed by   
in state  .  
3.1.2 Markets 
There are   Arrow-securities                  ) paying one unit of the good if state   is 
realized. The spot price of the good is set to one in all states. Denote by    the price of 
security    and let        )    be the portfolio of assets traded by agent  .  
3.1.3 Optimal portfolio choice 
After revelation of state   an agent’s budget is        . Thus,  
(2)                
Anticipating this when maximizing expected utility the agent chooses portfolio    by solving  
   
   
∑  
 
          ) 
(3)     ∑  
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For logarithmic utility functions,     )      ), the first-order conditions give us for each  :
11
  
(4)     
  
    
  
where      denotes the Lagrange multiplier for the restriction ∑         . Moreover, 
restriction (3) is binding under the optimal plan. This gives us, using            , the 
condition  ∑
  
  
  ∑        which reduces to  
(5) 
 
  
 ∑  
 
     
because of ∑      .  
3.1.4 Equilibrium 
Market clearing in the asset market requires  
(6) ∑   
 
               
Note that (2) and (6) imply that also the spot market is cleared, that is, ∑      ∑      for all 
s. Using (2) and (4), we obtain for (6)  
(7) ∑
  
    
 
                  
where    ∑      is aggregate endowment in state  .  
 
                                            
11 A more general analysis, including the case of risk-neutral agents, can be found in a preliminary 
version of this paper (Falkinger, 2011). 
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Normalizing prices such that ∑
 
  
   , we have:  
(8)    
  
  
   
(Alternatively, we could choose      or any other numeraire and adjust    accordingly.)  
Using (5) and (8) in (4), we obtain  
(9)       ∑  
 
   
  
   
Agents can fully insure their endowment risk up to the aggregate risk component   . In each 
state of the world, agent   consumes the same share of the aggregate endowment. If there is no 
aggregate risk i.e.      for all  , each agent consumes her or his expected endowment. 
However, if there is aggregate risk, or if any non-zero mass of agents generates a systemic 
risk by inducing aggregate endowment shocks, all agents share the burden of this risk.  
3.1.5 Transaction costs 
Realistically, trading in asset markets has transaction costs    for a consumer.    may depend 
on the complexity of the world, in particular the number of uncertain states  , but they may 
also vary with the agent’s ability to handle her or his wealth management. For instance, a 
financial agent can do it easily whereas a consumer may need to delegate this management to 
a banker. Finally, the cost may also depend on the effectiveness of the financial system. 
Professional financial intervention by a financial sector may lower the cost; market power and 
other imperfections in the financial sector will raise them.  
The issue of transaction costs will play a more important role if I come to deviations from the 
baseline model. The important thing here is that the above analysis remains valid as long as 
such costs are charged lump-sum on the agent. The only thing that changes is the agent’s 
endowment, namely from     to  
(10)  ̃           
which of course affects then the agent’s consumption possibilities and its utility.  
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3.2 An equilibrium model with risk-creation 
Suppose now that a subgroup      of agents moves (or is moved) to an environment, in 
which, in each state   of the world,     new uncertain alternatives emerge. For instance, 
they start careless projects which give them high returns if they are lucky and end in desaster 
otherwise. Or they save costs by abandonning quality controls or puffers for bad times. 
Another example are bets on real or systhetic random processes whose nature and relationship 
to the fundamental economic states of the world are not known or not understood.
12
 I call    
"risky agents". The other group of agents,   , are called ordinary agents".  As a consequence 
of the exposition of    to additional risk, the world consists now of     states, denoted by    
instead of  . If    , we are in the baseline world with         . I therefore call    
"fundamental state". If    , the risky agents face an endowment shock    
 . More precisely, 
we have  
(11)      {
       
            
                             
  
where    
    and, for    ,    
  is a positive or negative number. For simplicity, I assume 
that each sub-state   occurs with probability     so that  
(12)                            
The new risk exposure clearly opens up a business opportunity for financial innovations. 
Suppose that markets are completed by new Arrow-securities    ,    , in addition to the 
securities for    considered so far. Note first that also ordinary agents      have to trade in 
the securities for    . Otherwise, since security     pays only if      is realised,   would 
be uninsured in all other states. In an analogous way to the derivation of equation (9), we 
obtain  
                                            
12 One may ask why a risk-averse agent should move to a risky environment. It is however a 
behavioral fact that some people (although risk-averse) participate in financial gambles, without being 
forced by insurance motives in the fundamental states of the world. For instance, buying complex 
derivatives can generate new risk exposure. Maybe there is indeed a gambling motive involved, maybe 
it is confusion or ignorance. Or seduction, imitation, overconfidence? 
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(13)         ∑∑
  
 
  
    
   
   
where  
(14)                 ∑    
   
    
  
This shows that in general also ordinary agents, which do not move to the risky environment 
and are not exposed to additional individual risks (         for     ), are affected by the 
risk exposition of risky agent. Only if       for all  , consumption as given by (13) 
coincides with (9). Otherwise, there is a systemic risk component,    , created by the move of 
   to the risky environment.  
Is there a possibility for    to escape this systemic infection? In particular, suppose that asset 
markets are separated in the following way. For     , the original Arrow-securities    are 
available, paying in each fundamental state   one unit of the good, regardless of which state   
is realized. In contrast,      has only access to the Arrow-securities    , paying one unit if 
and only if state    is realized.  
Then, we obtain in an analogous way to (9), for ordinary agents,     ,  
(15)       
 ∑  
 
   
   
   
and for risky agents,       
(16)         
     )∑∑
  
 
  
       
 
       
   
where   
  ∑              .  
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Comparison of (15) with (9) shows that    may still be affected by the risk exposition of    
indirectly. Market segmentation may change the systemic risk component   
  compared to 
  , as the relevant set of agents is reduced. Furthermore, whether or not the segmentation of 
markets is in the end to the benefit of   , depends on   
  as compared to       . For a 
definite result suppose, for instance, that there is no systemic risk in the baseline, that is 
  
    
   . In this case, for     , equation (15) and (9) coincide and give  
(17)     ∑  
 
      
Moreover,      is indifferent between separated and pooled markets, since (16) coincides 
with (9) in this case.  
Thus, if there is no aggregate risk in the fundamental economy, if financial markets are 
perfect and if the completion of markets by new financial assets is costless, then there is no 
effect of risk creation on the ordinary agents under a separated banking system. This leads us 
to the central policy questions. Why do we see risk creation and inflation of financial 
innovations? And why is there resistance against the separation of investment banking from 
ordinary banking? The answer is to be found in the fact that things clearly are different in a 
more realistic world with transaction costs or other imperfections.  
3.3 Risk creation and investment banking 
I use the label "investment bank" for a risk-neutral agent   with unlimited short selling 
capacity who designs and trades financial products and helps the other agents     in their 
portfolio management. They cover their cost by charging on   a fee. It is assumed that the size 
of the fee rises with the number of financial products in the market or the number of states of 
the world. Moreover, it may vary with an agent’s average endowment to be managed. Finally 
if the investment bank has market power, the fee also covers rents of the bank. Agent   may 
have other costs in addition. For instance, own transaction costs including time and worries 
involved in optimizing the portfolio. I assume that in sum the costs can be represented by an 
increasing function of the number of traded securities  
(18)     )       
 
   )      
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and that the investment bank earns a share   of this cost. The other possible cost factors which 
were discussed are considered as shifts of     ). We combine now these transaction costs 
with the analysis of risk creation considered in the previous section.  
There is only one important change: Endowment     is now reduced to  
(19)  ̃             )   
This has a clear consequence for the welfare assessment of separated financial markets for    
to which    has no access. Under such separation, the relevant endowment levels would be  
(20)  ̃   {
          )                 
        )                      
  
Hence, a separate financial market for ordinary people, providing securities only for 
fundamental states, would be beneficial, since endowments are not burdened by transaction 
costs stemming from financial innovations for risky agents. Agent  , the investment bank, 
clearly has an interest in non-segmented markets since then its earnings are        )  
     ) from all individuals, whereas under separated markets         ) can be earned only 
from group    while group    generates      ).   
Morevoer, the investment bank has an interest in risk-creation since this increases the 
opportunities to earn money from providing financial innovations. If the risk generated by 
risky agents creates need for the new financial products also among ordinary agents - all the 
better. For this reason, an investment bank may even incur costs for creating risk. Assume for 
the sake of illustration that     ) is uniform across agents and let    be the size of group    
(without counting  ) and    be the sizeof group   , respectively. Then, the bank’s expected 
income,     ∑        ) is  
(21)            )     )  
under non-segmented markets, and  
(22)             )       )    
   
under segmentation.  
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This is clearly an extreme example which may be elaborated in many ways. In my opinion it 
conveys nonetheless a very important feature of our reality. Risk exposition of a subgroup of 
the population has systemic effects on everybody. In particular, it generates in interaction 
with unregulated financial innovations external effects on ordinary people who do not 
participate in risky actions. Furthermore, the creation and detection of risks opens up business 
opportunities for new financial products.  
4. On the power-play between citizens and financial gamblers 
I have argued that an inflation of financial innovations has generated a basic disorder of the 
financial system which carries over to the economy as a whole and finally puts the stability of 
the social order at risk.   
In the previous section I outlined how such an inflation can emerge in an ideal financial 
market frame-work and who may potentially benefit from this inflation. It was shown that 
there is a conflict of interests between ordinary agents on the one side and banks - together 
with agents who expose themselves to a risky environment, on the other side. Reality is 
obviously much more imperfect and complex. However, the conflict between ordinary people 
and what - for lack of a better word - may be called "financial gamblers" (a coalition of 
bankers and financial investors with careless or seduced households, firms, communities and 
governments) has become a crucial topic on the political and economic agenda. In this 
section, I want to present what in my view are the fundamental elements of the game played 
by the financial gamblers, as seen from a macroeconomic point of view and without any 
reference to particular micromechanisms.  
4.1 Financial innovations and the return-risk structure: An aggregate framework 
Let   be the set of feasible financial products and   {            } be the family of 
feasible combinations of financial products.
13
 Now, one of the most basic insights of finance 
is that different financial products generate different returns, where the level of return is 
positively correlated with risk. Let return and risk be denoted by   and  , respectively. In 
addition to the risk considered by the individual investor, there is also a social (or 
macroeconomic, or systemic) risk. Let the social risk be denoted by  . In sum, we have the 
following mapping  
                                            
13 The singleton {f} represents product  . 
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     ∑)     
  
Let, for any constant    ,     {         )   }.
14
 Furthermore, let    ) be defined as 
the minimal risk consistent with  , i.e.,    )      {     )      }. In an analogous way, 
define ∑  )      { ∑   )      }. With this notation we can collapse the complex and 
many-dimensional relationship between (combinations of) financial products and their risk-
return structure in a two-dimensional picture as shown in figure 1.  
In this figure,    represents the minimal-risk interest generated by basic financial products like 
treasury bonds. By using a richer family    of financial products, for instance shares, one can 
achieve returns between    and    which are associated with higher individual risk and no 
social risk on top of the individual risk. This is the standard view of portfolio analysis. 
However, the financial developments in the last decades have led us beyond the region 
       . A flood of financial innovations has blown up   and family   of combinations of 
products from  . With a richer family of financial instruments returns beyond    have become 
possible - at the cost of higher individual risks (in line with the conventional picture). But 
now also external costs begin to emerge. These costs may come directly from the high 
                                            
14 To save notation I use   (and later also  , ) as a constant as well as function symbol. The role of 
the symbol will be clear from the context. 
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individual risk-exposure  . For instance, if the high   is generated by high leverages, the 
capital basis may be too small to effectively bear the high   on a bad day. This may lead to 
the destabilisation of the whole financial system familiar from the "too big to fail" discussion. 
However, there may be other external costs as well. For instance, as shown in section 3, 
financial products which are beneficial fo "financial gamblers" indirectly expose also the non-
gamblers to uncertainty or forces them to participate in the new financial markets even if this 
implies transaction costs. The most severe external cost comes from confusion.
15
 To 
emphasize this point, I propose to distinguish in the high-return world      ) two cases. Let 
   be the family of (combinations of) financial products generating returns in the bracket 
        with corresponding individual and social risk patterns    ) ∑  ). For example, take 
highly leveraged investments and derivatives. Furthermore, assume that there is an even 
richer familiy    of financial possibilities which generates returns above   . Now, a specific 
feature of sophisticated financial innovations in the securitization and hedging business has 
been the claim that they can insure risks, which have been uninsured so far; thereby providing 
to the investor a higher return without incurring higher risks.
16
 In figure 1, this type of 
innovatons is represented by the downward rotation of    ) to  ̃  ). If    were truely 
efficiency-improving innovations, ∑  ) should be rotated downward as well. However, it has 
been repeatedly revealed by the financial crises that much confusion is out there and the 
"insurance quality" of sophisticated financial products is often illusionary rather than real. 
Symbolically,  ̃  ) is actually a "broken" line.   
The rich family of financial innovations,   , promises to investors extraordinary high returns 
at low risk. The question then is: Who pays the cost of the actual individual and social risk 
implied by the extraordinary return?   
The social risk (   in figure 1) is payed by the citizens anyway (as households or firms, who 
do not play in the high-return gamble, or as taxpayers). In addition, many arguments put 
forward in the recent policy debate by representatives of the financial sector require from the 
                                            
15 As discussed at the beginning of section 3, the central argument against conventional inflation (i.e. 
a rising price level) is, that people get confused with respect to the correct assessment of relative 
prices. The inflation of financial products however generates an ever rising flood of new price signals 
which confuses people and often distorts relative prices directly. 
16 See Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishy (2011) for a model of financial innovations with securities that 
are perceived to be safe but in fact are exposed to neglected risk. As a result there is excessive 
issuance of such securities. They conclude that proposals like levarage control do not go far enough 
and regulatory attention should be paid to the scale of financial innovation. 
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citizen to cover also the illusionary individual risk reduction   . The argument is blunt as 
this: Markets do require return  ̃ . Therefore, the public has to make sure that  ̃  can be 
delivered. One may see here a version of what according to Rothschild (1947) is a basic 
feature of oligopoly power: "the desire for secure profits" (p. 308). And the opposition of big 
banks to be split up could be explained by his conclusion that "size" is one of the means to 
secure profits, among others. More generally, the inflation of the uncertainty structure has the 
same harmful consequences which Keynes attributed to deflation. It effects "a change in the 
existing standard of value, and redistributes wealth in a manner injourious at the same time, to 
business and social stability ... In particular, it involves a transference from the active to the 
inactive" (Keynes, 1923, p. 118).  
4.2 Policy action required 
Crises provoke several types of reflexes among economists - reaching from neglect to 
fatalism. One reaction resembles to the phrase "Crisis? What Crisis?". Another one is: Let the 
market fever do its job and heal our sins, or rather those of the others. Also, some people want 
that the system totally crashes hoping that they then can take over. And finally, there is the 
story "Schocks happen, also big ones. It’s a random process". Such views either are naive and 
reckless, or they hide interests. I therefore think that besides political leadership also more 
academic responsibility is required. "In the long-run we are all dead. Economists set 
themselves too easy, to useless a task if in temptestuous seasons they can only tell us that 
when the storm is long past the ocean is flat again." (Keynes, 1923, p. 65).
17
   
Much of the current discussion has focussed on increased capital-requirements and 
restructuring procedures for big financial institutions. I think that both measures are very 
appropriate and may be also sufficient to the extent that the financial system operates in the 
medium social-cost region        . However, I do think that a more basic message has to be 
conveyed to the market. In particular, since the current disorder is more of the type illustrated 
in the region to the right of    in figure 1. The most important message to the market is: We 
take actions so as to make sure that this region of the picture is closed down so that no more 
games can be played in this field.
18
 To calm fears that this is too radical an attack on 
                                            
17 The often cited dictum of Keynes that "in the long-run we are all dead" has been taken by his 
opponents as proof of cynism or short-sighted opportunism. It is in fact the contrary, namely, a call to 
economists to take their responsibility in difficult times, as the full quote reveals. 
18 This comes close to what Rothschild said in a newspaper interview brought to my attention by 
Gugler (2011, p. 49). "Im Kern geht es um eine ganz harte politische Frage: Darum, den enormen 
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capitalism, it should be remembered that also Smith supported financial regulation in the 
interest of the community and of a stable banking system by arguing that "the obligation of 
building party walls, in order to prevent the communication of fire, is a violation of natural 
liberty, exactly of the same kind [as] the regulations of the banking trade" (cited from the 
entry on Smith in The New Palgrave (1987, Vol. 4, p. 371), written by Andrew S. Shinner).   
The question is of course, what are measures to make this message credible? If we believe in 
the relationships presented in section 1, there are only two possibilities: Either forbidding the 
tools leading the financial system into the high-risk-return region, that is, forbidding financial 
operations   . This measure corresponds to the recommendation following from the specific 
micro-economic considerations in section 3. As an alternative, the analysis in the more 
aggregate framework of section 4.1 suggests an indirect measure for achieving the same goal: 
Regulations of returns - either by a cap on the average rate of return or by a sufficiently 
progressive tax on returns. (I do not, in this rough analysis, distinguish between returns to 
owners and earnings to managers. They are lumped together under the  .)   
Partly capital requirements have the same effect as a cap on returns, since high returns often 
are related to high leverage. The advantage of a direct rate of return regulation is that it 
eliminates also the attractiveness of other forms of careless investments. And there is the 
communicative advantage that the high-risk-high-return connection is addressed directly. One 
may argue that such a regulation destroys the incentives to innovate. Partly, this is exactly the 
purpose of the measure, namely to the extent that the inflation of damaging financial 
innovations is stopped.
19
 One should notice, however, that the incentives to provide a feasible 
  efficiently are not affected by the proposed regulation. Another objection may be that 
typically the return of a single operation is by its nature uncertain and only revealed ex post so 
that return regulation is a random punishment. This is a misunderstanding. Any single return 
component may be random but the average rate of return of a financial player - a bank, a 
funds and its managers etc. - can only be extraordinary high if extraordinary risky tools are 
used. Therefore, the regulation of these returns hits its target - the risky instruments and 
actions.   
                                                                                                                                        
finanz-wirtschaftlichen Komplex unter Kontrolle zu bringen, der in den vergangenen dreissig Jahren 
entstanden ist und mit dessen neuen Möglichkeiten enorme Gewinne zu machen sind." 
19 One may also ask whether it wouldn’t be desirable from a macroeconomic point of view, to direct 
innovative energy more to productivity progress in the real economy rather than to financial 
innovations, which often are instruments to acquire a larger share of the cake rather than of producing 
a larger cake. 
  
79 
 
Finally, there is the question of whether the described policies are credible enough to be 
effective. Let me start to answer this question with a quite general remark. If there is some 
truth in the described positive relationship between high risks and high returns, and if there is 
some economic logic in the financial market left (otherwise the question of credibility has no 
meaning in the first place), then the message: We take action so as to bring down the high 
rates of return - directly or indirectly - is the only one message which is credible to the 
financial market and to the citizens. To illustrate the point, consider for instance the argument 
that banks will not be able to raise the capital they need, if they cannot deliver the high returns 
which the market has become acquainted to. Now, if a clear regulation credibly sends the 
message that there will be no such high returns any more in no bank, then the capital which is 
there in the market will go to where the return is highest within the given limits. If the capital 
in the market is too little, to supply to banks a stable capital basis, then the taxpayer pays 
anyway, in one form or the other. The most transparent and market-conforming way would be 
that in this case partly banks close down, partly the state re-capitalizes the banks and takes 
shares in return.   
Finally, there is the argument of international competition that capital will shy away from 
locations with financial regulations. As argued in my general remark, this is only to be feared 
if the regulation is half-hearted and thus no credible sign that the financial system is brought 
in order. The business model, to bet on salvation by the taxpayer of a country, is only 
attractive for the short-sighted investor. Sooner or later also the taxpayer will go bankrupt. In 
other words, a location operating in the high-return-high-risk region in figure 1 will become a 
bad investment opportunity sooner or later. The competitive advantage is with the location in 
which credible regulation guarantees financial order. My guess is that bankers and investors 
know this - citizens anyway. They just wait that it happens.  
5. Conclusion 
Philosophy derives its appeal from questions like what is reality, what is truth or what can we 
know. Medicine has the promise to save lives or prolongue them, and physics supports our 
dream to reach the stars. The powerful appeal of modern economics as an academic 
discipline, since when it began to blossom in the age of enlightment, is grounded on the hope 
of bettering our condition - not of a few of us but of the many. A regulated market economy, 
in which the productive forces unfold competitively and powers that exploit others or threaten 
the system are kept under control, has turned out as the appropriate economic order to achieve 
this goal.   
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Recent financial crises are no single events but a consequence of the fact that the financial 
system has got out of order over the last two or three decades. The nature of this disorder is an 
inflation of financial innovations which are meant to complete markets. But even if they do so 
for some of us, they generate additional risk for all of us. Technically, this means that the 
uncertainty structure of the economy is changed by blowing up the set of uncertain states of 
the world. This exposes everybody to new risks and increases the systemic power of financial 
agents who provide financial products and services to "insure" these risks or to deliver higher 
returns at the cost of increasing externalized risk. If the inflated uncertainty structure leads to 
a financial crisis, the powerful systemic role of the financial sector is exploited by requiring 
policy measures to save the system. The measures, if not paid immediately by the taxpayer to 
avoid recession, increase public debt which in turn is a threat on the system.   
The damming of powerful economic forces like this requires a strong political power, in the 
sense of a power which effectively is able to set and enforce rules of the game. De jure, the 
state is the rule setter, de facto, however also political power has an economic basis and 
powerful private agents have political power too. This has led to proclamations about the 
primacy of policy to be regained.   
I have argued in this paper that the primacy of policy is not in danger because of a lack of 
economic means of the public sector. States are very resourceful economic agents. An 
increase in the public sector share would therefore not contribute to regaining primacy of 
policy.
20
 The main handicaps of the public sector compared to powerful private forces are: 
First, aggregation of political preferences to a clear and narrowly focused goal is much more 
complex than maximizing wealth of an individual or the value of the firm. Second, policy is 
organized regionally in states while powerful private agents operate globally. Regaining the 
primacy of policy in the regulation of financial markets requires thus two things: a clearly 
focused goal and global political leadership. Such global leadership does not require a global 
government or global coordination on all possible things but the agreement of a few big 
players to take action on the one goal. This is not unthinkable to happen. The opinion that 
something is wrong with the financial system is widely spread among people and in the 
business world so that a clear goal to bring it in order by a well-targeted global action has a 
big potential of broad support.   
                                            
20 This is no statement on the optimal government share. There may be many reasons to change the 
supply of public goods or redistribution. The point is: For giving to policy more political power, no 
additional resources are required. States have already the most powerful resource basis. 
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The action proposed in this paper is regulation which eliminates the creation of risk, in 
particular systemic risk, by careless financial innovation. A minimal requirement is to 
separate investment banking from ordinary banking and that states and public funds withdraw 
from the further. A more credible and sustainable policy would be - in analogy to other 
industries, to admit only financial products to the market which have passed the following 
test: the issuer can show why the product closes a missing market and how it effects the 
general or macroeconomic equilibrium (including production and distribution). Alternatively, 
a cap or a progessive tax on the rate of return could be used to ban financial innovations 
which seek for high returns at the cost of the stability and efficiency of the system. It may be 
argued that such a measure would heavily bound the innovation dynamic in the financial 
industry. But such argument just proves that the regulation is well targeted and exactly fulfills 
the purpose to eliminate financial instruments which potentially destabilize the system.   
Let me close with a remark on ideology or - to use another Rothschild-phrase - on the 
problem of "reliance on one eye only and blindness on all other eyes (of which there should 
be many)".
21
 Disorder and appropriate regulation of the financial industry are not matters of 
quarrels about who is the good guy and who is the bad one, or about who is more (im)perfect, 
the private sector or the public sector. Ideological battles on first principles are 
counterproductive here. Nobody is perfect and, if a system is out of order, bad guys in the 
public sector as well as in the private sector will exploit it. Appropriate regulation to bring 
things in order is therefore the common concern of ordinary people and responsible leaders in 
politics as well as in business and banking.  
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Sepp Falkinger has presented an interesting paper on a very timely question – namely the 
effects of financial innovations on the so-called real economy. Complaints about the 
tremendous growth of the financial industry triggered or at least enhanced by liberalisation of 
financial markets in some states are well known. Falkinger’s paper brings these complaints 
into the framework of analytic economic theory – particularly General Equilibrium Theory. 
He used the instruments provided by this theory in order to derive important results.  
His treatment of the financial industry is traditional. This industry provides insurance against 
all risks. The risks in turn are given. Therefore he can use the results of GE theory as a 
starting point, namely that if there are complete sets of markets against given risks, the 
allocation is efficient. He distinguishes between two cases: one situation in which all agents 
are risk averse and the other in which a subset of agents is risk neutral – the financial 
intermediaries. In the first case nobody can insure against aggregate risks, in the latter case 
this is possible – as long as problems of liquidity can be ruled out. This is a standard result for 
the Arrow-Debreu world. For this world it is the case that higher returns go together with 
higher risks, however in the aggregate the returns as well as the risks are limited by the risks 
of the real economy.  
This is not our world. We can observe a steady flow of new financial instruments, and the 
analysis of the consequences of these innovations delivers new insights. Falkinger sets his 
analysis in the following framework: he assumes that there is a subset of agents who make 
bets with higher expected returns and consequently with higher expected risks.  That has 
effects for all others – externalities. First their risks might be increased and therefore more 
insurance is needed, for example as a given share of reserves of a bank may cease to be 
sufficient, higher reserves are necessary. That is tantamount to an increase of costs. We can 
observe it already. Second, transactions create costs, basically the income of the people 
working in the financial industry – usually with a high income – are paid by the rest of the 
economy. Falkinger mentions a third type of external effect: inflating the number of assets in 
an economy creates more and more noise. Everybody knows that daily shopping gets difficult 
when one has dozens of brands for each item one wants to buy. The number of assets goes to 
infinity as each asset brings a new risk and therefore a new insurance to cover it. In the 
traditional setting of mainstream economics, namely that external effects result in welfare 
losses and therefore need to be reduced by appropriate actions by the state, this paper makes a 
strong point for regulation of the financial industry without calling on anti-market economy 
feelings.  
Three short critical comments are in order. The first relates to the GE context. The problem is 
the following: for a GE model it is assumed that technologies, endowments, institutions and 
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risks are given. It is appropriate to work out the welfare difference between two situations 
differing in a specific way – a comparative static analysis. The paper contains such an 
analysis, namely that introducing very risky bets can be welfare decreasing. However, the 
paper wants to show something different, namely what happens when suddenly some actors 
start to create such assets. In that case it is no longer  true that there were a full set of Arrow-
assets in the beginning, namely there were no assets to cover this contingency, but the risk 
was already there. In that case the comparative static comparison is not appropriate.  
The second point is the following. The GE framework is set in a wider political economy 
framework. It is claimed that the financial industry has the power to create risks because the 
state has given up its power to set rules. The paper ends with the call for new regulations. This 
is somehow true, however only in a metaphorical sense. When we say a person or an 
institution has power, we mean it can act strategically. One can call a strike, state a law, 
subsidize a political party, bribe an official, pay for ads in a paper, set monopoly prices, etc. 
The state has power, as it can set rules. The financial industry may also have power, namely 
paying for lobbies or outright bribery. But this is not present in the model presented. In 
Falkinger’s model there are no actions by the financial industry, merely actions by agents who 
provide very risky bets. This is power in the sense of the power of the working class or the 
bourgeoisie, but it is not a case of power in the sense of strategic action. Therefore I have 
doubts in the expression of a ‘power play’ between the financial agents and the rest of the 
society represented by the state. 
The third point concerns the fundamental question of whether the state has the power to 
regulate the financial sector, namely to curb the excess of a creation of more and more types 
of assets. One is tempted to say no. This can be a result of Falkinger’s paper. Everybody can 
agree that there can be bets which are too risky. But how do we decide what the appropriate 
level of risk is? What does it mean to be ‘too risky’? Second, there is an organised financial 
industry, which is covered by rules and regulations. But there is also a shadow banking 
system that is not regulated. If opportunities for profit between the two systems diverge too 
much the banking system may lose its impact. The growth of over-the-counter trade 
supplanting regulated and well-documented exchanges shows the danger. But as we know one 
should not give in to all temptations.  Not to resist this temptation, namely to refrain from 
attempts to regulate the financial industry, is too dangerous. We simply have to do the fine 
tuning. This paper shows the direction, namely instead of calling upon sentiments against 
banks, good economic analyses can provide a basis for sensible regulations.  
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1. Introduction 
Heterodox exonomics (as well as its complement: orthodox economics), Austria and Kurt 
Rothschild are all time-variant concepts. Which heterodox economics? Which Austria? Which 
Kurt W. Rothschild? Three difficult questions to be answered in a single paper!? Poor me! 
Poor you! 
Section 2 points out that major Austrian economists from Carl Menger via Eugen von Böhm-
Bawerk, Joseph Alois Schumpeter and Friedrich August von Hayek to Joseph Steindl and 
Kurt Rothschild were heterodox economists of sorts. What changed over time was orthodoxy 
(and therefore heterodoxy). Interestingly, heterodox Austrian economists variously 
contributed in important ways to what was to become a new orthodoxy. The reverse also 
happened: once orthodox, some Austrian economists without substantially changing their own 
views became heterodox, because what is frequently called the “mainstream” changed. Kurt 
Rothschild’s Keynesianism is a case in point. Section 3 deals with what I consider to be the 
two main pillars of present-day orthodoxy, that is “marginalist” or “neoclassical” theory: 
Say’s law and marginal productivity theory of income distribution . Heterodox economists 
reject one of the two or both. Section 4 provides some examples in this regard. Section 5 
specifies Rothschild’s heterodoxy in the terms elaborated. Section 6 draws the attention to 
Rothschild’s concern with developing a universal social science that seeks to overcome the 
current division of labour and research within the discipline and the detrimental effects of a 
fragmentization of knowledge. Section 7 turns to what Rothschild considered most important, 
and badly missing in much of economic analysis: a proper treatment of the role of power in 
society and in the economy. Section 8 discusses briefly the treatment of power in 
conventional marginalist economics. Section 9 then turns to the classical approach and the 
role of power in it. Section 10 directs the attention towards the implications of the presence of 
power for welfare economics, a field Rothschild was critical of. Section 11 concludes. 
2. Austrian economists: heterodox by nature 
“Orthodox economics” is not a well defined and unchanging entity through time and space, 
nor is “heterodox economics”. What was heterodox at some time may have become orthodox 
at another time, and vice versa. If there is to be progress in economics then any particular 
doctrine or theory is bound to be overcome sooner or later by a doctrine or theory that is 
radically different or just an improvement on the former. 
Interestingly, major Austrian economists have been dissenters from what was the mainstream 
at their time, and actually have advocated points of view which eventually contributed 
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important ideas to what was later to become a new mainstream in economics or new 
orthodoxy. A few examples may illustrate this. 
In the second half of the nineteenth century the younger Historical School, championed by 
Gustav Schmoller, dominated the profession in the German language area. Carl Menger, the 
alleged founder of an “Austrian school” of economics, challenged Schmoller in a famous 
debate, known as the Methodenstreit, in which the very nature of economics was in dispute. 
Menger opted in favour of a theoretical economics, whereas Schmoller advocated the view 
that economics was an empirical-historical-ethical subject. 
Menger and Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk took issue with Léon Walras’s general equilibrium 
theory and the project of rendering economics a branch of applied mathematics. The 
formulation of economic matters in terms of systems of simultaneous equilibrium equations 
Böhm-Bawerk dubbed “a deadly sin against all scientific logic”: economics had to adopt 
instead a “causal-genetic method” that started the analysis from the needy individual. In terms 
of important concepts forged by Böhm-Bawerk (and other Austrian economists) that were 
included in the marginalist “tool box”, it suffices to mention the concept of a positive rate of 
time preference, the concept of the superiority of more roundabout processes of production, 
which anticipates the marginalist concept of substitution in production, and the related 
concept of the remuneration of factors of production according to their marginal 
contributions. Hence, at one time a dissenter, central concepts of Böhm-Bawerk’s theory 
filtered into what is the orthodox (marginalist or neoclassical) point of view today. 
Joseph Alois Schumpeter (1912) on the one hand praised Walras’s theory as the “Magna 
Carta” of economics, but on the other hand saw its scope restricted to the “circular flow” of 
the economy, that is, the stationary state. The latter, however, is of only very limited interest, 
since according to Schumpeter the economic system is continuously in travail because of the 
innovations carried out by entrepreneurs and therefore cannot possibly be understood in terms 
of general equilibrium theory: development and equilibrium mutually exclude one another. 
Schumpeter also parted company with Böhm-Bawerk’s idea that time preference is a primal 
cause of a positive rate of interest, his idea of more roundabout processes of production and 
the idea that savings are the key to wealth and material well-being: a positive rate of time 
preference is a consequence rather than a cause of a positive rate of interest, technical 
progress need not always be more roundabout, and innovations rather than savings are the 
main source of wealth. 
When John Maynard Keynes’s macroeconomics, centred around the principle of effective 
demand, was on the rise within the profession of economists, Schumpeter and Friedrich 
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August von Hayek opined different dissenting views, the former placing the emphasis on 
innovations and their disruptive character (“creative destruction”), the latter on government 
and the banking sector, which he considered to be destabilising the economy. And when 
Monetarism and new versions of marginalist orthodoxy gradually regained lost territory, 
Joseph Steindl steadfastly advocated a Kaleckian approach to macroeconomics. 
In short, Austrian economists are a rebellious species and Kurt Rothschild is no exception to 
the rule. More precisely, depending on the changing nature of the mainstream during the time 
of Rothschild’s academic career, he was more or less heterodox: as long as Keynesianism was 
dominant, Rothschild’s dissent from the mainstream was negligible, whereas when so-called 
New Classical Economics advocated by Robert Lucas and his acolytes began to take over the 
discipline, his dissent became huge. 
While, as has been stressed in the above, the very concepts of “orthodoxy”, “mainstream” etc. 
in economics are continuously changing, we may nevertheless specify elements of 
contemporary orthodoxy, which are but particular expressions of lasting elements of 
marginalist theory that by and large survived all changes in form and content of that theory. 
To these elements we turn in the following section. They define the background against which 
we specify heterodoxy in general and Rothschild’s heterodoxy in particular. 
3. Today’s orthodoxy: Say’s law plus marginal productivity theory 
For the purpose of this paper modern orthodox economics is taken to revolve around two 
ideas, or building blocks, that are intimately intertwined. These concern 
 the determination of the volume of output as a whole and employment and  
 the sharing out of that output amongst different strata of society. 
Orthodox economics envisages output as a whole as subject to 
 Say’s law (SL), which states in its marginalist version (which is not to be confounded 
with the version we encounter, for example, in Ricardo) that there is a tendency of the 
market economy, if left to itself, towards the full employment of labour and the full 
utilization of the capital stock. 
There are some bold conditions to be met for this to be the case, such as flexible prices of 
goods and services and rates of remuneration of factors of production, the stability of the 
equilibrium and, most important, as Rothschild was to stress, perfect competition. Any market 
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failure is blamed on the absence of  one or the other of these conditions. Hence the basic 
message of the theory is plain and simple: the market economy is self-regulating and tends to 
make full use of the productive resources at its disposition. There is, in principle, no problem 
of unemployment and idle plant and equipment. The economic system, if left to itself, solves 
these problems in an efficient way. 
The second idea or twin core element of the marginalist doctrine is that income distribution is 
adequately explained by 
 Marginal Productivity Theory (MPT), which states that in conditions of perfect 
competition the proprietors of the productive resources are remunerated according to 
the resources’ marginal contributions to the product. Wages (profits, rents) are high or 
low in proportion to whether the marginal productivity of labour (capital, land) is high 
or low. 
For the marginal productivity theory to hold again bold assumptions have to be met, such as 
constant returns to scale in order for Euler’s Theorem to be applicable. We need not dwell on 
these, but remark that the two ideas – SL and MPT – are intimately intertwined. MPT 
presupposes the full employment of labour and full capacity utilization. With idle resources, 
as they are typically experienced in the real world, the system is not on its “production 
possibility frontier” and accordingly marginal conditions are not met. An excess supply of a 
resource, such as labour, is ideally seen to lead to a swift fall in the resource’s price, which 
increases the demand for the resource and possibly also decreases the supply of it. The 
marginalist economists interpret a failure of the system to reach the full employment of its 
productive resources as the result of rigidities of various sorts and outside interventions that 
prevent the market from working efficiently. 
We may put the core idea of marginalism as follows: According to its “monotonic prejudice”, 
to use an expression coined by Piero Sraffa, methods of production of single commodities as 
well as techniques of whole industries or the entire economy can be ordered monotonically in 
terms of the capital-to-labour ratio with respect to the ratio of the rate of profits (rate of 
interest) to the real wage rate. With qij giving the factor input use of factor i per unit of output 
of commodity j, where commodity j can also be an aggregate of commodities of given 
composition, and pi as the price per unit of the factor, the theory presupposes that 
(1)     ∂qij/∂pi ≤ 0 
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In words: factors that become relatively more expensive will not be employed in greater 
quantities (per unit of output).
2
 
Can the underlying concept of “substitution” in production be generally relied upon, as 
marginalism contends? If the answer happens to be “yes”, then the marginalist intuition would 
be confirmed and markets could be considered to tend to clear (provided the above mentioned 
conditions are met). But if the answer happens to be “no”, what then? 
4. Heterodox economics 
Seen from this vantage point, heterodox economists reject either the first or the second or both 
building blocks of the marginalist doctrine. John Maynard Keynes (1936), for example, was 
perhaps the severest critic of SL and replaced it by the principle of effective demand, 
according to which there is no reason to presume that the volume of investment will oscillate 
around full employment savings. At the same time he tried to retain MPT, which, however, 
sits uncomfortably with the fact of idle productive resources. Piero Sraffa (1960), on the other 
hand, was perhaps the severest critic of MPT. He showed that the conventional principle of 
substitution between factors of production cannot generally be sustained. By analysing the 
problem of the choice of technique of cost-minimizing producers he found that the choice 
depends on the rate of interest (wage rate) and that with a change in this rate (and a contrary 
change in the wage rate) factor intensities need not move in the opposite direction to changes 
in relative factor prices, or, in obvious notation, 
(2)     ∂(K/L)/∂(r/w) ≤ 0 
need not be true. Reswitching of techniques and capital reversing thwart the orthodox 
message. 
Interestingly, a positive rate of interest is not indispensable in order to see that 
nonconventional results may emerge even in conditions that appear to be strongly favourable 
to the marginalist approach, provided one focuses attention on full industry equilibrium. This 
means that one cannot typically entertain the partial-equilibrium-ceteris paribus method of 
analysis: a change in the wage rate, for example, typically has an impact on the other 
distributive variables (the rate of interest, rent rates etc.) and on relative prices. Ignoring this 
                                            
2 This is essentially a generalisation of the classical principle of diminishing returns in agriculture 
with homogeneous labour and homogeneous land and no capital goods. 
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impact is generally inadmissible, because it leads to results that may grossly, and perhaps 
even qualitatively, deviate from the results derived within a framework that takes into account 
the impact under consideration. As Arrigo Opocher and Ian Steedman (2012) show in a work 
in progress, even with a rate of interest equal to zero there is generally no reason to presume 
that quantities of factors employed (per unit of output) are inversely related to “factor prices”. 
This, however, spells trouble for the conventional marginalist argument, based, as it is, on the 
monotonic prejudice. In terms of the concepts used by the theory, the “demand curve” for a 
factor of production need not be inversely related to the factor price. If this is the case and the 
factor supply curve is upward sloping, as is usually assumed, the resulting equilibrium, if 
there is one, need not be stable. Yet, as economists such as Alfred Marshall have stressed, an 
unstable equilibrium does not explain anything and throws into doubt the explanatory 
capacity of the underlying demand and supply approach to the theory of value and 
distribution. 
We are now in a position to identify the kind of heterodox position in economics Kurt 
Rothschild assumed. It goes without saying that over time he somewhat changed his position, 
but here we are only concerned with the stable and permanent part of his heterodoxy. 
5. Rothschild’s heterodoxy: “realism” vs. “utopia” 
There is clear evidence that Rothschild rejected both main pillars of the marginalist doctrine: 
he rejected SL and he was critical of MPT. His criticisms of SL and MPT permeate his entire 
work. 
Say’s law.  As regards SL, Rothschild variously stressed the fact that unemployment “is a 
serious economic and social problem … There are only a few periods during the past one 
hundred and fifty years, in which this problem did not attract the attention of politicians and 
the public, and these were partly exceptional on account of wars” (Rothschild 1988: 1). Hence 
in his view in capitalist industrial societies unemployment is not the exception to the rule, but 
the rule, whereas according to the orthodox view it is the other way round. The unsatisfactory 
state of affairs in explaining the World Economic Depression in the late 1920s paved the way 
for the success of Keynes, who argued “in accordance with reality, that unemployment is … 
an essential characteristic feature of ‘free’ market economies” (Rothschild 2004: 169). 
Conventional theory failed badly and Keynes offered the sought alternative to it. His realism 
was in marked contrast to the “Utopian” view of the perfect competition world of neoclassical 
theory (Rothschild 1971b: 9). Keynes understood that the money and financial markets were 
prone to instability; the investment process was subject to huge economic and political 
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uncertainties; prices and wages were sluggish, etc. “This leads to the insight”, Rothschild 
concludes,  
‘that “market failure” is a “normal” by-product of the market economy, which 
can be mitigated or overcome by a “sage” economic policy. In strong contrast 
to the economic policy doctrine of the neoclassical paradigm, which regards 
state interventions basically only as derangements of a well functioning market 
process and sees bureaucratic “state failure” as the rule, Keynes stressed the 
positive role the state may play in stabilising an inherently unstable economic 
process.‘ (Rothschild 2004: 170) 
Keynes is said to have managed “to break old taboos of neoclassical theory against the 
regulating and ‘repairing’ state interventions”, and he did so “not only because of social 
considerations, but also in order to safeguard the acceptance and capacity of survival of the 
capitalist system” (Rothschild 2004: 176). 
Marginal productivity theory.  As regards MPT, from an early time onwards Rothschild 
questioned the explanation of the distribution of income and especially of wages in such 
terms. In The Theory of Wages (Rothschild 1954) as well as in the revised German version of 
the book, Lohntheorie (Rothschild 1963), he disputed the view that marginal productivity 
theory was “a complete theory of wages” (1954: 27). He insisted that work effort and labour 
productivity are not independent of the wage level, as MPT assumes; they are rather “a 
function” of that level (1954: 30). Rothschild thus anticipated an idea which was to become 
prominent in the efficiency wage doctrine and which can in fact be traced back to Adam 
Smith, who emphasized that high wages may induce labourers to work hard, whereas low 
wages may result in indolent, careless and even obstructive behaviour on their part. 
In several of his publications Kurt Rothschild stressed that there is no such thing as “the 
economic theory, rather there are several theoretical approaches, which partly complement 
and partly contradict each other” (Rothschild 2004: 16). Some of these approaches, “for 
example the so-called institutional and evolutionary models, stress the necessity to assume a 
more comprehensive social perspective” (Rothschild 2004: 16-17). This was certainly 
according to Rothschild’s own taste. He added that “the criticism of the dominant neoclassical 
mainstream which is put forward under the heading of ‘The crisis of economics’ is not so 
much that its analyses are totally useless, but that because of their methodological 
confinement they are too much tied to a narrow formal framework that not only blocks the 
way towards, but also the view of important linkages or allows them only in a rather twisted 
manner” (ibid.: 17). Mainstream economics is said to set aside the “political element” and 
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focus on “pure theory”. Rothschild deplored the fact that only “economic efficiency” is being 
discussed, whereas the fact “that cultural, social and political conditions exert a decisive 
influence upon economic processes … is largely ignored by the ‘law oriented’ perspective of 
‘Economics’” (ibid.: 18). He also chastised the “economic imperialism” that carries the 
paradigm of the utility maximising homo oeconomicus over to other spheres, such as politics. 
All this is said to be the consequence of a majord reorientation in economics, away from an 
essentially philosophical view of human and social problems towards one that is informed by 
the natural sciences, especially physics (ibid.: p. 13). But economics is not physics or any of 
the other “exact” sciences and never will be. As we shall see below, Rothschild paid tribute to 
the boldness of economists, who sought to shape their field in the image of the natural 
sciences (Marx no less than the neoclassicals), but in the end, he was convinced, they 
followed a will-o’-the-wisp. 
It is interesting to note that Rothschild was not much concerned with the problem of whether 
an economic theory is consistent and coherent. The measuring rod he used in order to assess 
the quality of alternative theories and doctrines was first and foremost whether they were 
“realistic” or not. Realism was not so much a question of the empirical fit of some 
econometric model. He rather relied on the judgement of the well informed observer, 
possessed of a knowledge of the various dimensions of the problem involved. In this regard 
he followed in the footsteps of Adam Smith and John Maynard Keynes. 
Rothschild showed relatively little interest in the debates about capital theory in the 1960s and 
1970s that involved major economists on both sides of the fence: advocates of marginalist 
theory and its critics. The crucial issue was whether the concept of capital in marginalist 
theory could be sustained. According to it the “quantity of capital”, whose relative scarcity 
had to be ascertained, can be given independently of, and prior to, the determination of the 
rate of interest and relative prices. “Capital” could thus be considered an original and not a 
derived magnitude of the economic system. (Below we shall come back to this issue.) The 
critics showed conclusively that the marginalist concept of capital cannot be sustained and 
that therefore income distribution cannot generally be explained in terms of MPT (for a 
summary account of the debate, see Kurz and Salvadori 1997: chapter 14). 
It is surprising that Rothschild hardly took account of the debate, although it supported his 
heterodox position. Instead he kept drawing the attention to facts and factors above and 
beyond those contemplated within the marginalist framework, which might change things and 
even reverse allegedly well-established relationships between variables. He did not, however, 
take pains to show this in terms of models constructed for the purpose at hand. Rothschild was 
more on the lookout for missing influences and factors at work than for a logically impeccable 
  
96 
 
analysis of the interplay of given factors. Vis-à-vis marginalist theory he opted for “realism” 
rather than “utopia” in economics. This is also reflected in his search for a universal social 
science or, to use Bertrand Russell’s concept: a science of power. 
6. Towards a universal social science: Smith, Marx, Russell and Keynes 
As we know from Adam Smith, the division of labour may lead to substantial productivity 
gains, but it comes at a considerable cost: the fragmentation of knowledge. Hayek, in a similar 
vein, spoke of the costs and benefits of the division of knowledge in modern society. Smith 
and Hayek’s observations apply cum grano salis also to the division of labour and research in 
the social sciences. This is illustrated by the following event. On the occasion of her visit to 
the London School of Economics in November 2008, Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth asked the 
assembled scientific community why the financial crisis had not been anticipated and 
measures proposed and taken to fight it. On 22 July 2009 two Fellows of the British Academy 
answered the Queen in a letter (Besley and Hennessy 2009). They pointed out that while there 
had been warnings about imbalances in financial markets and in the global economy, a 
“psychology of denial” of the dangers involved is said to have emerged. “It was a cycle 
fuelled, in significant measure, not by virtue but by delusion.” According to the two authors, 
while individual risks and imbalances were perceived, “the failure was to see how collectively 
this added up to a series of interconnected imbalances over which no single authority had 
jurisdiction. ... Individual risks may rightly have been viewed as small, but the risk to the 
system as a whole was vast.” They concluded that “the failure to foresee the timing, extent 
and severity of the crisis and to head it off ... was principally a failure of the collective 
imagination of many bright people ... to understand the risks to the system as a whole.” In 
short, one problem was that economists and others missed the forest for the trees. 
The negative impact of the division of labour among the social sciences was a major concern 
of Kurt Rothschild. Not for nothing he chose as the motto of his introduction to the Penguin 
reader Power in Economics Bertrand Russell’s statement: 
‘Economics as a separate science is unrealistic and misleading if taken as a 
guide in practice. It is one element – a very important element, it is true – in a 
wider study of the science of power.‘ (see Rothschild 1971b: 7) 
This was indeed the leitmotiv of much of Rothschild’s work: without taking into account 
power relationships and re-integrating economics and other social sciences, economics will 
arrive at “unrealistic” and “misleading” results and will prove to be barren and irrelevant. The 
response of some of the leading advocates of so-called “New Classical Economics” to the 
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current world-wide crisis, its causes and remedies, illustrates what Rothschild in all 
probability had in mind. Certain parts of mainstream economics have turned out to be at best 
useless and at worst harmful, because they formulated the policies put in place that were co-
responsible for what happened. 
Paraphrasing Hayek, an economist who knows only economics cannot be a good economist. 
A good economist knows many things and is possessed of many capabilities and skills. In his 
book on the political visions of great economists Rothschild identified Keynes as a scholar 
who ideally met the requirements mentioned. He remarked that “we are living in a period, in 
which the new circumstances require in a particularly high degree new ‘visions’ about 
economic and political connections and their reciprocal conditioning and dynamism” 
(Rothschild 2004: 209). This was written prior to the current financial and economic crisis, 
which was gist to Rothschild’s mill. 
Keynes possessed all the characteristic features and talents which, according to Keynes 
himself, made a great economist: he knew mathematics and history, was a statesman and 
philosopher and did not leave unnoticed any of the aspects that are characteristic of human 
nature and man’s institutions (Rothschild 2004: 20). Keynes also conceived of the economic 
process as a part and parcel of social and cultural development in general. He was, in terms of 
Schumpeter’s distinction between “method” and “vision” (Schumpeter 1954), both an 
economist, who revolutionised the method in terms of which the economic process was 
analysed, and he had a vision of the dynamism of the economic and social process as a whole. 
Keynes was “not only a successful theorist, but also a successful practitioner in the world of 
finance” (Rothschild 2004: 160-1). He made a substantial amount of money not least on 
behalf of King’s College, Cambridge. Keynes, very much like Adam Smith, was driven by a 
concern with fostering the “good” and “beautiful” and bringing it to society at large. Under 
the influence of George Moore’s moral philosophy he rejected utilitarianism and hedonism 
and developed a sentiment of responsibility towards society, which permeates his entire work 
(Rothschild 2004: 164-5). The philosophical underpinnings of Keynes’s position and the 
deeper motivation for his work and political orientation are best seen in four essays he 
published in Nation and Athenaeum, a journal he edited: “Am I a liberal?” (1925), “The end 
of laissez-faire” (1926), “Liberalism and labour” (1926) and “The economic possibilities of 
our grandchildren” (1930). While there are parallels with other economists, in Rothschild’s 
view Keynes was a “phenomenon sui generis” (Rothschild 2004: 161). 
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It must therefore not come as a surprise that Keynes was by far the most influential economist 
of larger parts of the twentieth century with an impact on economic theory, economic policy 
and politics more generally (Rothschild 2004: 159).
3
 Most important, perhaps, in Rothschild’s 
view, Keynes’s “purely” theoretical work “always started from real problems and real policy 
possibilities”. This is what fascinated Rothschild most. Keynes was not an economist with his 
head in the clouds, and like Marshall he had recourse to “verbal methods” when these 
corresponded better to a “fuzzy reality”. While a useful tool, Keynes used mathematics only 
“parsimoniously and in a ‘hidden’ way” (2004: 160). And whenever new facts became 
available, Keynes did not hesitate to take them into account and, if necessary, change his 
view. Any sensible person would do so. 
It is interesting to notice that Rothschild counterposed Keynes’s point of view and general 
outlook with that of “neoclassical economics”. The “Keynesian revolution”, he maintained, 
was neither “a complete break with received theory, nor did all new elements come 
exclusively from Keynes” (Rothschild 2004: 168). Similar ideas had been put forward by 
Michal Kalecki and the German Carl Föhl. However, Keynes managed “to integrate the 
various elements in a convincing and broadly applicable theoretical framework that opened 
new ways to received problems, which at the time were particularly pressing and for which 
traditional theory could not find answers that were satisfactory theoretically and as regards 
their economic policy relevance.” (Rothschild 2004: 168) Against “traditional equilibrium 
theory” Rothschild argued “in accordance with reality, that unemployment is not an 
exceptional situation, but an essential characteristic feature of ‘free’ market economies” 
(Rothschild 2004: 169; emphasis added). Hence, conventional theory failed badly and Keynes 
offered the sought alternative to it. His realism stays in marked contrast to the “utopian” view 
of the perfect competition world of neoclassical theory (Rothschild 1971b: 9). Keynes 
understood that the money and financial markets were prone to instability; the investment 
process was subject to huge economic and political uncertainties; prices and wages were 
sluggish, etc. “This leads to the insight”, Rothschild concluded,  
                                            
3 When asked which was the most important influence upon his own thinking, interestingly 
Rothschild answered that the real “eye-opener” to him was not Keynes’s General Theory, which at 
first he did not understand, but Joan Robinson’s book An Introduction to the Theory of  Employment 
(Robinson 1937). 
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‘that “market failure” is a “normal” by-product of the market economy, which 
can be mitigated or overcome by a “sage” economic policy. In sharp contrast to 
the economic policy doctrine of the neoclassical paradigm, which regards state 
interventions basically only as derangements of a well functioning market 
process and sees bureaucratic “state failure” as the rule, Keynes stressed the 
positive role the state may play in stabilising an inherently unstable economic 
process.‘ (Rothschild 2004: 170) 
What matters is to recommend the “right” measures, because obviously state interventions, if 
wrong-headed, may cause harm. Keynes is said to have managed “to break old taboos of 
neoclassical theory against the regulating and ‘repairing’ state interventions”, and he did so 
“not only because of social considerations, but also in order to safeguard the acceptance and 
capacity of survival of the capitalist system” (Rothschild 2004: 176). The kind of society 
Keynes had in mind combined three major goals: economic efficiency, social justice and 
personal freedom (see Rothschild 2004: 178). Keynes despised “the absurd love of money, 
which was half criminal and half pathological”, a judgement Rothschild shared 
wholeheartedly (Rothschild 2004: 180). 
What was Kurt Rothschild’s view of Karl Marx? He admired Marx, the ‘”philosophical” 
economist’ (2004: 73), but he did not follow him closely. He called him “the only one among 
the great economists and perhaps even among the social scientists who ventured … to connect 
and relate to one another the various social spheres – economy, politics, social relationships, 
culture – and who ‘dreamt the impossible dream’ (Don Quixote) to bring this complex 
network into a comprehensive perspective and theoretically under a single umbrella” (2004: 
73-4). In this Rothschild’s position is similar to Schumpeter’s, who also held Marx in high 
esteem. In an interview he explained that “in Marx I was interested in the ideology and in the 
content” of  the analysis (2006: 38). Interestingly he added that Marx showed that economics 
“has a certain proximity to exact, analytical thinking, just like physics”, and that “This is also 
the attraction of neoclassical economics to me” (2006: 38). But above and beyond this 
Rothschild admired Marx’s attempt to develop a universal social science, his concern with the 
lot of the labouring poor and his quest for a better and more just society, motivations 
Rothschild shared. 
According to Rothschild the two most outstanding features of Marx’s analysis are, first, his 
understanding that capitalism is a “conflict prone system” and not a harmonious society and, 
secondly, his combination of the economic with a “sociological perspective” (2004: 82-3). 
This also allowed him to see the role of power, conflict and class antagonism in the economy 
and society (2004: 93). “Methodological individualism” and the idea that a society could be 
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analysed in terms of a representative agent – Robinson Crusoe – Marx would in all probability 
have rejected as utterly misleading, and Rothschild agreed with him (2004: 83-4). Marx has to 
be credited, Rothschild insisted, with having “provided more space for questions of 
distribution, power elements and the political dimension” (2004: 84). 
The sociological-cum-cultural elements are perhaps best visible in the labour market, which 
according to Marx “is not a market like any other market”; it rather is a market on which “an 
unequal scramble over the sharing out of the product between profits and wages takes place” 
(2004: 84), and in which employers frequently prevail. Rothschild’s view of labour markets is 
similar (see, for example, Rothschild 1954 and 1988). 
We now turn to the largely neglected problem of power in economics. We begin with a 
discussion of the problem in conventional marginalist economics. 
7. Power in conventional neoclassical economics 
In order to be clear about what is missing in neoclassical economics as regards the role of 
power, one ought first to be clear about what is there in this regard.
4
 We might start with Max 
Weber’s definition of power. Power, he wrote, “is every opportunity within a social 
relationship to realize one’s own will even against opposition, irrespective of the source of 
this opportunity” (Weber 1972: 28). The focus of mainstream economics, as Rothschild 
stressed, is perfect competition, and the reason for this is that it reflects in an ideal way liberty 
and equality in the economic realm or, in other words, a situation in which none of the agents 
on whichever side of the market possesses power and is thus capable of forcing other agents 
to come to terms with his or her will. Agents are price takers, not price makers. The existence 
of power is therefore conceived of in terms of deviations from the ideal state of perfect 
competition. But is it also the real state of an economic system or, at least, the state towards 
which any real market economy tends to gravitate? 
The problem of “Power or Economic Law?” was famously formulated by Eugen von Böhm-
Bawerk in a paper published in 1914 and directed at the view advocated by M. Tugan-
Baranowsky et al. according to which the labour market reflects first and foremost opposed 
social powers and not demand and supply (Böhm-Bawerk 1914). Böhm-Bawerk’s answer 
contained two elements: First, social power acts through economic laws by affecting demand 
and supply. Secondly, positions of power will be reflected by extraordinarily high rates of 
                                            
4 For the following, see also Kalmbach (2008: 88-91). 
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remuneration, which, however, are of a transitory nature, since they will attract competitors 
whose activities will wipe out the existing differentials. Hence, in Böhm-Bawerk’s view 
perfect competition was the appropriate focus of economic analysis.  
This view was not generally shared by marginalist authors. They saw that there could be 
persistent deviations from perfact competition. The conventional marginalist concepts of 
power and “exploitation” go back to works of Arthur Cecil Pigou and Abba Lerner. In price 
theory the latter introduced the concept of a degree of monopoly, which equals the difference 
between the product price and its marginal cost, divided by the product price. Since in perfect 
competition the price is taken to be equal to marginal cost, the degree of monopoly is zero and 
there is no power at work in the system. Reformulating the degree of monopoly in terms of 
the Amoroso-Robinson formula shows that the degree of monopoly expresses the price 
elasticity of demand. 
In a more general formulation deviations from perfect competition in both product and factor 
markets have to be taken into account. On the input side power is now reflected in a deviation 
of the remuneration of a factor from its marginal product. The price of one unit of factor 
service i, qi, can now be shown to be determined in the following way: 
(3)    qi = ’p (1 – 1/)(1 + 1/)
–1
 
where  ’ is the marginal product, p the product price,   the price elasticity of demand and  
the elasticity of supply of the i-th factor service under consideration (i = 1, 2, …., n). If and 
only if 
(4)               
the marginal productivity rule applies in its well-known form. Monopolistic and 
monopsonistic conditions imply that factors will not be paid their marginal products. This 
finding has prompted some neoclassical authors, especially Arthur Cecil Pigou, to speak of 
“exploitation”, thereby deliberately invoking a concept of Marx. However, the meaning of the 
concept is very different: Whereas in Marx only workers could be exploited, in the neoclassial 
conceptualization in principle each and every proprietor of a factor of production could be 
exploited by getting less than (the value of) its marginal product. 
Hence within the confines just delineated power can also be dealt with by neoclassical theory 
and it is expressed through the economic laws at work. Power may be discernible both in 
product and factor markets and its effects are seen in terms of deviations of prices and rates of 
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remuneration of factors from what they would be in conditions of universal perfect 
competition. As Kurt Rothschild perceptively remarked, perfect competition has thus been 
advanced to the status of a norm against which reality is assessed. Due to certain optimality 
properties of perfect competition as they were derived within the conventional neoclassical 
framework this norm also played an important role in economic policy and especially in 
competition policy and Ordnungspolitik. 
However, as Joseph Alois Schumpeter (1912) had already forcefully argued, the vision of the 
economic system expressed by the neoclassical doctrine is misleading in that it totally sets 
aside the role of innovations and dynamically increasing returns and the associated 
monopolistic elements that come with them. As we know from various publications of 
Rothschild, he basically shared Schumpeter’s respective misgivings. And he insisted that 
power was a much more pervasive phenomenon than reflected in the cases mentioned. 
Conventional neoclassical economics had dealt with only some of its dimensions, but had left 
out others, especially political, institutional and sociological ones. This of necessity led to a 
highly distorted view of the world. 
How did classical economics deal with the problem of power? 
8. Power in classical economics 
Rothschild praised repeatedly the classical economists for their concern with the problem of 
power. He wrote, for example: 
‚Early classical “political economy” right up to the days of J. S. Mill was fully 
aware of the sociological and power background of economic events. The 
writings of this era abound with remarks and hints at the interplay of market 
mechanisms and outside intervention. It was only in its later stages that the 
main strand of traditional economic thinking turned inwards towards “purely” 
economic matters, paying increasingly less regard to extra-market and power 
affairs.‘ (Rothschild 1971b: 8) 
Whilst I agree with the assessment that power played an important role in the classical 
authors, the important point to mention seems to me to be the fact that power came to the fore 
right within the classical authors’ analysis of the economic system. This was only possible 
because of their very different approach to the theory of value and distribution and a concept 
of value or price that differs markedly from the later marginalist one. In the latter, due to the 
full employment assumption normal prices are seen to reflect relative scarcities of factors of 
  
103 
 
production, whereas in the classical authors prices reflect the prevailing conditions of 
production and reproduction and the actual distribution of income between capitalists, land 
owners and workers. It is easiest to illustrate the classical approach in terms of the well known 
equations of production and relative prices in the simple case of single production, setting 
aside also the problem of land and rents, 
(5)      p = (1 + r)Ap + wl 
(6)      d
T
p = 1, 
where p is the vector of “normal” or “natural” prices, or “prices of production”, A is the 
material input matrix per unit of output, l is the labour input vector, d is the vector of amounts 
of commodities constituting the standard of value or numéraire, r is the competitive rate of 
profits and w is the wage rate in terms of the standard. These equations have been studied in 
great depth (see Sraffa 1960 and more recently Kurz and Salvadori 1997). For a given system 
of production in use, defined in terms of the input requirements of means of production, A, 
and labour, l, one can show that there is an inverse relationship between the general rate of 
profits, r, and the real wage rate, w, and the vector of prices is typically a complex function of 
one of the distributive variables, e.g. r, given A and l, that is 
(7)               w = f(r),   with   dw/dr < 0, and 
(8)      p = p(r) 
for economically feasible levels of r (and non-negative levels of w). Equation (7) reflects 
David Ricardo’s fundamental law of distribution: “The greater the portion of the result of 
labour that is given to the labourer, the smaller must be the rate of profits, and vice versa” 
(Ricardo, Works VIII: 194). 
This was the first clear analytical expression of what Adam Smith had bothered a great deal: 
the conflict over the distribution of income between “workmen” and “masters” in chapter VIII 
of book I of The Wealth of Nations (1976, WN, I.viii). Smith had stressed:  
‘What are the common wages of labour, depends every where upon the contract 
usually made between those two parties, whose interests are by no means the 
same. The workmen desire to get as much, the masters to give as little as 
possible. The former are disposed to combine in order to raise, the latter in 
order to lower the wages of labour.‘ (WN, I.iii.11) 
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Due to differences in the power of each party, wages will be higher or lower and profits 
correspondingly lower or higher. As regards the main determinants of the two parties’ relative 
power, Smith mentioned especially the size of each party – an argument that foreshadows the 
problem of collective choice and action, political and institutional factors, such as the 
prohibition of strikes etc., and the fact that in conflicts workers cannot hold out for a long time 
due to a lack of resources. Therefore he saw the masters to have commonly “the advantage in 
the dispute, and force the other party into a compliance with their terms” (WN, I.viii.12). I 
suspect that Smith would not have been surprised by the huge bonuses paid to managers in 
recent times despite worsening performances and even bankruptcies of the companies they 
led. Smith knew well the East Indian Company and the working of “clubs” and understood 
what it meant, if there was no competition and no countervailing power and managers were 
able to determine their salaries and gratifications by themselves.  
Economic, social and political power speaks through the above equations. The “scramble for 
the surplus”, that is, the conflict over the distribution of income, can be expressed in terms of 
them. For example, the greater is the power of trade unions, the higher the general level of 
real wages and, correspondingly, the lower the rate of profits. Due to different proportions of 
labour and means of production in the production of the various commodities, different 
constellations of r and w will typically also lead to different systems of relative prices. 
Generalisations of the above equations allows one to study the implications of deviations from 
free competition. If, for example, different industries exhibit different degrees of monopoly 
than this can be reflected in differential rates of profit. Or if different trade unions are 
differently effective in advocating the interests of its members in wage negotiations, then this 
will be reflected in differential wage rates. In this way one can express both what Adam Smith 
and Karl Marx called “class conflicts” and what Alfred Marshall called “trade conflicts”. 
Clearly, for a given overall real wage rate the rate of profit obtained in one industry is 
inversely related to at least one rate of profit in another industry, given the system of 
production in use. And given the general rate of profits the wage rate paid for one kind of 
labour is of neccessity inversely related to at least one wage rate paid for another kind of 
labour. Therefore, when the CEO of the Deutsche Bank, Ackermann, put forward the 
proposition that the bank must earn at least a rate of return of 25%, this ought to have been 
understood by workers and/or other sectors of the economy as a sort of declaration of war. 
9. Welfare economics 
A crucial assumption of neoclassical economics in general and of welfare economics in 
particular is that agents are possessed of autonomous preferences and that therefore “supply” 
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and “demand” can be envisaged as entirely independent from one another. However, the 
realism of this axiom has been questioned from an early time onward. For example, John 
Maurice Clark stressed       
‘Economic wants for particular objects are manufactured out of this simple and 
elemental raw material [primitive instincts] just as truly as rubber heels, tennis 
balls, fountain pens, and automobile tires are manufactured out of the same 
crude rubber. The wheels of industry grind out both kinds of products. In a 
single business establishment one department furnishes the desires which the 
other departments are to satisfy.‘ (Clark 1918: 8, emphasis added) 
And several years later Frank H. Knight insisted that “one of the most fundamental 
weaknesses of the market system is the use of persuasive influence by sellers upon buyers and 
a general excessive tendency to produce wants for goods rather than goods for the 
satisfaction of wants” (Knight [1934] 1982, emphasis added). 
Alas, this possibility of agents using part of their property – their “endowment” – to alter, in 
their favour, the needs and wants of those with whom they deal and exchange is neglected in 
conventional neoclassical theory. The Arrow-Debreu model, which purports to be “general”, 
sets completely aside this possibility, which according to both Clark and Knight is ubiquitous 
in market economies. 
Rothschild shared this concern.
5
 In his work on welfare theory (see, in particular, Rothschild 
1992) he questioned the usefulness of this branch of mainstream economics and arrived at the 
conclusion that “the ambition of New Welfare Economics to find on the basis of economic-
theoretical constructions an ideology-free ‘scientific’ basis for ethical-economic value 
judgements has not been satisfied and presumably cannot be satisfied” (1992: 56). 
Indeed, if power, i.e. resources of one sort or another, are used to shift the preferences of 
some other market participants, then the usual results of Welfare Economics, whether Old or 
New, fall to the ground. How is one to make a welfare comparison of two alternative 
economic equilibria which differ because in one of them resources have effectively been used 
to make some of the agents’ preferences different from what they would have been in the 
                                            
5 Rothschild (2009: 568) lists in addition a number of further difficulties welfare economics 
encounters, including the one already mentioned by J.E. Meade, that in conditions of increasing and 
decreasing returns “one cannot deal separately with the question of ‘size’ and ‘distribution’.” 
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absence of such resource use? Obviously, one cannot ex definitione have recourse to a 
straightforward Paretian Welfare Economics approach. Vis-à-vis the nature of the difference 
involved the approach is inapplicable. One might compare the two alternatives from both the 
perspective of the preferences before and after the change. But there is no presumption that 
the two rankings will be the same. 
With his insistence on the importance of taking power into account Rothschild has put his 
fingers into an open wound of neoclassical theory and especially Welfare Economics. He has 
done so from an early time onwards. Alas, those whom he addressed took little notice of his 
warnings. His final verdict on New Welfare Economics was that its dream “to find an 
objective indicator for making welfare judgements regarding welfare changes that is accepted 
by everyone and that can be used for policy decisions” did not come true (Rothschild 2009: 
571). 
10. Empowered economics vs. a “power-free” economics 
Put in a nutshell, Rothschild was disenchanted with conventional neoclassical economic 
theory because it portrays the economic world as if was largely “power-free”. This is its major 
shortcoming. Looking at the world through the prism it proposes is like looking at it with 
blinkers that cut out what is truly important. This kind of complaint can be found already in 
early contributions of Rothschild, especially in his edition of the Penguin reader Power in 
Economics in 1971, and was emphasized again in a recent essay by him entitled “The absence 
of power in contemporary economic theory” (Rothschild 2002). 
To be clear, Rothschild admits that monopoly power and bargaining power are dealt with in 
mainstream economics, and in game theory and other more recent developments there are also 
attempts to come to grips with other aspects of the problem at hand. But the few and timid 
attempts highlight all the more the absence of the problem of power in conventional 
economics. Why is it that power is given short shrift in neoclassical economics? Rothschild 
sees essentially three reasons: 
1. Economics is under the spell of “the sheer force of tradition”, which explains to some 
extent the “‘hysteresis’ of power exclusion” (2002: 436). The tradition under 
consideration is said to have been started by Adam Smith with his emphasis on 
competition and to have been continued “in the 19th century from Ricardo to 
Marshall”; it is said to have led up to “the important and impressive structure of 
classical and neoclassical economics with power remaining on the sidelines” (2002: 
436). 
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2. There is the “fear that the ‘scientific’ structure of the neoclassical edifice could be 
contaminated by … sociology, psychology, and non-neoclassical economics” (2002: 
439). Economists who pride themselves with having established a “hard” or “exact” 
science in the image of physics insist on “rigour” to the detriment of relevance. 
3. The request that science ought to be “value-free” and non-ideological has contributed 
to “the dominance of a ‘powerfree’ neoclassical theory” (2002: 440), which allegedly 
meets this request. 
To my great surprise Rothschild in the first reason given put together Adam Smith and the 
classical economists on the one hand and the marginalist authors on the other, although we 
have heard in Section 8 above that the classical economists cannot be accused of overlooking 
the problem of power. Even in the 2002 essay Rothschild reiterated his earlier point of view. 
And in his 1971 edition he stressed: “Early classical ‘political economy’ right up to the days 
of J. S. Mill was fully aware of the sociological and power background of economic events” 
(1971: 8). What apparently prompted Rothschild to place the classical and marginalist authors 
in the same camp of powerfree economics is that he identified the classical concept of free 
competition with the marginalist concept of perfect competition. He wrote, for example, that 
“one of the most important causes [leading to a powerless economics] was the complete 
victory of ‘perfect competition’ as the basic model for economic theorizing” (1971b: 8). He 
then even associated the classical economists with the Chicago school and the Neo-Liberals of 
the Freiburg school in Germany (1971b: 9, fn. 2). 
In my view this is based on a misconception. The free competition of classical economics is 
an entirely different animal compared to the perfect competition of marginalism. Free 
competition means the absence of barriers to entry in and to exit from markets and implies a 
tendency towards a uniform rate of profits and a uniform wage rate for each and every 
particular kind of labour. It does not mean that there is no power, as we have seen with regard 
to Adam Smith’s view of the scramble for the surplus. Contrary to the marginalist concept of 
perfect competition the classical concept of free competition does not postulate an infinite 
number of agents both on the supply and on the demand side of the market. In Smith’s case 
employers are powerful essentially for the three reasons given and can push wages down to a 
social and historical subsistence level, unless a brisk accumulation of capital implies a rapid 
growth of the demand for “hands” and wages are bid up to levels above subsistence. 
As regards his first reason, Rothschild relies on a passage in John Hicks’s Value and Capital, 
first published in 1939:  
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‘It has to be recognized that a general abandonment of the assumption of 
perfect competition, a universal adoption of the assumption of monopoly, must 
have very destructive consequences for economic theory. Under monopoly the 
stability conditions become indeterminate, and the basis on which economic 
laws can be constructed is therefore shorn away … It is, I believe, only possible 
to save anything from the wreck – and it must be remembered that the 
threatened wreckage is that of the greater part of general equilibrium theory – if 
we can assume that the markets confronting most of the firms with which we 
shall be dealing do not differ very greatly from perfectly competitive markets.‘ 
(Hicks 1946: 83-4; quoted in Rothschild 1971b: 10, fn. 4, and Rothschild 
2002: 439) 
While abandoning the assumption of perfect competition may be bad for neoclassical theory, 
it would be good for economics in order to increase its “realism”. To paraphrase the late Paul 
Samuelson: economists have not been born to live easy lives, but to address the economic 
problems that are out there. 
As regards the second reason, Rothschild disputed time and again the claim that economics is 
or could ever become a sort of social physics. By the nature of its object of study and the 
latter’s complexity economics is bound to be, and remain, a soft science, he insisted (see 
Rothschild 1991: 12). Closely related to this, he dubbed the view that only deductive 
reasoning and mathematical models should count as economic science “nonsense” 
(Rothschild 2009: 152). 
As regards the third reason, it is easy to show that whilst ideological elements have 
demonstratively been thrown out by the front door of marginalist economics, they have re-
entered the edifice by the back door. This is a recurrent theme in Rothschild’s work and 
expresses his scepticism as to the possibility of a “value-free” economics. In this regard 
Rothschild’s view is again very Schumpeterian with its emphasis on the role of “vision” in 
shaping an author’s perception of the world. 
11. Concluding observations 
Rothschild’s heterodoxy comes well to the fore in the following statement. “When you ask me 
where I stand, I don’t know” (2006: 39). He added:  
‘In principle there is mainstream economics, neoclassical theory, and there are 
the heterodox econonomists. This is an absolute chasm. There are also 
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differences between heterodox economists, but this is the big chasm and there 
is one variant that rejects neoclassical theory a hundred percent and calls it the 
wrong way. – And then there are others, who say that neoclassical theory has a 
certain justification, that it is one of several possible aspects. … I reckon that I 
myself belong to the second group.‘ (2006: 39)  
Rothschild was an eclectic. He picked up from the different economic traditions what he 
considered to be sound and helpful and therefore he did not (want to) belong to any one 
school. His was critical of the mainstream, but he did not entirely dismiss it. He also did not 
wish to build a school himself and transform students into close followers of his ideas. Instead 
he was keen to expose them to alternative ways of seeing a particular problem and to enrich 
the picture by bringing in political and sociological aspects. His ideal was a universal social 
science that took into account all facets of economic life. He opted for greater realism in 
economics, for a greater down-to-the-earth approach and deplored “the complete victory of 
‘perfect competition’ as the basic model for economic theorizing” (1971b: 8). Conventional 
marginalist theory, he maintained, is hooked on an “Utopian formulation of society in which 
power is so widely and thinly distributed that its influence can be neglected” (1971b: 9). 
In Rothschild’s view basically all theories are more or less incomplete, qua theories, because 
they always set aside factors that are at work in the real economy. Marginal productivity 
theory “will be of immediate value in interpreting the wage situation” (1954: 27), provided 
the situation under consideration comes close to the one contemplated by the theory. 
However, there are two reasons why this is typically not the case. First, man is indivisible and 
therefore the marginalist mode of thinking does not apply fully. Secondly, there is “the 
economy of high wages” (1954: 29). As Adam Smith had already argued, high wages may 
spur labour productivity: “The higher wage and the higher standard of living that goes with it 
will increase the productivity of workers” (1954: 29). But this effect of high wages is 
typically ignored by marginal productivity theory. Therefore, a higher real wage rate need not 
lead firms to reduce employment. If firms take into account the positive impact of high wages 
on labour productivity, higher wages may lead to an increase in employment and not to a 
decrease. The conventional neoclassical view of the labour market and thus of the economic 
process as a whole cannot generally be sustained. 
Rothschild’s view was panoptic, not monomanic: he saw many things at work in society and 
in the economy and not only one thing.  
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I found the presentation of Heinz Kurz very interesting and stimulating. It gives an excellent 
and impressive account of Kurt Rothschid’s scientific position, in particular with respect to 
Smith, Ricardo, Marx and Keynes as well as the Austrian economists Menger, Böhm-Bawerk 
and Schumpeter. I would like to add some comments: 
My first and most striking observation is that Heinz Kurz draws a very broad sketch of 
heterodox economics, encompassing Carl Menger, Böhm-Bawerk, Schumpeter, Hayek, 
Steindl and Kurt Rothschild – a very diverse group of economists indeed. So what do they 
have in common? Heinz Kurz argues that all of them challenged some elements of the 
“orthodoxy” of their time, developed new ideas, and some of them became part of the “new” 
orthodoxy –Kurz portrays the “orthodoxy” as evolving over time by incorporating elements 
that were once considered “heterodox”. 
 
1. I am very sympathetic with this view; when reading it, it immediately reminded me of the 
positions David Colander put forward recently and which I would like to recapitulate: 
Colander differentiates between  
 Mainstream and “the cutting edge” of it 
 Orthodoxy and 
 Heterodoxy. 
For Colander, Mainstream and its cutting edge is the today’s evolving and constantly 
changing science in which many new ideas are formulated and tried out in discussions; most 
of the new ideas are rejected and only some of them survive. Although – or perhaps because – 
he is a very close observer of the current scientific discourse, Colander stresses that it is 
difficult to define a static core of this dynamic and constantly changing Mainstream. 
In contrast, for Colander the Orthodoxy is the static representation of “what historians of 
economic thought have classified as the most recently dominant “school of thought” 
(Colander et al, 2004, 490). It can only be defined in retrospect; it is an abstraction and never 
represents what the mainstream was doing back then or currently is in fact doing.  
Mainstream economics and its cutting edge evolve in constant dispute with the Orthodoxy – 
accepting some of its elements, challenging others, and eventually replacing them. 
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Colander puts in that group economists such as Samuelson, Arrow, Solow, Schelling, Sen, 
Stiglitz, Sims, Woodford, Akerlof, Thaler, Krueger, Bhagwati (Colander et al., 2004, 493) – a 
list similar and complementary to the one put forward by Kurz. 
For Heterodoxy – according to Colander – it is not easy to find its place: For Heterodoxy it is 
tempting to define its position with respect to Orthodoxy which provides a clearly defined 
“school of thought” as a focus for heterodox research interest and criticism. That is a 
comparatively comfortable – but potentially sterile – position. The alternative for Heterodoxy 
is to seek a more challenging – but potentially more rewarding – position; i.e. a position with 
respect to the Mainstream from which to contribute and influence the ever changing “cutting 
edge” of the Mainstream. In this view, Heterodoxy shares actually much with the mainstream 
and its cutting edge: “… both mainstream and heterodox economists are working on issues 
that challenge neoclassical orthodoxy …” (Colander et al, 2004, p.492). 
I definitely agree with Heinz Kurz that Rothschild found his position in the latter, trying to 
influence the ”cutting edge” and/or taking from there ideas/models that he considered relevant 
for his subjects and questions. 
 
2. Having drawn this picture of a quite fuzzy mainstream and its cutting edge, can Colander 
say something about its definition? He claims that it is method that ultimately defines the 
current Mainstream in economics (see Colander, 2000, 137), and provides a definition that 
Keynes put forward in a letter to Harrod in 1938: 
“Economics is the science of thinking in terms of models joined to the art of choosing models 
which are relevant to the contemporary world.” 
I admit that might be a bit overoptimistic with respect to the current Mainstream – I would 
like to share this position as a form of calculated optimism but perhaps this is only wishful 
thinking. However, I am deeply convinced that this was indeed the position of Kurt 
Rothschild. 
 
3. Returning again to the picture of a fuzzy, experimental cutting edge of the mainstream, the 
question arises how those ideas disseminate to the rest of the profession. Colander points to 
the important role of teaching in that process (Colander et al, 2004, 493). Kurt Rothschild was 
an excellent academic teacher; he was extremely quick in introducing ideas from that “cutting 
edge” into teaching – he even wrote textbooks to make those ideas accessible to third year 
students. When I studied with Kurt Rothschild back in the late 70’s of the last century, we 
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already had a textbook (or its manuscript) on disequilibrium theory (a theory that was 
developed in the decade before). Even more astonishing, I find, is the fact that Kurt 
Rothschild published a textbook on labour economics in 1988 covering the new theories of 
labour markets that started entering the Mainstream around 1980. Perhaps he was so quick in 
that field because unemployment was indeed one of his core subjects; because in that field the 
need for new ideas was most urgent; because some of these new ideas correspond to what 
Kurt Rothschild himself has put forward himself for already some time (as Heinz Kurz points 
out with respect to the efficiency wage theory); and – last but not least – because those ideas 
have been around in the Heterodoxy for quite some time (definitely not unnoticed by Kurt 
Rothschild): Stiglitz (1974, 1976) published on the labour turnover model and the efficiency 
wage hypothesis in the context of development economics. The efficiency wage hypothesis 
was well around in Radical and Marxian economics (for an overview see Rebitzer, 1993); a 
very clear account is found in Gintis (1976, 43): “The model we have presented indicates …. 
that the market wage represents a minimum which will normally be exceeded. For in this 
situation, at the market wage, a major instrument of the employer in evincing appropriate 
worker behavior – the threat of dismissal – is absent. Raising the wage above the market rate, 
however, restores the threat of dismissal, and hence is part of a profit-maximizing strategy.” 
Kurt Rothschild found his position at the “cutting edge” where mainstream and heterodox 
economists challenge orthodoxy. He was very quick in translating academic ideas into 
teaching; and he definitely contributed to educating a generation of economists sharing the 
view of economics as “the science of thinking in terms of models joined to the art of choosing 
models which are relevant to the contemporary world.” 
References 
Colander, D. (2000): The Death of Neoclassical Economics. Journal of the History of Economic 
Thought 22(2): 127-143. 
Colander, D., Holt, P.F., Rosser, B. (2004): The Changing Face of Mainstream. Review of 
Political Economy 16(4): 485-499. 
Gintis, H. (1976): The nature of labor exchange and the theory of capitalist production. Review of 
Radical Political Economics 8 (2): 36–54. 
Rebitzer, J.B. (1993): Radical Political Economy and the Economics of Labor Markets. Journal of 
Economic Literature 31 (3): 1394-1434. 
Stiglitz, J.E. (1974): Alternative Theories of Wage Determination and Unemployment in LDC's: 
The LaborTurnover Model. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 88 (2): 194-227. 
Stiglitz, J.E. (1976): The Efficiency Wage Hypothesis, Surplus Labour, and the Distribution of 
Income in L.D.C.s. Oxford Economic Papers, New Series 28 (2): 185-207.  
  
116 
 
Harry Bloch* and Mita Bhattacharya** 
 
 
Price Theory and Oligopoly 
  
                                            
* Curtin University, Australia 
** Monash University, Australia 
  
117 
 
1. Introduction 
In his seminal article, ‘Price theory and oligopoly’ (Rothschild 1947), Kurt Rothschild 
critically reviews recent developments in the theory of imperfect competition and puts 
forward several ideas on how the theory might develop in the future. Subsequent 
developments in the theory of imperfect competition have shown the fruitfulness of his ideas. 
In this paper we review these developments and discuss the correspondence to Rothschild’s 
original propositions. We also discuss ideas from Rothschild (1947) and his later writings that 
can stimulate developments in price theory in the future. 
The main theoretical works discussed in Rothschild (1947) are Edward Chamberlin’s Theory 
of Monopolistic Competition (Chamberlin, 1932) and Joan Robinson’s Theory of Imperfect 
Competition (Robinson 1933). Rothschild hails these works as major advances in theory as 
they brought a large number of new cases into the formal theory of markets, extending the 
theory that had previously relied predominantly on the two polar cases of perfect competition 
and pure monopoly. However, he notes that while these advances allow theory to be applied 
to cases, such as product differentiation across firms, which had been treated as exceptions in 
the theory of competition and monopoly, they do not go far in dealing with interdependence 
of firms and the resulting indeterminateness of pricing outcomes. 
 Rothschild notes the hesitancy of economists to move away from theory that provides the 
type of determinateness for price found in the theory of competition and monopoly. He also 
notes that the tools available for properly examining pricing behaviour when firms are 
interdependent had not yet been developed.
1
 However, he suggests ‘a general approach which 
– while much less elegant than traditional price theory – promises a more realistic treatment 
of the oligopoly problem.’ (Rothschild, 1947, p. 307)  He then proceeds to set out ‘some 
considerations to which this approach gives rise.’ (ibid)  
                                            
1 He comments perceptively on the potential to tackle these problems using the analysis presented in 
the book, The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, that had just been published by Morgenstern 
and von Neumann (1944), even though he had to rely only on review articles to make this judgment 
(see Rothschild (1947, p. 306, fn. 4). The development of game theory as a framework for analysing 
price behaviour has been impressive. However, Rothschild (1993) points to limits to extent to which 
game theory has been successful in dealing with interdependence in oligopoly pricing and continues to 
support the pursuit of alternative approaches. Thus, game theory is only discussed peripherally in this 
paper.  
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The remainder of this paper concentrates on reviewing developments in research on oligopoly 
theory and related empirical research on pricing in oligopoly over the years since the 
publication of Rothschild (1947), focussing in particular on developments related to the 
considerations proposed by Rothschild. We examine, in order, research on the topics of price 
rigidity and other pricing practices, non-price competition and barriers to entry, internal 
organisation of the firm, and the political and economic power exerted by large firms. In the 
process, we examine later writings by Rothschild that relate to these topics. We then conclude 
by reviewing Rothschild’s writings for guidance on considerations that might fruitfully be 
explored in future research related to price theory. 
2. Price rigidity and other pricing practices 
Essential to the propositions in Rothschild (1947) is the notion that in oligopoly ‘a “struggle 
for position” is taking place side by side with an attempt to make the best of every position 
that is held at any special moment’ (Rothschild, 1947, p. 309-10). Also, important is the 
treatment of price as a dynamic phenomenon in the sense that the implications of a price at 
any point in time for a firm’s position relative to its current rivals, its customers and its 
potential rivals need to be taken into account. This leads Rothschild to conclude that, ‘Since, 
therefore, the quoted price is not the mechanic result of impersonal market forces nor the 
essential adjustment to a constantly changing environment, but the expression of a strategic 
policy, it is clear that there will be a tendency for its rigid maintenance.’ (Rothschild, 1947, p. 
311) 
Price rigidity was not a new concept in economics. As Rothschild (1947) notes, Hall and 
Hitch (1939) had reported findings from interviews with businessmen in which price rigidity 
featured as an observed phenomenon. Also, Sweezy (1939) had put forward the theoretical 
explanation of rigid prices based on kinked demand curves. However, rather than rely on 
empirical evidence as in Hall and Hitch or on a profit-maximising model as in Sweezy, 
Rothschild’s proposition regarding price rigidity is based on his general approach that situates 
oligopoly behaviour in the context of the struggle for position and making the best out of 
every position at any special moment. 
Rothschild abandons the neoclassical approach, which is universal in the sense that it is 
derived from axioms, such as profit maximisation, that are meant to apply to every situation. 
Instead, he pursues an approach that is general in the sense of having broad applicability, but 
with recognition that prices are subject to other influences not incorporated within the general 
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theory.
2
 The term, strategic policy, combined with the notion of struggle, reflects the 
environment of uncertainty in which oligopoly firms operate. Rothschild notes that oligopoly 
firms have a security motive as well as a profit motive (Rothschild, 1947, p. 308). Further, 
there is scope for judgement and for taking definite positions in the market, which would be 
unjustified in an environment of certainty or rational expectations. The firms make choices 
that are not the unique outcome of external conditions. Price rigidity is a feature of oligopoly 
in this sense in that changes in cost or demand conditions don’t necessarily lead to changes in 
price.  
The mainstream of neoclassical economics has never accepted price rigidity as a pervasive 
characteristic of oligopoly. Both the logic and the empirical support for the proposition have 
been strongly attacked. One serious logical problem is that the theory is incomplete, as it 
explains why prices don’t change but not how the fixed price is determined (see Reid, 1981 
for a full discussion). Price rigidity can at best be considered as a theory of price in the short 
run, a theory of price change or rather lack of price change, but it is not a theory determining 
the price level and certainly not a theory of price in the long run. The empirical attack has 
been focussed on the distinction between posted prices and transaction prices, with the latter 
shown to be much more flexible than the former (see Stigler and Kindahl, 1970 for evidence 
on this point). 
Rothschild’s point is that the tendency to maintain rigid prices is a pricing practice notable 
specifically in the context of oligopoly, because it is when firms are engaged in the struggle 
for market position and aware of their interdependence that this type of behaviour makes 
sense. Immediately after arguing for the rigidity of quoted prices, Rothschild (1947, p. 312) 
adds that, ‘Oligopolistic circumstances lead to a multitude of conditions surrounding the 
quoted price.’ He recognizes deviations from posted prices as a common occurrence and 
further discusses circumstances that lead to purposeful deviation from the normal practice of 
maintaining fixed posted prices, including the aggressive pursuit of a stronger market position 
(Rothschild, 1947, pp.313-317). Thus, attacks on the theoretical and empirical validity of 
price rigidity do not directly address the proposition put forward by Rothschild, which is that 
the circumstances of oligopoly lead firms to try to maintain fixed prices as a normal business 
                                            
2 These other influences are not simply random shocks that have no systematic impact on the 
equilibrium outcome, as in neoclassical theory. Rather, they impact on the outcome in a systematic 
way, but only under special circumstances that are considered in more detailed analysis on a case-by-
case basis. 
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practice in circumstances where profit maximisation would suggest a pattern of fluctuating 
prices. 
Price rigidity remains controversial in economics, but its practical relevance has dissipated in 
an era of endemic inflation. Rigid prices are not an appropriate business practice for achieving 
a secure position when costs and prices of substitute products are normally rising. Rather, 
maintaining rigid prices would lead to steadily declining profit margins under such 
circumstances, which would undermine the financial stability of the firm.  Thus, alternative 
pricing practices are required for oligopoly under inflationary conditions. This is fully 
consistent with Rothschild’s general theory of pricing in oligopoly. 
An alternative pricing principle discussed briefly in Rothschild (1947) is full-cost pricing of 
the type identified by Hall and Hitch (1939) in their interviews with businessmen. Rothschild 
suggests that this type of pricing is a 
‘perfectly logical outcome of the market situation with which they were 
primarily concerned – monopolistic competition with an admixture of 
oligopoly’ as alternative pricing practices... When, however, the position of the 
oligopolists or duopolists is more powerful and not easily invaded they will not 
keep to the full-cost principle, but will add varying and " abnormal " profit 
percentages to their costs  in proportion to their assumed strength, or they will 
fix prices without reference to costs altogether.’ (Rothschild, 1947, pp.311)  
The general form of pricing practice covered by this passage is mark-up pricing, prices that 
are set by adding a percentage profit margin to some measure of unit cost.  
Mark-up pricing satisfies the basic requirements of Rothschild’s general theory of pricing in 
oligopoly in that it is a practice that allows firms to maintain a degree of stability in the 
struggle for position while doing the best they can at any special moment. When all firms in 
an industry follow mark-up pricing rules and face similar inflationary cost increases, their 
relative position in price can be maintained and the threat of price wars minimised. This is the 
scenario discussed by Rothschild (1993) in a comparison of a Stackleberg model of oligopoly 
with a model that he labels the “Sylos approach” in that it is based on the work of Sylos-
Labini (1969, 1979 and 1987). Rothschild (1993, p.169) concludes the comparison by stating 
that, ‘Openness of approach can be important. From this point of view case studies, numerical 
and graphical exercises, and so on, have a role to play in addition to or in place more “exact” 
but less open analytical methods – more so in the sphere of oligopoly than in other branches 
of price and market structure theory.’ 
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Variants of mark-up pricing are dominant in the post-Keynesian theory of pricing (see Lee, 
1998).  Applying mark-up pricing to the manufacturing sector of economy, which is generally 
characterized by oligopoly, provides a powerful tool in analysing aggregate economic 
activity. In particular, Kalecki (1971) shows how the distribution of income in the economy 
evolves over the business cycle by combining mark-up pricing in oligopoly with competitive 
pricing in primary production. Similar models are widely applied by other authors for 
analysing many aspects of income distribution and inflation.
3
  Indeed, Rothschild (1972) in 
his analysis of pricing in an inflationary environment directly applies a variant of mark-up 
pricing.
4
  
As with price rigidity, mark-up pricing is not a complete theory of pricing. It is a theory of 
price change, but not the price level.  In particular, in the context of oligopoly an explanation 
of the size of the mark-up is required to complete the link between the cost level and the price 
level. Rothschild (1947) considers factors affecting the gap between cost and price in only a 
general way, but there is substantial analysis of these factors in the post-Keynesian literature 
cited above. 
3. Non-price competition and barriers to entry 
Rothschild (1947) makes scant mention of non-price competition and does not deal directly 
with issue of barriers to entry aside from a very perceptive comment on the endogeneity of 
market structure that is discussed below. Rothschild’s article was written before the seminal 
contributions of Bain (1956) and Sylos-Labini (1969), which introduced the threat of entry as 
a main consideration in the pricing behaviour of oligopoly. This section discusses these 
contributions and subsequent developments in the analysis of non-price competition and 
barriers to entry so as to assess the implications for price theory. 
The most direct implication for price theory of non-price competition and barriers to entry is 
in the entry-limiting-price model as discussed in the seminal works of Bain (1956) and Sylos-
Labini (1969) (the Italian original of 1956 is exposited in Modigliani. 1958), which identifies 
                                            
3 See, for example, applications to the analysis of inflation in Beckerman and Jenkinson (1986) and 
Bloch, et al (2004). 
4 In Rothschild (1972) prices rise by a fixed proportion of unit costs plus a percentage that depends on 
the phase of the business cycle. This ignores the role of raw material costs and results in a percentage 
profit margin that varies over the business cycle, but roughly captures the spirit of cost-plus pricing 
rules. 
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a maximum price by incumbents to deter entry of new competitors. Spence (1977) reassesses 
this model in emphasising early capital accumulation helping incumbents to build large 
capacity and to make plausible the threat to lower price after entry. Caves and Porter (1977, 
p.261) generalise this approach stating, ‘as an investment decision made under uncertainty 
and conjectural interdependence, and by recognizing that subgroup structures of industries 
impede intra-industry mobility, we have sought to generalize the theory of barriers to entry 
into a theory of mobility barriers that takes a consistent and comprehensive view of the 
decision-making behaviour of both nascent and going firms.’  
The work of Spence (1977) and Caves and Porter (1977) raise doubt on the ability of 
incumbents to use the threat of lower prices after entry as an effective deterrent to potential 
entrants. These doubts are amplified in the application of game theory to the investment 
decisions of incumbents and entrants by Dixit (1979 and 1980). Milgrom and Roberts (1982) 
further develop this line of inquiry by assuming asymmetry of information between the 
incumbent and the entrant may happen, where low demand or low marginal cost is signalled 
by the incumbent to limit entry by the entrant. Under conditions of full information and 
complete markets, Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982, p.82) consider high sunk cost in 
defining an entry barrier in a contestable market as ‘anything that requires an expenditure by a 
new entrant into an industry, but imposes no equivalent cost upon an incumbent’. At this 
point, the idea that incumbents can use low prices to deter entry disappears completely from 
the horizon.  
Much of the early research on entry barriers is based on the structure-conduct-performance 
paradigm, which ignores the dynamics of industry adjustment. In this paradigm, the number 
and size distribution of firms in an industry (as measured, for example, in a concentration 
ratio) determine profitability. Essentially, it is high entry barriers, rather than firm price or 
non-price behaviour, which result in highly concentrated industries and allow firms in these 
industries to persist in earning higher profits in without eroding their position.
5
  
This view of exogenously determined market structure is challenged by Rothschild (1947) in 
another of his prescient commentaries of the state of existing theory. Rothschild notes,  
‘these theories are all based on the assumption that the oligopolists - while 
recognising that their price activities will call forth reactions from their rivals -
                                            
5 Mueller (1986) provides detailed evidence on the extent of persistence of profits and Warning (1996) 
summarizes the literature on factors affecting profit persistence across industries. 
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acquiesce in the permanent nature of the industry's structure. But since it is 
doubtless one of the distinguishing characteristics of duopoly and oligopoly 
that the rival firms can actively influence and change the market situation, these 
theories, too, fail to provide a theoretical framework for the interpretation of 
reality.’ (Rothschild, 1947, pp. 303)  
Some fifty years later, Sutton (1991, 1998) addresses this issue in an application of game 
theory to the conceptual inadequacies of the structure-conduct performance paradigm. Sutton 
argues that a definitive inverse relation is expected between concentration and market size as 
a barrier to entry, only as long as set-up costs for the industry are exogenously determined. 
Large markets are possible with a few large firms instead of a large number of firms as long 
as the few firms have available a strategy of high expenditures on items that enhance their 
market position, such as advertising and research and development, provided those 
expenditures have no market value outside of current operations (they are “sunk costs”).  
Sutton (1991) tests this hypothesis with twenty narrowly defined food and drink industries 
across six developed countries. Further evidence in support of Sutton’s proposition is 
provided by Robinson and Chang (1996) for a cross-section of US consumer and industrial 
goods manufacturing and by Bhattacharya and Bloch (2000) for a cross-section of Australian 
manufacturing industries. 
In Sutton’s analysis, pricing does not play a role in the long-run steady-state structure of an 
industry. However, a potential role emerges in considering the process of adjustment to the 
steady state. Empirical studies of the adjustment of industrial concentration towards a steady 
state generally find that adjustment is very slow, approaching steady state at rates of no more 
than a few percentage points a year. High prices might speed or slow the adjustment process 
by affecting the timing of the investment decisions of either incumbent firms or potential 
entrants, for example by providing more internal finance for incumbents or reducing the risk 
of short-run losses for entrants. However, there is no clear evidence of a strong impact of 
profitability on the speed of adjustment.
6
 
In recent decades, the structure of many industries has changed substantially, particularly due 
to the globalization, liberalization and privatization across industries and countries. 
Transnational corporations are increasingly expanding boundaries along with local firms. The 
whole process opens up both opportunities and threats to the industries. The role of entry 
                                            
6 See Bhattacharya and Bloch (2000) for some estimates for a cross-section of Australian 
manufacturing industries and for a review of earlier studies on the speed of adjustment.  
  
124 
 
barriers has evolved from the era of Bain and Sylos-Labini to that of Sutton’s research. The 
importance of non-price competition strategies (research and development, advertising, 
variety of products, product quality, etc) has increased over time in explaining competition 
within modern industries as compared to pricing strategies.
7
 The exact calculation of price 
associated with entry-limiting pricing has been generally abandoned in theoretical models, but 
a general proposition that entry barriers do lead to higher prices relative to unit production 
costs remains (especially when the “sunk costs” associated with building barriers to entry are 
excluded from production costs). This proposition fits well with Rothschild’s general theory 
of pricing in oligopoly, where barriers to entry are taken to be one of the other factors that 
must be kept in mind when considering pricing practices in oligopoly.  
4. Internal organization 
The growing scale and scope of firms had progressed sufficiently to be noted in Rothschild 
(1947) and is later discussed by Rothschild in relation to the power of transnational 
corporations (see the next section below). Large diversified firms develop complex internal 
structures to be able to manage their extensive and diverse operations. This complexity in turn 
influences decision making in the firm, including their pricing practices. (Rothschild, 1947, p. 
313) notes the implications for pricing theory, stating that ‘Prices are therefore increasingly 
the outcome of the different pulls of the conflicting interests of various departments.’  This 
idea has not been directly developed further in subsequent literature, but there has been 
substantial development of the theory of organisation within the firm. At least some of this 
literature has implications for the strategies adopted by firms, including the way in which they 
compete in price and non-price dimensions. This section is devoted to discussing this 
literature and its implications for pricing theory in oligopoly. 
Penrose (1959) provides a seminal contribution to the theory of organisation of the modern 
firm. Penrose argues that with modern forms of internal organisation there is no constraint on 
the size of firms. Large size brings with it the advantages of productivity gains from the 
division of labour, with large firms able to take advantage of the highly specialised skills and 
knowledge of individual workers. However, specialisation of knowledge implies a lack of 
shared knowledge, which contributes to the conflicts of interest noted by Rothschild and the 
                                            
7 For example, using data for 46 major product innovations, Agarwal and Gort (2001) find that the 
average duration of between the commercial introduction of a new product and its imitation by 
competitors declined from 33 years at the beginning of the century to 3.4 years for the two decades, 
1967 to 1986. 
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consequent need for mechanisms for coordination and the managing of conflict. Further, the 
need to share knowledge implies that the growth rate of a firm is constrained by the diversion 
of managerial effort to train and integrate new managers as the scale and scope of the firm 
expands. 
Innovation is a key requirement for success in the modern large firm, which means the 
continual introduction of new knowledge to the firm. This adds to the complexity of the 
modern firm as discussed by Bloch and Metcalfe (2011). Therein, it is noted that such 
complexity contributes to the adoption of simplified rules and routines as mechanisms for 
decision making, providing a further rationale for the prevalence of rule-based pricing 
practices, such as maintaining rigid prices or basing prices on fixed mark ups over unit cost. 
Modern firms have to deal with complexity from within as well as interdependence from 
without. 
It is interesting to compare the complexity view of the firm with the developments in 
mainstream analysis of the organisation of the firm. Here, the main focus in answering why 
firms exist and what determines their boundaries in terms of size and scope has been on 
transactions costs. Following Coase (1937), the basic mainstream argument has been that 
firms exist to economise on costs that would otherwise be incurred in organising transactions 
among independent workers, suppliers of materials and owners of capital equipment. 
Likewise, firm boundaries are determined to minimise the sum of transaction costs across all 
firms. This approach fits neatly with the axiomatic approach to production and consumption 
of neoclassical economics, but presumes a well informed process operating both within firms 
and across markets. Rothschild’s continual warnings about the dangers of pursuing theoretical 
elegance at the expense of relevance are particularly appropriate here. 
In practice, firm boundaries are blurred in modern industrial world. For example, compare the 
Japanese form of industry organisation with strong inter-firm relationships to fiercely 
independent European and American firms. The former have cooperated effectively to 
enhance their competitiveness in the world market since World War II (Caves and Uekusa, 
1976). This provides an illustration of how firm boundaries (level of integration), the structure 
of financial markets (in raising capital and develop innovative activities), formal (inter-firm 
agreements and complementary capabilities) and informal organisational structure (culture of 
workforce, managerial complexity) and historical path dependence are significant in 
determining competitive strategies of transnational firms.  
Case studies provide insight into the extent to which competitive strategy is influenced by 
internal structure. A powerful illustration is provided by Chandler (1990), particularly 
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focussing on the role of investment within organisations in building modern capitalism.  In a 
review, Teece (1993, p.200) suggests ‘Chandler has grasped some fundamental facets of 
enterprise performance largely neglected by economic theory –facets which must come into 
shape focus if economists are to understand the new forms of business organizations, financial 
institutions , governance systems, and policies needed to develop and exploit the wave of new 
industrial technologies which are upon us.” Modern firms are based on a variety of 
organisational mechanisms in determining cost and pricing structure.  
Teece, et al (1994) develop the concept of ‘coherence’ of the multiproduct business firm. 
Enterprise learning, path dependencies and nature of selection environment are found to be 
significant in determining diversity amongst modern firms. The influence of the selection 
environment in determining the outcomes of strategy, particularly innovation strategy, is 
explored in detail by Nelson and Winter (1982) in their evolutionary approach to firm and 
organisational behaviour. 
5. Power 
Rothschild (1947) emphasizes that oligopoly raises concerns for power well beyond influence 
in the marketplace. In particular, the large amounts spent on lobbying by large oligopoly firms 
are noted as playing a role in shaping the firms’ position comparable to the role played by 
amounts spent on advertising. Rothschild puts forward the proposition that, 
‘The oligopolistic struggle for position and security includes political action of 
all sorts right up to imperialism. The inclusion of these "non-economic" 
elements is essential for a full explanation of oligopoly behaviour and price.’ 
(Rothschild, 1947, p. 317, italics in original) 
The importance of power in pricing theory and other areas of economics is a theme that 
continually appears in Rothschild’s writings. He devotes one of his last articles, Rothschild 
(2002), to a detailed critique of neoclassical economics for its failure to include the 
consideration of power. Here, he notes that, ‘The neglect of power in mainstream economics 
has its main roots rather in deliberate strategies to remove power questions to a subordinate 
position for inner-theoretical reasons.’  (Rothschild, 2002, p. 437) These inner-theoretical 
reasons are partly methodological, particularly the desire to maintain an axiom-based theory 
that provides exact results and thereby avoids fuzzy notions embraced by other social 
sciences, and partly ideological, especially the pursuit of favour from powerful interests 
within society who benefit from the laissez-faire implications of neoclassical economics. 
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A specific concern related to the use of power by oligopoly firms in their modern guise of 
transnational corporations is taken up in Rothschild (2005). Here, transnational firms are 
noted as using their power of location of activity to enhance their position relative to parties 
that are unable to migrate, particularly small businesses and labour as well as national and 
local governments. The result is higher profits for the transnationals through reduced input 
prices and production costs. In terms of pricing for outputs not much is expected to change. 
Rothschild states that, ‘Competition within the transnational sector will continue to run 
according to existing theories of price and output determination.’ (Rothschild, 2005, p. 446, 
italics in original)  
As Rothschild maintained a stream of commentary on the treatment, or rather neglect, of 
power in economic analysis, we do not comment further on the literature. However, events of 
recent years provide compelling examples of the use of state power to the advantage of large 
firms, particularly in the financial sector. The use of public funds to prop up large banks and 
other financial firms has nearly bankrupted several economies (and may yet do so), while 
others in society have had to deal with the impact of severe austerity programs. Mainstream 
economists have been quick to defend the interventions as necessary to maintaining the 
integrity of the international financial system and avoiding a banking panic. However, they 
have not been so quick to provide a compelling theory of why governments allowed banks to 
become “too big to fail” or become so highly leveraged that they were unable to survive a 
large shock of their own creation. More directly of concern to price theory is the pressure 
being applied to governments to find ways of driving down domestic wages, at the same time 
as propping up prices by protecting domestic producers, including domestic subsidiaries of 
transnational corporations, from foreign competition, including through the use of tariffs and 
non-tariff trade barriers. 
6. Ideas for the next generation 
Rothschild’s (1947) seminal paper on price and oligopoly aimed to provide guidance to 
subsequent researchers and he clearly did that with at least some of his propositions and 
discussion. Price theory has developed in a number of different dimensions to deal with his 
main insight that oligopoly is a struggle for position, requiring an analysis that is much more 
than the application of an elegant profit-maximising calculus. Rothschild was consistent 
throughout his life in arguing for an open and realistic approach to economic theorizing, 
including price theory. As detailed above, there has been considerable progress of this sort in 
price theory through developments in rule-based pricing practices, such as mark-up pricing, 
endogenous market structure, the analysis of the impact of internal firm organisation on 
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strategic policy and the use (and abuse) or both market and political power by oligopoly 
firms. However, much remains to be done along lines suggested by Rothschild in his time. 
Power remains a key element of the economy that requires further examination. As noted 
immediately above, the exercise of state power to promote private interests is prominent in the 
factors leading up to and following the global financial crisis. Economists from Adam Smith 
onward have been strong critics of state power being used to pursue private interest and have 
even provided a theory of public choice based on the axioms of private optimization. 
However, the policy prescriptions from the mainstream for dealing with the problem fail to go 
beyond advocating laissez faire. As Rothschild notes, these policy prescriptions are long 
standing and flawed, 
‘The trouble began … by concentrating many of its analyses on the actions of 
single self-interested individuals in a competitive world. While competition 
certainly still exists, the individual behavior and the extent and type of 
competition have dramatically changed since Smith’s days and these changes 
suggest very clearly that today it might be—more than ever—a big mistake to 
regard the power problem as a quantité negligable.‘ (Rothschild, 2002, p.436) 
Power affects pricing directly through various state interventions into the market, including 
price controls, subsidies, taxes, tariffs and other restraints on trade. Power also affects pricing 
indirectly through the regulation of market structure, industrial relations, consumer protection 
and environmental controls, as well as a host of other legislative, regulatory and judicial 
interventions. More generally, power influences the whole structure of society and the course 
of development through time, including the provision of education, the development of 
technology, the degree of inequality in income and the extent of economic and political 
freedom for individuals. Rothschild was clearly on the mark arguing that this is a core issue 
for economics rather than a quantité negligable. 
The internal organisation of firms remains a fertile ground for further development of price 
theory. Rothschild (1947) noted conflicts of interest within the firm as being one possible 
influence on pricing. As noted above, the complexity of the modern firm contributes to the 
adoption of rules and routines, including rule-based pricing practices such as mark-up pricing. 
More generally, coordinating the specialised knowledge within a firm, and managing the 
conflicts that arise, impacts on the type of competitive strategies adopted by a firm. The link 
between internal organisation and competitive strategy remains to be fully explored. 
  
129 
 
In spite of the voluminous literature on the subject appearing since the middle of the last 
century, the dilemma for pricing theory in oligopoly today is not much different than the way 
it was described in Rothschild (1947). There are analytical models based on axioms, such as 
profit maximisation, yielding exact results but only under very narrow conditions that avoid 
the general indeterminateness of price in oligopoly. There are also general theories that 
emphasise the struggle for position in oligopoly and capture features of pricing that result, 
such as price rigidity and mark-up pricing. Neither approach is fully satisfactory in terms of 
rigour, realism and usefulness for economic modelling. Rothschild’s consistent argument in 
favour of openness in dealing with this dilemma is still relevant and helpful as are the closing 
sentences of his 1947 article, 
‘But the undiscovered territory must be entered by economic theory if it is not 
to lose all touch with reality. The tentative first step outlined in the previous 
section certainly looks very crude and pedestrian when compared with the 
polished elegance of modern value theory. But it is tentative steps of this sort 
which economic analysis must undertake to-day.’ (Rothschild, 1947, p.320) 
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Kurt Rothschild published one of his best-known articles ‘Price Theory and Oligopoly’ in 
1947 (Economic Journal, pp. 299-320) when he was lecturer at the University of Glasgow. 
The article should be seen in the context of the appearance of a number of important 
contributions over the 1930s and 1940s on the economics of Imperfect Competition, most 
notably the contributions of Joan Robinson (1933), Chamberlin (1933) and also the launch of 
game theory by John von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern (1944). 
Kurt Rothschild wanted to differentiate his own stance on the analysis of imperfect 
competition from these contributions and from the earlier approaches taken by traditional 
price theory which examined only the polar cases of perfect competition and monopoly. He 
criticised traditional price theory but also the contributions by Robinson and Chamberlin in 
that it “...badly neglects the case where a small number of powerful firms compete with each 
other, the action of each exerting a marked influence on the position of all the others, and each 
of them not only adjusting itself passively to a ‘given’ market situation, but capable of 
actively changing that market situation.”(Ibid p. 302) 
In his discourse Kurt Rothschild starts with a methodological point: that economic theory 
which addresses imperfect competition tries to be too ambitious to find a determinate solution 
for prices set in given market structures. In order to arrive at such determinate solutions, the 
theoreticians make too many restrictive assumptions, constraining the degrees of freedom of 
firm behaviour, thus losing sight of essential elements of actual behaviour in oligopolistic or 
duopoly settings. This is the setting which Rothschild sees as “the most typical case in 
industry” (Ibid p. 302). Kurt Rothschild attempts in this article to widen the analysis of 
economic behaviour in such settings, singling out qualitative aspects of such behaviour not 
emphasised in the literature so far without however deriving exact, quantitative solutions.  
There are two features in particular which Rothschild emphasises and which characterise 
strategic behaviour in oligopolistic settings: one is the importance of ‘uncertainty’ which 
implies “... that the vague knowledge a firm possesses of its demand and cost schedules 
cannot extend far into the future” (Ibid, p. 3081); the other one, linked to the first, is the 
distinction between a ‘security’ motive and a ‘profit’ motive. It is precisely the level of 
uncertainty in the context of competition ‘amongst the few’ when market structures can 
                                            
1 Rothschild continues: “Any theory, therefore, which tries to explain price behaviour in terms of 
marginal curves derived from long-term demand and cost curves really bypasses the problem of 
uncertainty and thus the very factor which gives rise to that desire for security which the theory tries to 
explain.” (Ibid)   
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change, when demand and supply shocks can affect the evaluation of longer-term demand and 
cost conditions of individual firms that make the ‘security’ motive an important one to 
describe ‘oligopolists’ behaviour.  
In quite a few instances, Rothschild argues, a distinction between a ‘long-run profits’ motive 
and the security motive does not lead to different predictions of behaviour. However, in other 
instances – Rothschild claims – this would not be the case. Rothschild singles out three types 
of behaviour which makes behaviour based on the security motive different from that based 
on simple profit maximisation:  one instance– Rothschild claims - is that profit maximisation 
would lead to continuous price responses in the face of ‘shocks’ to revenue and cost 
conditions while the security motive would likely lead to maintaining in many circumstances 
rigid prices. We shall return to Rothschild’s – not very satisfactory – argument in favour of 
this observation. The second example of differences in behaviour guided by the security 
motive vs. profit maximisation is that the security motive is likely to lead to ‘oversized firms’ 
while profit maximisation would suggest an ‘optimal size’ from a cost point of view. The 
third example he gives is that the security motive would lead firms to plough back most 
‘reserve funds’ back into their own firm while profit maximisation would suggest investments 
into whatever areas promise highest expected returns. 
Let us examine shortly Rothschild’s arguments in favour of these three observations linked to 
his strong belief that behaviour in oligopolistic markets is in many instances guided by a 
‘security motive’ more than a traditional ‘profit motive’.  The issue of ‘rigid prices’: here 
Rothschild makes an argument which is not unlike Paul Sweezy’s ‘kinked demand curve’ 
analysis published in a well-known article in 1939 (Sweezy, 1939) and which is strangely not 
referred to by Rothschild: “A price will have to be quoted that will allow the oligopolist to 
hold his own both vis-à-vis existing and potential rivals and vis-à-vis the consumers. This 
means that in ‘normal’ periods the price must not be so low that it provokes retaliations from 
the competitors, nor so high that it encourages new entrants, and it must be within the range 
which will maintain the goodwill of the customers – i.e. will maintain a protection against 
aggressive policies of the rivals.” (Ibid pp. 310-11). The main motivation of the oligopolist in 
such circumstances is – according to Rothschild – to ‘entrench’ themselves in their market 
position and “...should an opportunity arise – to launch an offensive into rival territory.” 
Pricing is thus a tool in the strategic behaviour of oligopolists, considering their market 
positions as their main targets while market positions in turn also determine the degrees of 
freedom an oligopolist has to pursue strategic actions. While not very stringently argued, 
Rothschild concludes that his approach will lead to a preference of ‘rigid prices’ in normal 
times (which can extend for long stretches of time). However such periods can be interrupted 
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by episodes in which ‘wars’ (these can be fought as ‘price wars’ but also employ a range of 
other ‘weapons’2 such as aggressive advertising, product quality, credit and discount 
arrangements, etc.) open the prospects of changes in market positions. Shifts in market 
positions can occur because of external factors which affect all market participants such as a 
strong change in the level of market demand (although here he argues that in periods of 
depressions, oligopolists are more inclined towards price-fixing agreements) or when an 
industry undergoes strong bouts of technical progress. Rothschild argues that the impulse to 
take advantage of changing market positions to one’s advantage is particularly strong in ‘new 
and expanding industries’ where “... it is not a question of invading a rival’s territory, but of 
rushing into new, unoccupied territory before the others have taken possession of it.  ... the 
price pattern for such new, expanding industries is ... one of strong price competition, 
followed by a rigid price policy after the new territory has been divided up and further 
expansion would involve an attack on rival strongholds.”(Ibid, p. 314).  Apart from ‘external 
reasons’ (industry-wide shifts in demand and/or technical progress) there is always the 
(‘internal’) motivation present to improve a particular firm’s position at the expense of a rival. 
However, given “the cost of such a struggle, the uncertainty of its outcome, and the harmful 
effects it may have on other aspects of the security drive (e.g. public opinion), will make the 
outbreak of hostilities the exception rather than the rule”. (Ibid, p. 315)   
The struggle for maintaining or widening an oligopolist’s market position also leads to the 
other features mentioned earlier, the tendency towards ‘oversized firms’ which could not be 
justified from a pure cost-based approach towards an ‘optimum size of the firm’ and also the 
tendency towards a high share of reinvestment of profits into one’s own firm rather than 
searching for highest yields obtainable across all asset holdings. As pointed out in the later 
literature on investment in oligopolistic markets (see e.g. Dixit 1980), excess capacities  can 
serve as entry-deterrence, and similarly – as Rothschild emphasises -  merger and acquisition 
activity, reliance on financial strength, inter-locking directorates, attempts towards vertical 
integration to secure vital energy and input supplies, pre-emptive advertising campaigns, etc. 
can all contribute to strengthening a firm’s position either vis-à-vis existing rivals or vis-à-vis 
potential new entrants. These are now all well-confirmed features of strategic behaviour in 
imperfectly competitive market situations, both in theoretical contributions as well as in 
empirical research (see e.g. Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, Schmalensee, 1972). 
                                            
2 Kurt Rothschild throughout his article prefers the language of Clausewitz (‘Principles of War’) to 
that of either game theory or to biological or psychological terms to characterise the behaviour of 
oligopolists (see pp. 305-07). This is also linked to Rothschild’s life-long interest in the role of power 
in economics; see his well known Penguin volume (Rothschild, 1971). 
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There are two further features which should be mentioned with regard to Rothschild’s rich 
analysis of oligopolistic behaviour in this paper: one is the recognition that firms – especially 
above a certain size – should be considered complex organisational entities with different 
departments which are at times articulating conflicting interests (“Prices are therefore 
increasingly the outcome of the different pulls of the conflicting interests of various 
departments”; Ibid, p. 313); the other is a hall mark of Rothschild’s analysis which he 
continued to pursue throughout his life: that strategies by powerful economic actors do not 
just take place in the narrow economic sphere (‘the market place’) but involve political action 
of one type or another as evidenced e.g. by huge expenditures on lobbying. The substantive 
part of the article thus ends with a rather powerful statement which we would hardly be able 
to find in today’s economic journals: 
“The oligopolistic struggle for position and security includes political action of 
all sorts right up to imperialism. The inclusion of these ‘non-economic’ 
elements is essential for a full explanation of oligopolistic behaviour and 
price.” (Ibid. P. 319).    
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When I was asked to make a contribution in the honour of Kurt Rothschild I did not hesitate 
to accept the invitation. While doing so I underestimated the number of contributions 
Rothschild had published in English in the three fields which were entrusted to use, namely: 
- labour market theory 
- wage and price dynamics 
- theory of growth 
Since the conference considers the contributions of Rothschild on the international stage, I 
concentrate this report on his publications available in English. 
Fortunately I found in the literature the article “Kurt Rothschild and the Alternative Austrian 
economics”, written by John King in the Festschrift honouring the 80th anniversary of 
Rothschild and edited by Egon Matzner and Ewald Nowotny in 1994. This overview was a 
helpful guide for me. My thanks go to him. 
I. Labour Market Theory 
Since his beginning, Rothschild refused to restrain his analysis of the labour market to the 
hypothesis that perfect competition dominates even the labour markets. Consequently 
Rothschild’s first article in this field on “Monopsony, Buying Costs and Welfare 
Expenditures” (Rothschild (1942/43) dealt with the consequences of monopsony on the labour 
market. He analyzed a firm which is the only buyer of labour of a certain type in a region and 
asked whether it is useful for it to spend money to inform potential workers about its qualities 
as employer. Such job advertising increases the elasticity of supply by ameliorating workers’ 
information. According to Rothschild, these expenditures “will reduce monopsonistic 
exploitation and will almost invariably lead to an increase in employment.” (p. 64) 
Market imperfections are also present in Rothschild (1945) paper on “Wages and Risk 
Bearing”. There, Rothschild expresses once again his doubts about the smooth functioning of 
the neoclassical model. He shows that – contrary to neoclassical assumptions – the risks a 
worker is exposed to are not compensated by a premium above the wage rate. He assembles 
indicators for three occupational risks (occupational mortality, wage volatility, risk of 
unemployment) and shows for 29 occupations by a simple correlation between their weekly 
wage earnings and their exposure to each of these risks that these risks are not rewarded. On 
the contrary the correlation coefficients are negative! 
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Rothschild then discusses some possible explanations for the workers’ acceptance of jobs 
with high risks: 
“They consist partly of the ignorance of the workers as to the facts about risk, 
but the main factor is probably the impossibility for workers to move from one 
occupation to the other, because they lack financial and other opportunities to 
do so and stand under continuous pressure to take up work quickly without 
waiting and weighing alternative possibilities.“ (p. 197) 
On the basis of his intensive occupation with the determination of real wages, Rothschild 
published his “Theory of Wages” (1954). This book emanated out of the lectures delivered by 
Rothschild at the University of Glasgow. The book consists  - after a short introduction giving 
an overview of the “classical” wage theories – of four parts. The first and the second are 
concerned with the determination of the wage level, separated into “wages under perfect 
competition”, determined by demand and supply of labour, and “Wages in the actual world”. 
In chapter III of the first part, Rothschild discusses the consequences of a change in the wage 
rate on the supply of labour. For obvious reasons Rothschild concluded “that the short-term 
supply of labour tends to be inelastic and responds only slowly to changes in wages (p. 40). 
But also in the long run two effects pull in opposite directions:  
“On the one hand a higher wage will mean to the worker a greater reward for 
his efforts, and that may induce him to work more than he thought worth while 
at the old rate. On the other hand, with a higher wage-rate the worker will be 
able to obtain his previous real income in a shorter time (or with a smaller 
effort), and he may prefer to take part of his increase in the standard of living in 
the form of leisure rather than additional income. This would mean that he 
would work less than at the old, lower wage. The combined effect of these two 
forces, then, will decide whether a rise in the wage-rate will induce the worker 
to increase or decrease his labour supply.“ (p. 40/41) 
The demand for labour is discussed “under perfect competition” (part B) and in the actual 
world (part C). In Part B, Rothschild discusses critically in the chapter on the demand for 
labour the theorem that wages equal the marginal productivity of labour and asks, whether the 
microeconomic analysis can be applied to labour as a whole. His answer is:  
“When all wages are altered this is no longer true. The changes in money 
wages will have an appreciable effect on the price level. Until we have 
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investigated more fully the nature of these repercussions (see chapter XI), we 
shall not be able to estimate the effect of general change in money wages on 
real wages and employment.“ (1954, p. 26) 
It is only in the part “Wages in the actual world” that Rothschild turns to the arguments given 
by Keynes in chapter 19 of his General Theory (1936). He reaches the following conclusion 
about the consequences of a reduction of the wage level:  
“the usual course will be a slow dragging down of wages, causing losses all 
along its course, raising expectations of further declines, and thus leading to a 
cumulative downward movement of wages, prices, investment, employment 
and the national income. The growth in the rigidity of money wages is, there-
fore, not in general, as has often been alleged, a major cause of unemployment, 
but, on the contrary, an important stabilizer in a world which otherwise might 
experience violent fluctuations in prices and incomes and all the uncertainty 
that goes with them.“ (1954, p. 155) 
This statement corresponds fully to Keynes’ ideas. Perhaps it would have been useful – 
especially in a text book – to express these findings about the supply and the demand on the 
labour market graphically to underline the opposition to the neoclassical interpretation. 
Stylized Neoclassical Labour Market               Stylized Labour Market of Keynes
1
                      
 
                                            
1 This presentation avoids the trap that the “totem of the macros” looks exactly like the well known 
“totem of the micros” which forms the basis of the neoclassical theory (see for this allusion the 
wonderful article of Leijonhufvud (1981) about “Life among the Econ”). 
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According to the arguments of Rothschild, both sides – Demand and Supply – show no clear 
and predictable reactions to changes in the real wage level. Therefore it is possible to have 
two curves which do not intersect! In that case equilibrium can only be reached if the demand 
curve is shifted to the right or the supply curve to the left. 
For a labour market dominated by collective bargaining, Carlin/Soskice (1990) developed 
their labour market model which consists of a wage-setting and a price-setting curve and 
which is often called a “reference model” (e.g. Bean, 1994 and Franz, 1996) (see for an 
integration of the labour market of Keynes into the model of Carlin/Soskice (1990) the article 
by Kromphardt/Schneider (2007)). 
Finally, in part C, Rothschild considers the prevalence of monopolistic and monopsonistic 
conditions which open a field for wage bargaining by trade unions and employers 
associations. 
The much shorter part D discusses very shortly the problems of minimum wage and of the 
labourers share in national income. The last item does not concern my contribution, but with 
respect to minimum wages two remarks are in order: 
a) With respect to a minimum wage for specific branches of industry Rothschild states:  
“If the minimum wage is at all effective, i.e., if it does not lie below the wages 
actually paid, its immediate effect will be a decline in the demand for this type 
of labour. But this may only be temporary. If the labour market is 
monopsonistic, the minimum wage may simply put an end to monopsonistic 
exploitation without affecting employment at all. In other cases the ‘economy 
of high wages’ may be set in motion so that the shock of the wage increase 
leads to higher productivity, the instalment of better equipment, and ultimately, 
perhaps to a return to the original employment level.“ (1954, p. 150) 
b) According to Rothschild (see 1954, p. 151 ff.), it is very difficult to determine the 
optimal minimum wage on the national level. Two factors have to be taken into 
account: The standard of living and the capacity of industry to pay. It is remarkable 
that Rothschild does not use any macroeconomic argument relating to the enhanced 
income of those workers who are not immediately thrown out of their job.  
The publications of Rothschild made strong impression in the field of labour market research. 
Thus, Rothschild was invited by John Dunlop to participate in a conference organized by the 
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“International Economic Association” on the topic “The Theory of Wage Determination” and 
to deliver a paper on the “Approaches to the Theory of Bargaining”.  
Rothschild was one of only two economists from German speaking countries to contribute a 
paper – the other one was Wilhelm Krelle.  
In his contribution (published three years later by Dunlop (1957) in the conference volume 
“The Theory of Wage Determination”, Rothschild starts with an explanation, why the leading 
theories of the 19
th
 century had no place for bargaining: 
“It was comparatively easy to exclude bargaining from the leading nineteeth-century wage 
theories, or at least to show that it must be a futile undertaking. For all these theories relied on 
rigidly determined supply or demand conditions from which there was no escape: 
- The Iron Law of Wages, by postulating a perfectly elastic supply of labour (in the long run) 
at the substistence wage, could easily show that every wage advantage gained would soon be 
translated into more labourers  competing for work and reducing wages to their old level. 
- The wage fund theory in its various forms could dispose with equal ease all claims that 
bargaining could lead to an all-round improvement in labour’s income: With a fixed stock of 
capital available for wage payments every improvement in one direction would be fully 
compensated by a deterioration in another direction. 
- Finally, the marginal productivity theory, by taking perfect competition and the supply of 
the various factors of production as given, could construct an employers’ demand curve and 
determine an ‘equilibrium wage’, any diversion from which would lead to unemployment or 
labour shortages, which in turn would press the wage back to its equilibrium level.” (1957, 
p. 282) 
Rothschild found it more astonishing and more open to critique that even later mainstream 
economists took the same position: 
“While unemployed families were suffering severe hardships and trade unionists were risking 
their lives to secure collective bargaining rights, unemployment was regarded by many writers 
as practically non-existent and bargaining itself as an empty illusion.” (1957, p. 281) 
For Rothschild, “it is not difficult to find the reasons for this astounding one-sidedness, if not 
to say blindness in many post-Ricardian economic treatises. Two strong motives (not 
necessarily conscious) combined to produce this result: the desire to preserve a neat 
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theoretical structure, unblurred by such disequilibrating forces as unemployment and 
bargaining, and the wish to defend the capitalist system – at least in its pure, theoretical form 
– against criticisms from the growing socialist movement.” (1957, p. 281)  
Rothschild then distinguishes two approaches to the theory of bargaining: 
 - bargaining and imperfect competition theory 
 - ‘psychological’ and ‘institutional’ theories  
The first approach elucidates the “scope for bargaining within the framework of marginal 
productivity theory. This is done by dropping some of the simplifying assumptions” (1957, p. 
283). E.g. the assumption of a static marginal productivity should be dropped because a 
higher bargained wage “may increase the productivity of the workers,  it may force the 
capitalists to improve the efficiency of the production process” (1957, p. 284). Beyond that 
imperfect competition in the labour market (monopsony) and the goods market may give 
room for bargaining. 
Nevertheless Rothschild was rather sceptical with respect to the overall explanatory power of 
this approach: 
“All the various facets of the bargaining problem advanced in this group do not add up to a 
bargaining theory. They do not show whether bargaining takes place or how it is done. They 
rather represent an attempt to rid the marginal productivity approach of some of its 
assumptions which made it incompatible with the idea of successful bargaining. This in itself 
has been an important step. But it remains to be seen whether a conclusive theory of modern 
wage determination and wage bargaining can be constructed along these in the last resort 
traditional lines, or whether a different approach would be more fruitful.” (1957, p. 285/6) 
The second approach is described by Rothschild as follows:  
“From rather a different angle comes the other group of theories – predominantly American – 
which also accord to bargaining a central place in their theory, but are concerned specifically 
with the labour field and with the institutions observed there. These theories, in all their 
variety we may call institutional theories, in contrast to the ‘psychological’ theories 
mentioned before. … we can distinguish two very different origins from which stem these 
new approaches to bargaining. On the one hand we have the interest in the theory of duopoly, 
bilateral monopoly, oligopoly, coupled with a recognition that questions of strategy, 
uncertainty, bluff, and so on, cannot be regarded as exogenous forces, but must on the 
contrary be treated as decisive causal factors.” (1957, p. 286 f.) 
  
144 
 
The positive side of these theories is seen by Rothschild in the fact, that “they take bargaining 
as their starting-point, or at least introduce it at an early stage, rather than ‘explain it’ into a 
theoretical structure hostile to bargaining.” (1957, p. 287) But Rothschild is not content with 
the state of these approaches and he believes that “progress must be in finding some bridge 
between the ‘psychological’ and the ‘institutional’ theories. (p. 287) 
Rothschild had become very well known in the field of wage theory. So, two chapters of this 
textbook on wage theory were reproduced in the “Readings of Labour Market Analysis”, 
edited be Flanagan and others (see Burton et al., 1971). For the readings were chosen the 
chapters: 
- The demand of labour under perfect competition  
- Monopsonistic conditions  
More articles became available at the international (i.e. English speaking) stage when (in 
1993), Rothschild published 22 of his essays at Routledge under the title “Employment, 
Wages and Income Distribution”. Half of them appeared in English for the first time. It was 
only then, that the international stage had the possibility to get easily informed about some 
very interesting contributions to my subjects. 
Since I cannot mention them all, I concentrate in this section on two articles which are to my 
opinion the most interesting ones. The first about the microeconomics of the labour market 
appeared already in 1969  in a conference volume of the German Economic Association 
called – following an old tradition – “Verein für Socialpolitik” (Association for Social 
Policy). There, he reproduces arguments of his book on wage theory underlining that a theory 
of wage should be more than a simple subcategory of price theory. 
In his article “Wage levels and employment” (written in German in 1985) he shows – as in his 
text book - that Keynes (1936, chapter 19) convincingly demonstrated that a change in the 
wage level is no reliable way to more employment, since opposite effects cancel themselves 
out. The net result of all these effects is small and its sign is not known in advance. 
As I argued above, these conclusions are not new and they remain correct even when adding 
the Pigou-effect. But since the malfamous neoclassical synthesis denies them and pretends 
that unemployment is due to rigid and too high wages, it is necessary to derive and present 
Keynes´ conclusion again from time to time. 
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II. Wage- and price-dynamics  
The contributions discussed so far were concerned with the (difficulties of an) explanation of 
the level of the real wage. Stimulated by the famous paper by Phillips (1958) the relation 
between the changes in the wage- and price-level and the employment situation (often 
measured by the rate of unemployment) became one of the central questions in the 
macroeconomic discussion, which centered about the Phillips curve in the form modified by 
Samuelson/Solow (1960) to present a relation between the rate of inflation and the rate of 
unemployment. Rothschild enriched this discussion with his article “The Phillips curve and all 
that” in the “Scottish Journal of Political Economy” in 1971.  
At the beginning Rothschild addresses the question why Phillips’ article, containing no 
“sensational discovery”, had such an outstanding impact. Phillips was not the first to make the 
nominal wage rate dependent on the rate of unemployment, but “Phillips’s analysis provided  
a highly relevant instrument for policy decisions in a field where conflicting  aims had 
become a major headache for the governments of most Western countries: in the dilemma 
between full employment and price stability.” (1971: p. 249, 1993: p. 128))  
The most constructive part of Rothschilds article consists in the presentation of a small model 
of wage- and price-dynamics which allows to derive the conditions for a stable inflation rate 
as opposed to an unlimited accelerating one. The model consists of only two behavioural 
equations, the first concerning the wage dynamics.  
The model is based on the idea that workers aim at a compensation for price changes and at a 
participation in productivity growth. These assumptions are largely consistent with the results 
of an inquiry in Austria reported one year later in a book which Rothschild (1972) published 
together with Nowotny and Schwödianer. The trade unions named as the most important 
factors in the wage negotiations: growth of productivity in their sector, the inflation rate of the 
last year and of the current year, and the changes in profits. The employers associations added 
the changes in the general wage and in the general productivity level and the rate of 
unemployment in the sector and in the country. Interestingly, they mentioned neither the 
growth of wages nor of prices in foreign countries.  
The employers try to resist to these claims. The chances of the workers to enforce their claims 
depend on the employment situation, indicated here by the difference between the actual (ut) 
and the inflation-neutral (u*) rate of unemployment. 
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Therefore the growth rate of the wage level is given by
2
  
    )                    ̂        ̂ 
       ̂       
     )                             )       
The sign ^ indicates rates of growth. w is the wage rate (per hour), p the price level and x 
stands for labour productivity per hour. In Rothschild’s model, in the wage negotiations (e.g. 
in the beginning of the year) the workers take the expected rate of inflation during the year 
into account, but derive their forecast by simple extrapolation (therefore  ̂ 
  will be replaced 
by  ̂   ). From the last term (which indicates a linear relationship) results a linear Phillips 
curve.  
On the opposite side of the labour market, the employers try to get a compensation for any 
rise in unit labour costs, but the market situation does not always allow it. Therefore, in the 
price equation, b0 may be smaller than unity
3
: 
    )                            ̂       ̂    ̂ )        (0 <     ) 
Here the parameter   indicates to what degree the firms are able to pass-through the changes 
in unit labour costs.  
Inserting  ̂   in equation (1.1), the inflation rates is determined by 
    )                    ̂           ̂         ̂      
     )   ̂         
which gives: 
    )                   ̂         ̂            ) ̂         
     ) 
The inflation rates tends to a final constant value, where  ̂  equals  ̂   , which is given by 
equation (1.5) 
                                            
2 Rothschild (1971) neglects the influence of the growth of productivity and he does not specify the 
last term. He simply writes f(u). 
3 In Rothschild (1971)    is not mentioned, it is implicitly set at unity. 
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    )                            ̂    )  
        ) ̂         
     )
        
 
Equation (1.5) shows that to every value of    corresponds a different final inflation rate 
which remains constant so long as no shocks occur. The only exception to this rule is given by 
the case when       equals unity. Then, the inflation runs astray, except in the special 
situation in which        equals unity and    equals   
 . This is the Natural Rate of 
Unemployment, which has a unique value only under these two very specific assumptions. In 
their overview and critique of the literature on the inflation – unemployment trade-off, 
Santomero/Seater (1978, p. 52 f.) mention the decisive role played by the value of a1b0 (they 
set b0 = 1) for the existence of a long-run trade-off between inflation and unemployment 
(without citing Rothschild (1971). 
Unfortunately, the mainstream economists with their disinclination against active 
macroeconomic policy measures did not take account of these insights
4
. They continue to set 
implicitly    and     to unity, they do not even mention the possibility of a1b0 < 0 and thus 
conceal that not every claim for wage or for price augmentation will be accepted by the 
employers and the buyers of the good produced. 
Further articles concerning the wage and price dynamics appeared in English only in 1993 in 
the collection of essays which I mentioned already. The most impressive article was published 
in German already in 1978. The title is superb (esp. in German: Arbeitslose, gibt’s die? 
Literally translated: “Unemployed, do they exist?”) and full of irony. In this article Rothschild 
argues against the different approaches which try to minimize the problem of unemployment. 
Rothschild criticizes these approaches and he adds “But even more questionable is – in my 
opinion – the practice of choosing a highly relevant theme and then treating it in such an 
oblique way that it creates more confusion than understanding…” (1993, p. 19) 
One way to do this is to call the unemployed people “people employed with job search” or to 
call them “voluntarily unemployed”. Rothschild assembles all the relevant and well known 
arguments against these attempts. He agrees, that unemployed people search for a new job. 
But that doesn’t mean, that the search is the reason for their unemployment. It will rather be 
its result.  
                                            
4 Three years afterwards Auerbach/Moses (1974) even tried to prove Rothschild wrong. But 
Rothschild (1974) showed in his reply that his result are valid for all kinds of adaptive price 
expectations.  
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Especially the implications of the search theory for the relative volume of quits and dismissals 
are at odds with the facts: 
“In recession periods, when money wages rise less than before or even fall, the 
number of quits from among the employed workers would have to rise. But the 
opposite  is true. On the other hand we find that voluntary quits increase – in 
contradiction to the theory – in times of boom even when inflation rates are 
rising. To this must be added the general objection that a search for a better job 
does not necessarily require quitting one’s job and many workers do in fact 
change from one job to another without intermediate unemployment.“ (1993, 
p. 22) 
Another, more subtle and opaque way explains unemployment as “natural unemployment”. 
The corresponding NRU sets the upper limit to employment because of the behaviour of the 
workers who claim higher real wages as soon as the unemployment rate becomes less than the 
“natural” one. This leads in the short run to an accelerating inflation and in the middle or long 
run to a return to the natural rate. This approach neglects the dependence of the wage- and 
price-dynamics on the values of the parameters in the equations (1.1) and (1.2). 
The second article I wish to comment concerns the fate of the Phillips curve in the time when 
stagflation sets in. Rothschild argues – eleven years after his 1971 article on the Phillips curve 
which I praised above: 
“Stagflation forces us to see the theoretical, empirical and practical aspects of 
the Phillips curve in a new light and to reconsider previous arguments. This is 
particularly important because the Phillips curve is one of the rare examples 
where a close contact between theory and practice has been established so that 
the subject has to be attacked on this broader front.“ (1993, p. 163) 
Rothschild regrets that the discussion about the trade-off between inflation and unemployment 
has suffered from two short-comings: “The trade-off debate suffered under the uncritical 
acceptance of the existence of a reliable and fairly constant Phillips curve.” (1993, p. 165) 
On the other extreme, the existence of a long-term Phillips curve was denied, mainly for 
dogmatic reasons. Rothschild explains this critique: 
“The allegation of dogmatism rests on the impression that the main motive for 
these studies was not a desire to study in more detail the historically existing 
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Phillips curve phenomena, but rather an irritation about their existence. Phillips 
curves do not fit into the picture of neoclassical theory, with its tendencies 
towards price-determined full employment and market clearing.“ (1933, p. 165) 
Rothschild then shows by an international comparison between 15 industrial countries which 
he packs up into three groups, with data from 1950 to 1980 that (with one exception in 1970 
due to Switzerland) the group of countries with the lowest unemployment rate show the 
highest inflation rate and vice versa. Rothschilds conclusion runs as follows (p. 170): 
“In the longer run it may still turn out to be true that though inflation does not 
lead to high employment, high employment cannot be obtained when very 
ambitious price stability targets are set. This would suffice to lead to Phillips 
curve and trade-off considerations. But the idea that there exist constant 
Phillips curves which can serve as a base for reliable trade-offs will have to be 
buried for good. “ 
Whilst I agree with him I was astonished that Rothschild does (in 1982!) not mention the two 
oil price shocks with their inflationary effects which shifted (at least for some time) the 
Phillips curve upwards. 
III. Theory of Growth 
Apart from the great visions about economic development by Marx, Schumpeter, Lewis and 
Rostow, the field “Theories of Growth” was still empty after World War II. As you will 
remember, Harrod (1939) had published an “Essay in Dynamic Theory”. Whilst the Hicksian 
IS/LM-diagram led to stable static equilibrium values of output, Harrod aimed at a model (a 
system of equations), for a situation “in which certain forces are operating steadily to increase 
or decrease certain magnitudes” (Harrod, 1939, S. 14). 
His model of a closed economy without a public secteur consists of two very basic 
behavioural equations: 
(2.1)                                                                              
(2.2)                                                              
Equation (2.1) stipulates a constant share of savings (S) in output (Y). Equation 2.2 presents 
the famous acceleration principle, linking investment (I) to the change in output. The 
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parameter   is determined by the capital-output-ratio and by the degree to which the 
entrepreneurs are ready to adapt their capital stock to changing output levels. Normally they 
have the alternative to produce their actual output with a higher (or lower) rate of capital 
utilization. 
The model is closed by the equilibrium condition: 
(2.3)                                                              
Solving the model one gets the rate of growth which is necessary to ensure equilibrium 
between demand and supply in every period. This rate depends on the saving rate and on the 
capital-output ratio. Unfortunately, the equilibrium growth path is highly unstable. Thus, 
Harrod was not successful, as Rothschild underlines (see p. 567), to give an explanation of the 
actual growth of capitalist developments. His model produces a potential growth path, but it 
does not inform about the actual growth path, once there has been a deviation from the 
equilibrium growth path. 
This essential problem was neither attacked nor solved by Domar (1946) who took into 
consideration the capacity–enhancing effect of investment. The conditions for following the 
potential equilibrium growth path became still more restrictive when combining both models. 
This unsatisfactory situation asked for a different approach to explain the economic growth 
process of the industrialized economies. An essential feature of this process is described by 
Keynes as follows: 
“In particularly, it is an outstanding characteristic of the economic system in 
which we live that, whilst it is subject to severe fluctutations in respect of 
output and employment, it is not violently unstable. Indeed it seems capable of 
remaining in a chronic condition of subnormal activity for a considerable 
period without any marked tendency either towards recovery or towards 
complete collapse.“ (Keynes, 1936, p.249) 
To take account of this feature, it is necessary to enlarge or to replace Harrod’s accelerator-
based investment function by a function which contains not only the destabilizing forces of 
the accelerator, but also stabilizing factors. Such an investment function is one basic element 
of Kaldor’s growth model which is the object of Rothschilds (1959) article on “The 
Limitations of economic growth models. Critical remarks on some aspects of Mr. Kaldor’s 
model”. Rothschild praises it “as a particularly stimulating and well argued piece of research” 
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(1981, p. 569). Contrary to Harrod (1939) Kaldor’s model contained not only the demand side 
but also the supply side.  
In Kaldor’s investment function the volume of investment depends on expected changes in 
demand (destabilizing factor) and on changes in the expected profit rate (stabilizing factor). 
The expected profit rate (
 
 
) depends on changes in productivity and in the profit share, since 
                                                              
 
 
  
 
 
   
 
 
      
Kaldor suppresses the destabilizing factor by assuming, that the firms always expect the 
growth rate of demand of the last period; thus they invest according to a stable growth path. I 
shall not analyze further this aspect, because Rothschild concentrates his criticism on the 
“Technical Progress Function” (TPF) and on the saving function.  
The TPF is the second basic element of Kaldor’s model and it represents the supply side. The 
TPF is based on the general relation used in the neoclassical theory between ouput (X / N) per 
man (per hour) and the input factors labour (N), capital (C) and technical progress (F), 
separated in its autonomous (F
aut
) and its induced part           
 
 
̂
). This part of technical 
progress is induced by the growth of capital intensity. Only, when the parameter   is 
considered as a constant (what Kaldor rejects), the TPF can be reduced to the typical 
neoclassical production function.  
Making the simplifying assumption that the partial elasticities of production for labour (N) 
and capital (C) add to unity, Kaldor’s TPF is given by equation (3.1). 
(3.1)                                                      
 ̂
 
     )    
 
 
      
Kaldor insists first that it is useless and impossible to separate empirically c and a, secondly 
that a is declining with 
 ̂
 
. Since these two assumptions are not essential for the working of his 
model, I shall not discuss them, but concentrate on the critical remarks of Rothschild against 
Kaldor’s TPF.  
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A graphical representation of Kaldor’s TPF 
 
Rothschild starts with the praise, that the “TPF is a very ingenious assumption, and a highly 
simplified at that” (p. 572). Nevertheless, he criticizes the modern growth theories (he names 
Harrod, Domar and Kaldor, but his critique  would also refer to the neoclassical growth theory 
founded by Solow) for three short-comings (p. 568 f.): 
1) The limited number of variables taken into account and the simplicity of their 
functional relationships. 
2) The neglect of historical, sociological and institutional factors. 
3) The starting assumptions of an equilibrium growth at full employment of capital. 
The first and second critique demonstrate once again the preference of Rothschild for an 
economic theory not isolated from other social sciences Rothschild admits that in the early 
stages of a theory the first two limitation are a “legitimate analytical device”. He extends this 
“excuse” even to the assumption of full employment. With respect to Kaldor, this last 
concession is to my view much too friendly because the assumption of full employment is not 
at all necessary to derive the TPF, which is – since it is derived from a production function – 
nothing else but the line of the potential output growth at different values of the growth rate of 
capital (per person). 
The correct procedure by Kaldor should have been to clarify this point and to make clear that 
he assumes that the economy always produces on the TPF because the entrepreneurs expect a 
growth along this line. 
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In the next stop, Kaldor answers the question: Which point on the TPF will be realized? Here, 
Kaldor uses the fact, that above the 45°-line the productivity of capital (X/ C) is growing, and 
beneath it is declining. In Kaldor’s model there is a positive relation between the volume of 
investment and the productivity of capital because the entrepreneurs expect a parallel 
evolution of this value and the rate of profit (which has a positive influence on the volume of 
investment). 
Thus, if the economy is not on point P1 where the productivity of capital remains constant, but 
(e.g.) on point P0 there will be additional investment and the economy will move to P1. Hence 
P0 presents a stable equilibrium.  
Kaldor uses the saving function developed in his “Alternative Theories of Distribution” 
(1955/56) to make sure that total savings can always adapt to total investment even with full 
employment via a changing income distribution. The latter must be very flexible. Rothschild 
criticizes another point, namely that the saving rates of the two groups of income receivers 
considered in his theory will not be constant in the long run. 
I fully agree but I think that the recourse on Kaldor’s distribution formula poses a more 
serious problem of model consistency: The following equation (3.2) shows: The parallel 
changes of the profit-rate (P / C) and the productivity of capital (X / C) are only assured, when 
the distribution of income does not change. 
    )                                                                
 
 
  
 
 
   
 
 
    
Contrary to this condition Kaldor’s theory of distribution allows large changes in the 
distribution of income to guaranty the equality between savings and the investment. Therefore 
one has to choose between Kaldor’s two theories. Either the distribution of income is rather 
stable, then Kaldor’s growth model is stabilized, or the distribution on income is subject to 
severe fluctuations, then his growth model breaks down.   
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IV Final remark  
My overview over the fields assigned to me should have shown: Rothschild did not accept the 
reduction of economics to a calculation of optimization by selfish individuals acting in 
isolation in a given environment with the only aim to maximize monetary income.  
Instead he insisted to take into account other influences on human behaviour and not to 
neglect arrangements – like collective bargaining – to change the environment to the 
advantage of the actors. Therefore he propagated persistently the integration of psychological, 
sociological and institutional factors in the economic analysis and in following these ideas he 
produced many very valuable contributions to economic theory. 
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I hesitated to accept the invitation to discuss Kromphardt’s contribution to this conference as I 
expected very few differences in our assessment. And so it is. I agree to almost everything 
Kromphardt said, and I underline it. It would be Beckmesserei and boring for all of us, not 
least for me, to get lost in a discussion of irrelevant details of our potential differences. So I 
will use the time allotted to me to expand on some aspects not treated by Kromphardt, given 
his time restraints, and on one further aspect largely neglected by this conference. 
Let me first deal with the second, underexposed aspect, Rothschild’s stance on economic 
theory. For most authors, and even more so for neoclassical ones, a theory is a straightforward 
and universally valid explanation of economic problems by a limited set of explanatory 
factors. Real business cycle theory is a good example: technology shocks are the very one and 
exclusive explanation, developed on the basis of the famous unit root evidence. Any other 
explanation is aggressively rejected. More than one explanation is not necessary as “Business 
cycles are all alike” (Lucas [1977] 1981, 218), and former explanations had been an 
“empirical failure on grand scale” (Lucas and Sargent 1978). Wage theory in the neoclassical 
world is nothing more than price theory applied to a different market. If this market is less 
than perfect, this is a problem of the market, not of the theory. It is the task of policy to 
streamline the market to make it compatible with theory. 
Rothschild has a very different perspective on this subject, which I once formulated as article 
6 of Rothschild’s commonsense economics: “It is better to adapt theory to reality than to press 
reality into the straitjacket of theory” (Tichy 1985, 13). Rothschild strongly rejects the 
existence of straightforward and universally valid explanations of economic problems in 
general, and even more so explanations by a limited set of exclusively economic arguments. 
The main focus of Rothschild’s theory is the interaction of specific elements of diverse 
models which add up to different results under different conditions of the world. In doing so, 
he is well aware that an economic problem may become indeterminate. An important task of 
Rothschild’s theoretical explanations is to work out clearly what we know, what we can 
assume with some reservations, and what we do not know. 
“The theory of wages” (1954), which King (in this conference) characterised as both a 
textbook and a thought-provoking treatise, can serve as a perfect example of this stance on 
theory. In the introduction Rothschild emphasises that he “almost exclusively [deals] with 
wage theory” (v, original emphasis), but nowhere in the book straightforward and universally 
valid explanations of economic problems by a limited set of arguments can be detected, and 
even less so a radical demolition of former theories. Rothschild fights with a more elegant 
blade. Part One of the book (55 pages) starts with “Wages under perfect competition”, with 
subchapters on Demand, Supply, Hours and conditions for work and labour and capital. 
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Rothschild describes traditional theory in a fair way, but concludes “that in wage theory 
questions arise which can by no means be answered by marginal productivity theory alone” 
(26), and that “the competitive equilibrium … is not necessarily a unique point” (48). Part 
Two (77 pages) deals with “Wages in the actual world”. Subchapters deal with Friction and 
barriers, Monopolistic conditions, Monopsonistic conditions, Trade unions, Technical 
progress, Wages and the trade cycle, and Wages under full employment. This opens another 
wide space of potential outcomes; I will return to some of these problems. Part Three (26 
pages) of Rothschild’s book: “Wages and the community” deals with Minimum wages, 
Wages in the national income and last but not least with “The limitations of a purely 
economic theory of wages”. It comes “to the conclusion that the purely economic theory of 
wages … represents only one aspect, and not even the most important one, of the entire wage 
problem. It explains the minor adjustments that follow in a capitalistic economy after the 
basic conditions of supply and demand have been fundamentally influenced by social and 
political action. A complete theory of wages will have to include the latter aspects and will 
break down the rather artificial frontiers between economics and sociology.” (175) 
Rothschild himself states his intentions and his stance on theory clearly: he will not present a 
“‘simple’ theory” “far removed from the realities of the very complex labour market. … 
Rather, the reader will find material which will give him a clearer view of the relevant factors 
influencing the supply and demand for labour, and which should enable him to piece these 
factors together as required by any particular situation” (13). This is almost the opposite of 
what Lucas-type economists’ intend. Labour market conditions are not all alike and one-
dimensional theories definitely go astray. Rothschild’s theory has no glittering mathematical 
elegance. On the surface it appears to be more modest and less significant. Smaller minds may 
consider it as purely narrative. In fact, however, it is a wider, deeper and much more relevant 
theory, a guidance for intelligent and thoughtful experts, instead of a simple cooking recipe 
for mechanical operators. 
My second topic deals with problems at the interface of labour-market theory and labour-
market policy: the role of labour unions, the effects of minimum wages and whether full 
employment is sustainable. 
Chapter IX of the “The theory of wages” deals with “Trade unions and bargaining power”. 
Rothschild refers to part one of the book, saying that “even pure wage theory does not give a 
completely determinate answer to the question of the wage level, but that, on the contrary, 
more than one equilibrium may be possible with a given quantity of labour and capital. … 
Wherever such situations exist, bargaining may bring about a movement from a lower to a 
higher equilibrium without causing any long-term unemployment.” (109) This is even more 
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true in monopolistic or monopsonistic markets which allow additional profits. But can labour 
unions press for higher wages generally, not only in specific trades? “The whole question of 
bargaining power”, Rothschild says (112), “depends … on the factual conditions governing 
the expenditure of the capitalist class. If their marginal propensity to consume is large, 
bargaining activity will be capable of making considerable inroads into their consumption …” 
But under modern conditions capitalists’ propensity to consume is rather low, and so “the 
bargaining strength of labour is extremely weak. The position changes, however, when we 
substitute for the static society … the normal world of technical progress” (113). “By pressing 
for higher wages the trade unions may be able to reduce the rate at which capitalist 
consumption increases. … Thus we see that there is within the framework of a private 
enterprise economy a certain range within bargaining strength can operate. But it will also be 
seen that the rigidity of consumption habits will set serious limits to the results that can be 
achieved within this framework.” (114). And Rothschild adds the importance of strike and 
strike funds for the result. 
The chapter on trade unions’ bargaining power is a wonderful example of Rothschild’s 
mastery of combining different aspects of theory and realistic assumption to flag the borders 
between economic law and power. Another example, even more relevant in our days, is the 
consequences of minimum wages. The usual argument is that a minimum wage will increase 
unemployment. Rothschild introduces his argumentation by pointing towards the peculiar fact 
that we are fully accustomed to state intervention in working conditions since a decade or so, 
but that we still find state intervention for minimum wages incompatible with our economic 
system. At least in certain trades – he mentions sweated trades or trades employing young 
women – labour unions tend to be weak and market wages low, due to their restricted 
bargaining power. In these cases minimum wages could certainly help, and a legal minimum 
wage in one industry or occupation will not raise important problems: some temporal 
unemployment may arise, but the other industries will absorb the workers in most cases under 
normal conditions. Nevertheless: “In times of depression a policy of fixing minimum wages 
in some trades would have to be much more timid.” (151) A national minimum wage, 
contrariwise, “certainly demands separate considerations. … Obviously it will not be 
sufficient to determine a certain minimum money wage”, as a shift of the wage cost to prices 
is the most likely result. Furthermore the standard of living and industry’s capacity to pay 
must be taken into account, both rather catchy concepts. It is not easy to find the appropriate 
level and the optimal form of a national minimum wage. The social advantages and the 
effectiveness of a minimum wage are in any case the greater the more flexible it is. However: 
“Even with a well designed and conscientiously enforced national minimum wage law the 
state will not be able to alter fundamentally the income structure of a capitalist economy. … 
But limited effects can probably be reached with a minimum wage law. It can prevent bad 
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cases of exploitation of workers … who are in a very weak bargaining position … Moreover, 
the existence of a minimum wage can provide a constant stimulus to improvements in 
productive methods and organization.” (155) 
The third – and last – topic at the interface of labour-market theory and labour-market policy I 
want to add to Kromphardt’s remarks are “Wages under full employment”. Rothschild’s 
chapter XII starts with the remark that traditional wage theory always assumes a state of full 
employment, which didn’t exist at that time, and which changes the process of wage and price 
formation considerably in real-world institutions: labour unions’ power increases, the 
resistance of employers against wage claims decreases as they can shift the burden to prices – 
the problem of a wage-price spiral arises. Rothschild did not use this term at that early time,
1
 
but he clearly described the process and its potential danger. But he argues that the likelihood 
of a wage-price spiral getting out of control is reduced by several factors: increasing 
productivity gives some leeway to wage increases, the pressure of increasing wages will boost 
productivity further, and the institution of the wage bargains prevents changes at short 
intervals. A lasting solution could be found by an incomes policy, a term Rothschild did not 
use in 1954, but of which he had a clear vision: “Once collective bargaining has reached the 
stage where wage increases are brought forward with a concurrent demand that prices be kept 
unchanged or raised less than proportionately, the destabilizing effect of the wage-price 
situation under full employment will disappear. At the same time, however, the wage question 
will assume greater dimensions than it had in former days. For not only will trade unions 
demand greater information about the business accounts of firms; the whole question of the 
social and functional justification of certain profits in general will come into the focus of the 
wage bargaining.” (142) To this point, Rothschild in 1954 (!) was ahead not only of his time 
but of our time as well. 
The other problem Rothschild identifies in the context of full employment is the lack of 
flexibility of labour. “Changes in the industrial structure can now no longer be achieved by a 
redistribution of the unemployed, but depends on the transfer of workers from one economic 
sector to another.” (144) “The wage policy of the trade unions will have to be changed from 
isolated wage bargains in separate industries to a national wage policy which pays attention to 
the necessary wage differentials, which may have to be of a considerable magnitude in order 
to stimulate the proper distribution of labour over the various branches of industry.” (146-7, 
emphasis in original). The wage differentials must be supplemented by abandoning restrictive 
                                            
1 It is used in the completely revised German edition of 1963. 
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rules, ample training and retraining and a well-equipped and well informed system of 
employment exchanges. “But the highest grade of adaptability in a full employment system 
will certainly be reached only when the whole structure of industry becomes democratized. 
Once the workers become active participants … a new sense of interest and responsibility 
may develop that could provide a new driving force for mobility, where the recognition of 
necessity takes the place of purely monetary incentives.” (148) 
I deliberately drew your attention to these more visionary aspects of Rothschild’s wage 
theory, to his scepticism with regard to the prevailing order and his vision of a reorganization 
of the economy. Rothschild was convinced of “living in a period, in which the new 
circumstances request in a particular high degree new ‘visions’” (Rothschild 2004, 209). 
Today we are even more sceptical than Rothschild was in the early fifties, and we still lack 
visions: We have experienced the demise of the centrally planned economies, we are 
experiencing the malfunctioning and the breakdown of financial markets, and we suffer from 
policy failures on grand scale. Income distribution is deteriorating drastically and social unrest 
increases. Economic theory, strongly divided as to the causes of all that, searches hopelessly 
for a general, a unified explanation. And that is what Rothschild teaches us: There is no 
general theory that fits all problems all the time. There is no alternative to an eclectic 
approach: formulate the relevant problems as accurately as possible, analyse the existing 
theories as to their assumptions and their constituent elements, and then try to work out an 
answer applying all relevant aspects of diverse theories, all your knowledge about institutions 
and the history of your problem, piece these factors together as required by any particular 
situation and combine the conclusion with commonsense. To give the last word to Rothschild: 
“Different choices will lead to different approaches, each of which will spotlight a different 
aspect of a complex problem. Therefore a certain degree of variation in methods, tradition and 
starting points may be an asset rather than a disadvantage.” (Rothschild 1964, 28). 
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Kurt W. Rothschild was more than a scholar or economic researcher. He was an exemplary 
man, intelligent and hard-working. An institution by himself. A man, undoubtedly an 
inspiration to many generations of Austrian economists, businessmen and politicians.  
The legacy of Rothschild - what would he say today, given the current crisis in 
Europe? 
Rothschild’s thinking was shaped by the economic environment and living conditions from 
the time he grew up. He witnessed the economic and social consequences of the global 
economic crisis of 1929/1930 and the rise of unemployment and poverty. He critically 
examined the reasons and consequences of unemployment, which he considered to be a 
danger for democracy and freedom. 
Rothschild’s conviction was that the market alone cannot solve all existing problems. The 
State or government would therefore need to offer adequate framework conditions where 
companies and individuals could act and interact. 
In huge economic crises like in the 1930s or as we see it today, market forces by themselves 
would not be enough. Rothschild would most definitely find the origin of both crises in the 
financial markets.  
If asked about the current crisis, Rothschild would probably note that speculation has played a 
big role and needs to be regulated more tightly. He would wish that banks would become 
more risk averse and avoid taking out bad credits, and argue that they should build up more 
equity capital and that tax havens need to be controlled and regulated. The rising complexity 
in financial markets over the last decades has increased the possibility to make huge profits 
and has offered many opportunities to investors, but at a certain risk. Countries need to calm 
the markets and contain the risk by implementing decisive policy measures in order to keep 
speculation under control. He would most definitely reproach the dangerous levels of 
speculation and the fact that financial markets “set the tone” instead of governments.  
Rothschild would probably also say that the unemployment effects in both crises were 
potentially severe, yet less severe in our days than in the 1930s, when the unemployment rate 
reached 25 %. If asked about the government’s role in how to react, Rothschild would most 
definitely propose intervention from the State and demand support by the government to 
reduce the negative effects on the real sector.  
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One other certainty is that Rothschild would concede that governments would recognize the 
problems, but at the same time he would disapprove of them for not doing enough to solve the 
crisis and the significant lack coercive action – not only in Austria, but especially at the 
European level. 
Rothschild would presumably see that the crisis would be a strain on the principle of the 
welfare state, as a prolonged crisis would potentially lead to the possibility that people would 
start to revolt in the longer run. Already today we see people on the streets in many countries. 
Fortunately, most of these protests are not yet too violent. But Rothschild would undoubtedly 
urge politicians to react and offer solutions in order to prevent this dangerous development 
from actually taking place. Supporting consumption would be one piece of the puzzle.  
Given the advanced – but not completed – integration process of the European Union in a 
more and more globalized world, Rothschild would definitely prompt politicians to think and 
act on the global level and not on the basis of a nation state. This is especially true for a small 
and open economy such as Austria. He would complain about the loss of leadership in Europe 
and about the failure of politicians if they were to think that addressing the crisis would be 
possible at the national level.  
We need global governance, but politicians do not deliver. We also need adequate framework 
conditions for the economy to prosper and in order to support and defend our preferred 
economic model: a social market economy with free competition.   
Rothschild would concede, though, that government spending in the time of and after the 
crisis – the Austrian government decided upon economic stimulus packages just after the 
financial crisis 2008/2009 – was the right “Keynesian” thing to do. Countries like Switzerland 
or Sweden show, however, that one also has to save money and reduce the deficit and the debt 
level in good times. This might be difficult, but it is most definitely the right thing to do. And 
while saving, one should not forget about growth; governments would still have to decide 
upon investments in the future (e.g. education at all levels, investment in human capital and 
skills, new technologies and R&D). These investments are important to foster “our” 
comparative advantage. 
Asked about the role of the European Central Bank, Rothschild would recommend swift and 
decisive action, recall the importance of sufficient liquidity in the markets, and would argue 
that trying to keep the inflation target alone would be too restrictive and counterproductive for 
the economy.  
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Rothschild would also say that structural reforms were necessary now – more than ever. He 
would be very much in favor of a financial transactions tax at the global level.  
At the national level, Rothschild would probably propose raising or introducing new taxes, 
but one has to think about the fact that they would negatively affect Austria as an attractive 
business location. 
What can we learn from Rothschild? 
Kurt W. Rothschild was always optimistic. He would state that economics has a lot to do with 
psychology and expectations. He would definitely agree that the current situation is serious, 
but if politicians were to make the right choices and were to act together, the eurozone would 
not break up.  
With his ability to analyze problems and situations, his experience, but also with his character, 
Kurt W. Rothschild became highly influential in economic policy making in Austria. 
Rothschild did not stick to economic theory. He considered theory to be an important tool, but 
he was always practically oriented. He was always open to other views and opinions.  
His ideas, contributions to economics, his proposals and evaluations were numerous. They 
undoubtedly contributed to and helped Austria and Austrian economists to get noticed and 
recognized on the international stage. With his death, Austria lost a very distinguished and 
internationally renowned economist. Many generations will benefit from his knowledge and 
work. His ideas and contributions to the field of economics will be remembered and will 
prevail. 
Given the current situation in Austria, Europe and the world, it is truly sad that we do not 
have the opportunity to ask Kurt W. Rothschild for his advice and opinion. We can only guess 
what he would say and recommend and hope that politicians will follow his lead. 
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Although Kurt Rothschild started his career as a professor of economics at the University of 
Linz only in the late 1960’s, the influence on economic policy making in Austria which he 
had from this position was – and still is – considerable. As a graduate from the University of 
Vienna, I did not have the benefit of being Rothschild’s student, but his writings were of great 
importance for me and a group of fellow young economists who had just joined the economic 
research department of the Vienna Chamber of Labour. We always kept a close eye on his 
new publications. In the early 1970’s, inflation was the central issue of economic policy. 
When we wanted to discuss Rothschild’s essay “The Phillips Curve and All That” which had 
recently been published in Scottish Journal of Political Economy, we still had to obtain 
permission from the director to make the sufficient number of copies, since in 1972 there was 
only one copy machine in our institution. Fortunately, we were able to convince the director 
that this would be an important contribution to the formation of the Chamber’s position on the 
problem of inflation.       
Kurt Rothschild deserves credit for having made an important contribution to what has come 
to be the general conceptual framework of modern economic policy in Austria. What I mean 
by this is that in the 1950’s and even in the 1960’s, such things as the preparation of regular 
macroeconomic forecasts within the framework of the system of national accounts and the 
concept of an anti-cyclical macroeconomic policy were rather new and far from 
uncontroversial in economic policy circles as well as in the economic faculties of Austrian 
universities. 
As regards the orientation for economic policy, Kurt Rothschild has always been a steadfast 
advocate of Keynesianism. He contributed substantially to the dominance of the Keynesian 
economic doctrine in Austria’s economic policies for more than two decades. Even later, as 
the tide of supply side economics and market fundamentalism has swept into Austria, the 
impact of Rothschild as teacher and advisor is still visible, since Austria has not experienced 
such an anti-Keynesian turn of its economic policy as it occurred, for example, in Germany. 
As an economic theoretician, Kurt Rothschild did not narrowly focus on a single direction of 
economic thought. Rather than drawing a sharp demarcation line towards other schools of 
thought, he aimed at a synthesis which combined and integrated elements of various 
theoretical approaches. Rothschild himself called his own theoretical orientation “pluralism of 
methods” – ”methodischer Pluralismus”, by which he drew together elements of schools of 
economic thought as different from each other as Keynesianism, neoclassical economics, 
Marxism, and the Austrian School. He has never denied that neoclassical economics, which 
dominated economic teaching at the time when Rothschild studied economics in the UK in 
the 1930’s, left a strong and lasting imprint on his way of thinking – to be sure, Alfred 
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Marshall’s version of neoclassical economics, and not the form of mathematical general 
equilibrium theory that has increasingly perverted economics since the 1960’s. Due to his 
familiarity with the neoclassical way of economic reasoning, Rothschild’s ability to “go 
against the grain” of neoclassical economics (“gegen den Strich”)1 was unmatched by his non-
orthodox colleagues. To be sure, Keynesian macroeconomics formed the core of Rothschild’s 
economic thinking, but at the same time he was open to useful ideas from other currents, and 
he was always searching for new ideas. In an interview with an Austrian daily newspaper 
during the crisis year 2009, he said that “we are in a completely new situation for which we 
have only insufficient theories and models.” This is a very candid statement, quite different 
from the grandiloquent appeals to “the future” which often serve to conceal ignorance.  
Openness of mind for Rothschild also implied readiness for dialogue – with his students, his 
colleagues, but also with politicians and economic policy experts. He often emphasized the 
limits of economics as a science, and he rejected the conceit that economic theory could serve 
as a basis for defining a social optimum in an objective sense. He rejected the analogy 
between utility maximization by the individual choosing between alternative needs and 
choices which are made collectively at the level of society. The latter implies genuine 
conflicts of interest between different groups which cannot be reduced to a “simple calculus 
of economic rationality”2. Economic policy goals are not objectively given in themselves, nor 
does there exist a clear-cut hierarchy among them. Rothschild argued in favour of pragmatic 
solutions to conflicts of interest, for example through a system of “social partnership”, and his 
attitude towards neoclassical and other utopias of a perfect state was sceptical. This position 
serves as an important message about the situation today, when the ideology of financial 
market capitalism has failed, but has not really been abandoned by many decision makers in 
economic policy.      
Finally: Kurt Rothschild’s scientific thinking was directly or indirectly always oriented 
towards reality. His interest in current events was genuine and remained strong until the end 
of his long life. He seldom missed one of the meetings of the Kautsky-Kreis, a discussion 
forum for economic policy questions which he had joined in the 1960’s. The style of 
economic thinking and writing which Kurt Rothschild has cultivated can still serve as a 
standard today. In its inevitable abstractness, economics will always have difficulty making 
                                            
1 According to Hajo Rieses laudatio at the occasion of Rothschild’s 65th birthday (Riese 1979, 
p. 486).   
2 Rothschild 1989, p. 114. 
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its insights and findings understandable to a wider public. Therefore, economists must be 
certain that their work is applicable to real problems. It does not necessarily mean that 
economics must always directly aim at solutions for concrete problems, but it should at least 
aim at a better understanding of reality. I believe that I am not the only practical economist 
who has the impression that, for some time, the distance between theoretical economics and 
reality has been increasing.  I think in this respect there is a lot to be learned from Kurt 
Rothschild.   
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This note lays out ten hypotheses about how Kurt Rothschild’s choice of scientific topics was 
related to his political and ethical agenda. The first two observations claim that it was 
oligopoly theory in which Kurt Rothschild achieved his highest academic acclaim; and they 
show why this was such a good choice for a political figure. The following paragraphs refer to 
his specific interpretation of uncertainty, to which I was at first reluctant to subscribe, but 
which was instilled with new life in the recent Financial Crisis. Following these remarks are 
subjective observations about the relationship between his economic world and his character, 
which was firm, humorous, humble (and in some rare but important occasions) angry and on 
his six decade long connection with the WIFO (Austrian Institute of Economic Research). 
The final comments relate to ethical and practical messages he left and finally what would 
have made him angry about economists after the Financial Crisis. All these observations are 
restricted by the fact that I knew Kurt Rothschild for only 40 of his 96 years, and was director 
at WIFO for only five of his 63 years of collaboration with this European research hub. 
Thesis 1: Kurt Rothschild’s field of research, on which he built up his early academic 
reputation, was oligopoly theory. This is a surprising but excellent choice for somebody 
interested in the progress of society. 
Oligopoly theory tells us that firms have the leverage to shape their environment; managers 
are not mathematicians maximizing an exactly defined profit function given a set of 
exogenous variables. They are strong minded human beings, determined and able to do the 
best to achieve profit in a demanding, unshaped, chaotic and fluid environment. As a rule 
firms also have a few very determined competitors, using instruments known or innovative, 
fair and unfair, aiming for collusion or for war. 
Such a broad array of strategies in which many choices can and must be made, is not available 
under other forms of competition – neither in "pure” competition, nor monopoly. The world is 
richest in strategies under oligopoly; managers can choose and shape strategies, speculate, 
collude, innovate, and think strategically. And if you add power, pressure, class interests, 
lobbying and side payments, the choices available are even larger and more realistic.
2
 
Thesis 2: The rich set of strategies existing under oligopoly theory mirrors the available 
choices for economic policy and economic systems. We do not have to choose between one 
well defined socialist planned economy (e.g. Marxian communism) and an alternative 
                                            
2 Another field in which Rothschild contributed to economic theory profoundly and persistently was 
wage theory (see Rothschild (1954)  and Tichy (2012) 
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capitalist market economy (e.g. Manchester capitalism), but instead there are a plethora of 
different systems which may fit at different stages of development, to different cultural 
backgrounds, histories and specific interests; and they can all coexist in a globalized world.  
Furthermore, many economists and politicians think the solutions are clear cut, that the given 
circumstances point towards only a small set of options. "Handlungszwänge” (external 
constraints) are believed to dictate what has to be done in a competitive, globalized world. 
Rothschild did not claim that "one model fits all”, not even Keynesianism (a heresy for which 
he was rebuked by Joan Robinson). He maintained that there are many options, which may 
differ across countries and their particular stage of development. He believed nothing was 
straight forward, but rather that things were complicated; they could not be known ex ante but 
evolved, amidst a multitude of vested interests. 
Thesis 3: If there is one overarching economic message Kurt Rothschild wanted to deliver, it 
was that uncertainty is at the core of economics. Mechanisms and mathematical techniques 
which are applied to cope with uncertainty are no more than nice tries but to no avail. No 
mathematical formula, no insurance is able to cope with "true uncertainty" (in contrast to 
risk).  
This message is built on the ideas of Knight, elaborated and deepened by Keynes, but often 
forgotten by Keynesians and Post Keynesians. The idea that uncertainty is not insurable has 
recently gained dramatically in importance. Uncertainty, together with waves of optimism and 
pessimism, and profit maximizing firms, leads to a dangerous instability in the financial sector 
and in economies as such. Financial systems are inherently unstable and therefore have to be 
regulated. And regulation is no easy task in a world of mighty international oligopolistic firms 
and national multi layered government systems amounting to 30%-50% of Gross National 
Product in industrialized countries. 
I wrote a book on Production Theory under Uncertainty (Aiginger, 1987) in the eighties and 
tried hard to model utility maximizing firms in – what I thought to be - a Keynesian 
environment: a post-post-Keynesian model without market clearing, with inventory build ups 
and disequilibria. I felt very proud to have avoided the neoclassical ideology of quickly and 
perpetually clearing markets (with only differing “states of nature“ representing uncertainty). 
Keynesian uncertainty had finally found its place in the decision making process of firms, I 
thought. 
However, I earned only one of Kurt Rothschild’s typical statements: "Well done, given what 
you tried”. When I asked, I received the verdict that what I had modelled was not Keynesian 
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uncertainty: "Keynesian uncertainty can never be built into models”. What Keynes meant was 
"true” uncertainty; here all decisions are different because they follow a completely different 
logic. What I had modelled was "petty uncertainty” or insurable risk. The proudest piece of 
my academic, economic life had been dwarfed. But not for a long time, because then Kurt 
Rothschild encouraged me to address this problem directly. I then modelled differences 
between "severe” uncertainty (in which decisions could not be changed ex post) and "petty 
uncertainty” under which a part of the decisions can be adjusted ex post at some costs (see 
Aiginger, 1988). I could claim that my models referred to a middle ground between 
uncertainty and risk. I was rescued, and could continue to claim to be some sort of post-post-
Keynesian. 
Thesis 4: The financial crisis provided forceful evidence that true uncertainty differed from 
calculable risks. Despite ever more sophisticated models, no large forecasting model could 
predict the crisis. Many economists had warned about the housing bubble in the US, about 
irrational exuberance on the stock markets, about the size of financial transactions, about the 
amount of money looking for profitable investments, about disequilibria between the US and 
China and so on,  but no model could predict the interrelation between these problems and 
the sudden spread of the consequences across markets and regions. The failure to predict the 
timing, depth and scope of the crisis occurred on a macro level, on the level of banks and 
investment houses, and it affected seemingly well diversified portfolios across products and 
regions. Some economists did predict an eventual breakdown of the economic system, but had 
done this in past crises which afterwards proved only to be temporary or regional. 
As if to prove that Kurt Rothschild was correct, one million mathematicians had taken over 
banks and other financial institutions over the past decade. They were hired to limit, even 
eliminate the risks of any financial investment by bundling (securitization), adding another 
rating, and diversifying over firms and continents and between world class and junk firms. 
The new innovations were not disadvantageous from the start; they created a huge globalized 
financial market, which helped millions of people to rise above the poverty line (modestly 
defined by $1 or $2 per day). But regulation did not step up with globalization. Politicians 
persuaded publicly supervised firms to give credit to everybody, instead of persuading firms 
to pay higher wages, or encouraging trade unions to do so. And so the last/recent financial 
crisis came about.  
One of the reasons - if not the most important one - was that neither mathematicians, nor 
policy makers, nor bank regulators, nor economists had respected the concept of true 
economic uncertainty. Today – better late than never – the uninsurable part of risk is 
acknowledged; we call it "systemic uncertainty" and created systemic risk boards and request 
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that systemically important financial institutions (SIFIS) hold higher equity reserves (as 
compared to petty banks like Raiffeisen, Erste Bank, Landesbanken, Kommunalkredit or 
Hypo Alpe Adria).
3
 
Thesis 5: Having room to manoeuvre, the existing leverage of oligopolistic firms can be used 
for good as well as for bad. This is to some degree reflected in the objective function of a 
firm, or in the welfare function of society. But Rothschild claims that political processes as 
well as the conduct of individuals is important. Therefore Kurt Rothschild wrote a book on 
Ethik und Wirtschaftstheorie (1992). 
Managers and entrepreneurs may shape the environment for the good by adding value to 
products through innovation, by adding quality, by product upgrading, through services or for 
the worse by using financial power to expropriate labour or resources, by collusion, by raising 
entry barriers, by hijacking regulatory bodies, by subscribing to or complying with corruption, 
dictatorship, or wars to change market structures or the society.  
Political groups can engage themselves for a better life, more justice, equality of opportunity, 
the future of the planet or they can opportunistically exploit fears, prejudices, declare the 
superiority of classes, elites, religions, groups, lifestyles. 
Thesis 6: Kurt Rothschild had strong beliefs which shaped his thinking. I do not know how 
they came about (some were inherited, some shaped through experience, some based on 
empirical economics), but together they enabled his calmness, determination, and humour. 
You felt these beliefs, when you entered his room. But they were not thrown at you if he 
started to speak. Ever polite, humble, and pretending not to know all too much about the 
subject for which you were asking advise. But you were never told that he did not have time 
for discussion. 
He gave you advice, if you wanted it. If not, you could only present your ideas. But you felt 
that he knew more and that he approved of some parts of what you said and disagreed with 
others. And he would tell you about your omissions and shortcomings, but only on request. 
                                            
3 This hypothesis is an interpretation, how Rothschild´s insistence on the character of uncertainty 
could have been useful in the upcoming of the crisis, he did not publish himself much on the crisis. In 
personal discussions he persisted to realize the enormous differences in the level of the recent crisis 
with that in the thirties of the last century (“do not forget,  children of unemployed people had no 
shoes at that time, they had to go barefooted into school”) 
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On the other hand, you could be absolutely sure that he did not criticize you after you left his 
office. The worst he would say about you was "this is a good paper considering his age and 
his education" (a little forgiving smile about your conservative background, your teachers, 
and university as in my case). Maybe sometimes you would have liked him to be a little bit 
more explicit about why he did not like a paper, thus forcing you to sharpen your arguments.  
Thesis 7: Kurt Rothschild could become very determined, angry, and strategic, if it was 
important (for the university, for WIFO, for society; but never for himself personally). If he 
felt somebody was treated unjustly, if a bad policy was pursued with cynical arguments, if 
selfish interests or profit motives were carefully hidden (and argued for the sake of the 
"poor”), he became angry. 
In this case he could mobilize resources against such a strategy, and squash unjust arguments 
with polemic counter arguments. Rothschild could slam doors if a commission chose the 
wrong candidate and he usually believed this was done by a hidden conservative political 
agenda (as he had experienced for decades at Austrian Universities). 
But this was the exception. Kurt Rothschild was patient. Somehow he knew he could wait and 
that history and justice and the good arguments were on his side. He seemed to have 
anticipated his longevity, or he triggered it through his humour and stress resistance. Asked 
whether he worked on the weekend, he answered, "Why should I? The week would be too 
short anyway, whether I worked five or seven days”.  
He did not strive to be in the media, he did not want to be the doyen of Austrian economists, 
the best publishing scientist at WIFO. Good ideas if developed, even if dropped on invitation, 
would eventually find their destination. 
Thesis 8: Kurt Rothschild has two singularities which will pin him down in the history of 
WIFO. The first one is easy: he worked at WIFO for 63 years. He started in 1947, 
specializing in Trade Theory and Labour Economics, but contributed in fact to all important 
economic topics. The second singularity, which will be harder to achieve by a WIFO scientist 
in the future, is that he was recommended by a Nobel laureate. This Nobel laureate was the 
founder of WIFO and antipode to his political views: Friedrich August von Hayek.  
This fact demonstrates that his scientific contribution and his ethical position were respected 
by economists with different views on social and economic questions.  
Thesis 9: There is one command (ethical recommendation) in Kurt Rothschild's book on 
Ethics in Economics (1993), which I will never forget, because it is neglected day by day (and 
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I may find traces of this in my own publications): an economist (scientist) has the obligation 
to supply all the evidence that exists, the complete truth. 
This implies that if there is positive and negative evidence on some economic hypothesis, you 
have to cite both, and not only the evidence in favour of the political conclusion you want to 
draw. As easy as this looks, it is very unusual for this advice to be followed.  
Kurt Rothschild was never so naive as to believe that scientific research is absolutely 
objective. There are always some traces of subjectivity, vested interests play a role, along with 
one’s personal motives, history, and education. But a scientist should downgrade this 
influence, instead of using it to indulge in his own prejudices and political interests.  
There are some rules which Kurt Rothschild suggested to me which would lead to better 
policy advice; rules that were recommended (not necessarily devised) by him. The first one 
was that it is more important to raise an important question than to answer an unimportant 
one. The second one was that it is better to be vaguely right rather than precisely wrong. 
Thesis 10: One final reason why Kurt Rothschild will stay in our memory is that he did not 
present a complete, bounded and self-contained theory, but that he pinpointed problems in 
societies as well as shortcomings in theories. Each narrow theory will be wrong under most 
circumstances.  
He forgave economists for not predicting the recent financial crisis. The extent of the crisis 
was disadvantageous for many people and a failure for economists. But Kurt Rothschild's 
redemptory assessment would change into incomprehension, if some economists proclaimed 
to explain the occurrence of the crisis using their own narrow theory (be it neoclassical or 
one-sided in any other narcissistic fashion). And he would become angry (and slam doors 
again) if economists did not change their policy prescription in the wake of the crisis, if 
regulators did not change rules, and if the forecasters did not change their model. 
But mildness plus the curiosity to raise questions, positive and encouraging contributions, 
respect for the limits of knowledge as well as of policy were the dominant reactions, and they 
will last longer. As will our memory of Kurt Rothschild. 
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How did Kurt Rothschild shape economic thinking in Austria? Quite certainly he did not 
influence economics and economic policy understanding and thinking through public 
relations and media coverage – that was not his style. Much rather, he stood for certain 
qualities and took specific views in his general approach to economic issues. Rothschild stood 
for these qualities and espoused these views consistently in all his activities dealing with 
economics and beyond – in his courses, during discussions, on his research agenda, as well as 
in private conversation. In passing on his convictions, he directly and indirectly shaped the 
economic concepts of many generations of economists in Austria, their perspectives of 
economics issues and their understanding of how to apply the tools of economics to tackle 
with these challenges. 
Relevant Economics, or How to Approach Questions of Economics 
Rothschild left his mark in two different ways: For one thing, he took up relevant research 
topics – quite a variety of topics, in fact, because his interests happened to be quite broad and 
because his views of economics went well beyond the narrow confines of the mainstream. If a 
particular topic were to be singled out from this array, it might well be Rothschild’s lifelong 
preoccupation with all aspects of the labor market, an issue with which he established, as it 
were, an “Austrian tradition” in economics. For another thing, Rothschild put a stamp on all 
research topics he was involved with, above all influencing how good and relevant research 
should or must, in his opinion, be done. This highly normative view had material and personal 
aspects, and the personal aspects were just as important as the material ones – a fact which 
became quickly apparent during discussions with him (Rothschild, 2004). In a nutshell, 
Rothschild essentially focused on how to approach economic issues. 
As a case in point, he considered it eminently important to be calm and reasonable when 
discussing any issue, even the most incendiary one – for instance the topic of Keynesianism 
versus monetarism, which was en vogue during some period – and not to “constrain” the 
discussion by bias or a preconceived notion of the result. A consistent effort to stay objective 
has always been at the core of the cognitive process, and Rothschild considered scientific 
progress unattainable without such objectiveness. Even in a heated discussion characterized 
by preconceptions, the parties involved should try to find an objective basis. 
This conviction of Rothschild’s came through in a “piece of advice” he often gave when 
consulted on a problem or when a student was at a loss what to say during an exam: “Well, 
let’s just take a look at what we’ve got. Let’s try to put everything on the table and sort it out. 
We’re sure to find a combination that will take us one step forward.” And that was usually all 
that he would ask for at that point. In other words, let us try to take a step that is guided by 
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objectivity and that will bring us closer to understanding the issue at hand – a step that will 
take us up one rung on the “ladder of understanding”. This might sound simple, but the goals 
he set himself, and, implicitly, economics as a relevant science, were high (Rothschild, 1991), 
so high that it was hard to follow him on the way there – and easy to lose sight of him.  
In the following, only a few exemplary aspects shall be presented to highlight the approach 
typical of Rothschild, aspects which are particularly important today. After all, we have 
entered the fifth year of a pronounced crisis, and it would be interesting to hear how he would 
have commented on the current situation. In fact, he did make a few comments on this (e.g. 
Bürger – Rothschild, 2009; King – Rothschild, 2009), but one can certainly infer from his 
fundamental understanding of economics as a science quite a lot of things that he might 
consider important today. 
The World as a Succession of Disequilibria 
The key issue is that Rothschild always considered it paramount not to think about the world 
of economics as a succession of equilibrium states. Quite the opposite: You can only 
understand the world if you pursue a “disequilibrium approach”. This view embraces 
numerous components that should give us something to think about, especially during the 
crisis, and that underline the importance of this alternative approach for the real world. Time 
and again, Rothschild emphasized that the fundamental discrepancy between the theoretical 
concept which views the world as a succession of equilibrium states and economic policy 
reality would prove to be a problem in the long run. Good policymaking and sensible 
economic policy principles are impossible if the theoretical framework on which they are 
based does not admit the existence of the very imbalances one is confronted with in reality. 
Rothschild’s most famous example of such a discrepancy is his article “Arbeitslose, gibt’s 
die?” (roughly, “The Unemployed – Is there such a Thing?” Rothschild, 1978), a title that is 
to be interpreted as an intentional exaggeration of the basic question but that also reflects his 
subtle British-style humor. 
As a university teacher, Rothschild insisted on having neoclassical economics taught and 
having students understand the theory, understand and use the (equilibrium) models, because 
good command of the models is indispensable for dealing with economic policy reality in a 
meaningful way. At the same time, he emphasized that the models were based on highly 
mechanistic equilibrium concepts that had very little to do with reality. Looking at how 
researchers use dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models (DSGE) to make forecasts 
today – right in the middle of the worst crisis since the Great Depression – Rothschild would 
not have been surprised at the result, a result that one could have expected from the outset, 
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namely that econometric estimates will always produce a new equilibrium in the future, 
irrespective of whether the crisis continues or not. And that is exactly the right point at which 
to ask where the value of such an approach is. 
This does not mean that Rothschild intended to suggest that equilibrium concepts are 
worthless per se – one should simply know what they are good for and specifically how to 
integrate them into a realistic economic policy concept. What would truly be needed, 
however, is a theory of permanent disequilibrium. That is exactly why Rothschild’s book on 
disequilibrium theory (Rothschild, 1981), perhaps that work of his which comes closest to 
being a textbook, tries to comprehensively present the state of the research on disequilibrium 
theory. Of course, Rothschild was aware that disequilibrium economics was still far from 
having a fully developed, sustainable model. But if the mainstream of the economic 
profession does not consider such research important and does not work on such a model, it 
just will not evolve automatically, no matter how relevant the topic may be. 
Why was this disequilibrium view so important to Rothschild? The reason was that he was 
convinced that there are two relevant approaches to sensible economic policy: On the one 
hand, economic policymakers can try to generally and fundamentally change the framework 
conditions of economic activity, i.e. act very much like social planners. On the other hand, 
economic policymakers can concentrate more strongly on process-oriented economic policy, 
for example by implementing what is referred to in a simplified fashion as Keynesianism, 
namely to directly intervene in economic processes. When trying to establish which solution 
was better or more adequate in a given situation, Rothschild himself went back and forth on 
his assessment and weighting of options (Rothschild 1989). Possibly, he was a system-
changer at heart, but deferred to, or had to defer to, reality. In all probability, the only short- 
and medium term measures that can be realized under the given conditions have to be rather 
process-oriented economic policy measures. For this reason, it would be particularly 
fascinating to discuss these issues with Rothschild today in an economic policy reality in 
which practical economic policy measures seem to have been mostly exhausted or have at 
least arrived at a watershed. As the comprehensive reform of EU economic governance has 
shown, to cite just one example, quite obviously, fundamental measures are required to 
stabilize the system. 
Financial Market Developments Exemplify Structural Change 
Rothschild emphasized the importance of financial markets as a keyfactor, less in his writing, 
but all the more so in discussions. Financial markets are both a key element in the long-term 
structural change of our economic system and a primary source of destabilizing shocks in the 
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short run (Mooslechner, 2011). Rothschild never wrote extensively or regularly about the 
financial markets, but he had detailed knowledge about what was happening in the financial 
markets. Nevertheless, he personally believed that he knew too little, so he never really wrote 
an academic publication about the financial markets. This did not stop him from voicing very 
well-informed opinions about financial market developments in private discussions, and, as 
was typical of him, he argued his points forcefully and stringent. 
Rothschild was convinced that, in the end, financial market developments were very closely 
linked to the issue of disequilibrium and to the need to base economic policy on the concept 
of disequilibrium. The reason disequilibrium should be the starting point for policy is that 
crises and instability represent the normal course of economic life, and normal life is what 
economic policy-oriented analysis should be based on, not on a theoretical concept that will 
apply only under specific, highly abstract premises. As Rothschild believed that every 
economic concept worth its scientific salt has to play a useful role for society as a whole, the 
concept should relate to economic reality. Economic theory and economic policy should try to 
contribute at least a little bit to putting or keeping the economy on the right track. 
Rothschild’s contribution to this precept was to draw attention to distributional issues 
(Rothschild, 1993). It was always fascinating, original and hardly inferable from the literature 
how rightly he identified distribution problems in various aspects of economic reality, e.g. 
inflation (Rothschild, 1972). His insight was not just that inflation can and does have massive 
distribution effects, but rather that the development of inflation as a phenomenon is to a 
significant degree determined by distribution problems. 
Constantly Challenging One’s Own Paradigm  
Rothschild’s approach to economic understanding culminated in the key notion that the 
paradigm shift in economics as a science is the decisive starting point for progress (Kuhn, 
1967). He interpreted “paradigm shift” as meaning that researchers should strive to 
accomplish a paradigm shift with everything they intend to achieve with academic research, 
as the effort to bring about a paradigm shift is the only true source of substantial research 
progress. For Rothschild, “paradigm shift” did not simply mean e.g. challenging the 
neoclassical paradigm and replacing it by another paradigm. Instead, he consistently 
emphasized how important it was to always question one’s own paradigm. Only then would it 
be possible to actually achieve research progress with one’s own work. It may well happen 
that a researcher finds himself affirming the original paradigm, but at least then he has 
understood it at a deeper level than when he began. Researchers must always strive to 
overcome the limits of their own paradigms. 
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Let me conclude with a very personal observation on a topic that could be discussed at length 
and that is the key to why and how Rothschild has left his mark on generations of economists 
in Austria: When I was ready to leave for university and decided to make a go of it in 
economics, I took a closer look at all Austrian universities that offered economics in their 
curriculum. Even though I had no real previous knowledge, I immediately realized that there 
was only one cutting-edge economics program in Austria: the economics curriculum designed 
by and taught by Kurt Rothschild in Linz. 
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The appointment of Kurt Rothschild as the first professor of Economics at the newly 
established University of Linz (then called “Hochschule für Sozial- und 
Wirtschaftswissenschaften”) in 1966 was indeed a lucky chance for the Department of 
Economics. He represented a style of modern economic research which was rather rare at that 
time in Austria. 
Due to his emigration to Scotland and the start of his academic career at the University of 
Glasgow, he was familiar with economic research at an international level and as a founding 
professor he was influential enough to shape the Department accordingly. He taught new 
theories (not only Keynesian macro- but also standard microeconomics) and invited eminent 
international researchers (like Joan Robinson and Walter Weißkopf) to Linz, so that students 
got a firsthand impression of their ideas. He kept in close contact with Gottfried Bombach of 
the University of Basel, who received an honorary doctorate from the University of Linz in 
1983 and died in the same year as Kurt Rothschild. 
With his international relations and his open-mindedness, Kurt Rothschild had an important 
influence not only on the Department of Economics but on the whole University, where he 
served as rector in 1971 – 1972. It should be stressed that in the 1960’s the intellectual climate 
at Austrian universities was very different from what it is now. Universities at that time were 
dominated by strict conservatives and even German-nationalistic professors, after the big 
drain of the Nazi-era; an international orientation was certainly not standard at Austrian 
economics departments. On the other hand, however, it should also be mentioned that 
Rothschild’s habilitation at the University of Vienna was massively supported by Theodor 
Pütz, a Professor of Economic Policy. Being a conservative-liberal academic himself, Pütz 
was impressed by the excellent research of the left-wing Rothschild and achieved acceptance 
of his habilitation against severe resistance in the faculty.  
Clarity in thinking and writing is an essential characteristic of Rothschild’s work, and this was 
also what he requested from students and younger colleagues at the Department of 
Economics. As a consequence, the obligation to present a paper in the seminar which he 
supervised together with Kazimierz Laski, produced significant stress among the participating 
students. And for all his placidness, there were (rare) events when Rothschild could indeed 
get upset if he came to the conclusion that students only pretended to be familiar with the 
models they were talking about. (As Governor Nowotny explained, the reason for 
Rothschild’s strictness was his view that the university should indeed reward personal merits, 
as opposed to other institutions where a student’s social background is of primary relevance.) 
I would like to add that when supervising students’ papers and presentations myself, I often 
reflect on the appropriateness of the standards I request. That is, I ask whether I devote 
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sufficient effort to reading, correcting and discussing students’ papers (and everyone knows 
that doing this properly requires a lot of effort). 
A further important impact of Rothschild’s activities at the Economics Department in Linz 
came from his view on what constitutes relevant economic research. (The characterization 
given by Gunther Tichy on the occasion of Rothschild’s retirement from Linz in 1985 has 
rightly become quite well-known in this respect.) He certainly considered problems of the 
labor market, unemployment, the wage level, the distribution of income, and similar issues 
important topics of research. In the 1980’s he initiated, together with Gunther Tichy of the 
University of Graz, the research project “Dynamics of unemployment”. This was the first 
project in the social- and economic sciences financed by the Austrian Research Fund. In this 
project, economists (most notably Reiner Buchegger and Martin Riese) and sociologists 
collaborated, which demonstrates Rothschild’s preference for an interdisciplinary approach 
that he expressed on several occasions. This project was not only successful from its research 
output, but also offered the first job opportunities for a number of today’s well-known 
economists such as Josef Zweimüller (University of Zurich), Viktor Steiner (Free University 
Berlin), Ingrid Kubin and Wilfried Altzinger (both WU Wien), as well as Rudolf Winter-
Ebmer (University of Linz). Looking at their work and their fields of research, one can 
certainly detect several traces leading back to their involvement in the Rothschild project. 
Indeed, a particularly close relation can be detected between the Rothschild-Tichy labor-
market project and the present National Research Network “The Austrian Center of Labor 
Economics and the Welfare State”, again financed by the Austrian Research Fund and headed 
by Rudolf Winter-Ebmer of the University of Linz, with a number of collaborating 
Departments in Austria, Germany and Switzerland. Here the lasting impact of Rothschild’s 
activities in Linz is clearly visible. But even more generally I would claim that the current 
research interests of the members of the JKU-Linz Department of Economics still reflect 
Rothschild’s preference for topics of relevance for economic policy. This is true not only for 
labor economics but also for teaching and research in other fields like international trade, 
industrial economics, health economics, and also for my own (though sometimes rather 
theory-oriented) activities in public sector economics. 
In my view, a very important aspect in Rothschild’s thinking was his emphasis on pluralism 
in economic research. I remember well his talking about the toolkit of economists; he was 
certainly not a dogmatist. Time and again he insisted that insights from other disciplines like 
psychology or sociology should play a much more important role in economic research. 
Perhaps, one may regard the recent uprising of fields like experimental economics, behavioral 
economics or even neuro-economics as a step in the direction he suggested, even if, 
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surprisingly, the direction seems to have been the other way round, namely that economists 
enter the neighboring disciplines. These new insights severely undermine the model of 
rational behavior of individuals, though the actual consequences for how we view the 
functioning of market economies are not yet clear, and within most fields of the economic 
discipline it seems that the idea of pluralism has not really arrived; standard models and their 
variants, known to have a weak empirical basis, dominate journal articles. 
Let me come to a final point: In spite of his clear moral position that the first goal of an 
economic system is to improve the life of the underprivileged, which governed his research 
interests, one can in my view not claim that Rothschild belonged to a certain “school” in 
economics. He was certainly in favor of Keynesian macroeconomics, but I remember well 
discussions when he defended the insights of neoclassical micro. He was a brilliant critic of 
dogmatic attitudes and of scientific covering-up of individual or group interests. But at the 
same time he was – as already mentioned – open for different methods of economic research. 
When it comes to economic policy he clearly favored measures to avoid unemployment and 
to increase income equality, but to my knowledge he hardly expressed a comprehensive 
personal vision of how an economy should be organized and what its governing principles 
should be. Maybe – but now I am obviously speculating – this had to do with his sharp 
intellect which quickly revealed to him the limitations of any scientific approach and let him 
never fully identify with a particular idea. 
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Encountering Kurt Rothschild at what was then the University of Social and Economic 
Studies in Linz was to prove absolutely crucial for my future life. For, had it not occurred, I 
would certainly never have studied economics. 
Coming as I did from a classical grammar school, I had no real idea of the subject, whereas I 
did have a serious interest in philosophy and sociology. I had read the first social science 
books I can recall during my early teens in my home town of St. Pölten, which – to my good 
fortune – boasted a well-stocked and very cheap public library. Above all, I remember Rene 
König’s ‘Sociological Lexicon’, which, by leading me into a new conceptual world, left a 
particularly strong mark; Hofstädter’s volume on Social Psychology; Galbraith’s ‘The New 
Industrial State’; and works by Jung and by Schreiber (‘The American Challenge’). 
At that time, sociology was a flourishing discipline, undoubtedly also a ‘fashionable’ one, and 
I knew that it could be studied at the University of Linz, whose young, park-like campus I 
first visited in the summer of 1968. 
It was a visit I shall never forget, so impressed was I by the welcoming atmosphere. Quite 
unlike that of the Vienna universities I had run my eye over in July of the same year, where, 
in the stifling summer heat, the dust of centuries seemed to hang and most doors were firmly 
shut. Here, instead, everything was freshness and light, everywhere was glass, air, openness. 
The green, blissfully peaceful campus, village-like in its scale; the short distances between 
lecture halls and residences; and, last but not least, the fact that, unlike Vienna, Linz was 
undeniably too far from St Pölten for me to lighten the family budget by commuting to study: 
for all these reasons, my choice of university was made on the spot. 
In the eyes of my freshman self, there was just one drawback, which today I recognize as a 
further boon. In the first two years of my degree I had to take a whole range of subjects with 
no relation to sociology: from accounting, to various aspects of law, to mathematics and 
statistics. 
One particularly strange subject was economics. It seemed ‘strange’ because of the very first 
class in microeconomics. There a small, rather odd lecturer, first, virtually covered the board 
with his writings, and then attempted to fill in the few remaining free spaces with diagrams as 
microscopically small as they were complex. From my seat in one of the backmost rows, 
through my 8-diopter-strength glasses, I gaped in bewilderment at one of the earliest works of 
modern graffiti art. Finally, when – as frequently happened - the lecturer himself had become 
hopelessly lost in the havoc of his tiny chalk scratching, he would casually wipe away the sum 
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of his artistic endeavours with the sleeve of his jacket, only to begin yet another diagram over 
the still visible remains of his previous efforts. 
The small, odd lecturer was, of course NOT Kurt Rothschild but one of his colleagues, who 
had made his name above all – what irony - in the economics of education. 
Even my first encounters with sociology turned out to be much less stimulating than I, in my 
early enthusiasm, had hoped. Right at the start of my first course I had to write a seminar 
paper somewhat pompously entitled ‘Structure and Function in the Ideas of Talcott Parsons’. 
The experience awoke in me the first dark suspicion that abstract sociological theory is 
actually the art of using abstruse terminology to further cloud the layperson’s understanding 
of connections that are ill-defined and, by their very nature, hazy, to the extent that 
rediscovering them (‘what did he really mean by that?’) becomes a task sufficiently arduous 
as to cause a genuine sensation of academic insight. 
Today, as a grateful pupil of Kurt Rothschild’s, I am of course aware that this somewhat 
presumptuous, self-referential type of theorising can also be found in some areas of 
theoretical economics, at best much more elegantly disguised by the use of mathematics. 
Allan Kirman, the highly regarded exponent of general equilibrium theory, once remarked in 
a research retrospective of his own esoteric field that, at its conferences, he often seemed to 
himself to be a member of some sect that had gathered on top of a mountain to await the end 
of the world. I presume that one might experience similar feelings at a conference on, for 
example, the pioneering works of Parsons (or Luhmann). 
Up in the clouds were also to be found some heads affiliated to the Department of General 
Business Studies, where a spiritual follower of Spann’s holistic school worked away, with 
undeniably artful rhetoric, at his conceptual castles in the air. Two gems from his lectures 
have remained always with me. The first is his definition of the ‘essence’ of a loan as “giving 
something in the confidence of receiving it back” – and who would contradict this profound 
insight in our time of financial crisis? The second quote that has stayed with me represents an 
unambiguous rejection of the open nature of our Anglo-Saxon-tainted, hectic academic 
existences: “Those who feel at home with themselves have no need to travel.” 
At any rate, only a relatively short time into my studies any joy I felt at intellectual contact 
with all this woolliness had largely disappeared, to the extent that I began to seriously 
consider changing my degree course. As an escape route I would even have considered dry-
as-dust Law or the new degree in Economic Statistics, so strong was my yearning for 
something ‘to sink my teeth into’. After all, after a year of study I was still not in a position to 
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give anyone who asked me what I was actually studying a succinct answer that was either 
reasonably satisfactory or half-way honest. 
And then, all of a sudden, I found myself sitting in one of Kurt Rothschild’s macroeconomics 
lectures. Right from the start I was fascinated by his personality and soon my choice was 
made: I would switch to economics. 
With Rothschild there were no bogus depths of meaning, no conceptual hair-splitting. Instead 
he presented theories clearly, with no sign of pretentiousness, and so managed to induce a 
genuine feeling of insight. He did not use his theoretical models to instil in his students a 
belief in universally valid ‘natural laws’ of the economic world. Far less did he wish to dazzle 
us with complicated mathematics, even if he made use of formal deduction whenever it 
seemed useful and appropriate. But he always made explicit the restrictive assumptions on 
which a particular model was based, in order to forestall any rash belief in the general validity 
of its hypotheses. 
From the very start he was at great pains to get across the idea that not even the conceptual 
constructs of economic theory can be fully objective, that they contain an element of ideology 
and value judgement, just like the theoretical ideas on which all constructs are inevitably 
based. His altogether hostile reactions to concepts like ‘natural’ unemployment, ‘equilibrium’ 
or ‘Pareto efficiency’ all derived from this extreme sensitivity to ideological influence. 
Kurt Rothschild detested the notion of the economist as ‘high priest’ or ‘preacher’, sadly and 
too often adopted by famous practitioners and political advisors these days, and not only 
because he was himself so modest. Instead, he saw the economist as a sceptical son of the 
Enlightenment, whose task it was to point out the various possible consequences of a 
particular course of action. Prioritising different aims, the choice and implementation of 
particular economic policies; these were, for him, a matter for democratically legitimated 
political decision-makers. In that connection, I recall a sentence of Rothschild’s that I like to 
quote in my own classes: ‘Anyone who claims there is no alternative has certainly got 
something to hide’. Words which, incidentally, he spoke long before Margaret Thatcher’s 
famous – or infamous - TINA entered the political stage. 
Over and over again Rothschild stressed that economic theory can only be understood against 
the background of the socio-economic conditions under which it was developed. He liked to 
quote, often and approvingly, philosopher Hans Albert’s criticisms of ‘model Platonism’, that 
is, the retreat of neo-classical economics from empiricism into ‘pure’ logic. Albert speaks of 
the spatial and temporal relativity of all so-called ‘economic laws’, a view that Rothschild 
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illustrated in masterly fashion in his lectures on the history of economics. His immunity to 
preaching dogmatism in any form, his scepticism towards so-called ‘general theory’, were 
also presumably based on his long experience as an empirical researcher (in the words of the 
Polish satirist Jerzy Lec: ‘Reality is the enemy of truth‘) 
A further debt that my fellow students and I owe, indirectly, to Kurt Rothschild is our 
encounter at that time with another teacher who left a greater mark on me than others did. 
Kazimierz Laski, pupil of and assistant to the world-renowned economist Michael Kalecki, 
had been expelled from Warsaw University in 1968, the victim of an evil anti-Semitic 
campaign directed against dissident spirits of all types. His path took him first to the Vienna 
Institute for International Economic Studies, and then to a chair at the University of Linz, 
where his classes were of immense intellectual value to us students, for two reasons. On the 
one hand, because he came from an utterly different economic world, largely unknown to us, 
that of the planned economy, whose weaknesses and absurdities he laid bare in example after 
example. And, on the other, because his lectures – which ranged from growth theory to the 
economic cycle, from the theory of planning to Marxist economics – were pedagogically 
brilliant and clear as crystal, markedly more formal and analytic than Rothschild’s own, but 
also more firmly rooted in a paradigm than anything we had heard before. 
Every time a model was presented in one of our higher seminars – which were sometimes 
attended by more staff than students – it led to lively discussion between the two. They were 
fascinating experiences because, time and again, we were shown how even the most elegant 
of micro- and macroeconomic models were exposed and vulnerable to well-founded criticism. 
Whereas Rothschild considered each problem from many different perspectives, circling 
around it in a series of daring pirouettes, Laski preferred to attack it head-on, striking straight 
at its very heart, with his feet firmly planted on his Kaleckian foundations. Of course, given 
two such different approaches, sparks tended to fly. 
I won’t hide the fact that, as students and perhaps even more so in our subsequent teaching 
and research activities, we have had our occasional problems with the relativist approach to 
theory propounded by Kurt Rothschild, who, now as then, seems always to be looking over 
our shoulders. The resultant insecurity was undoubtedly one reason why those of us who 
dared to do our doctorates under his supervision took rather longer than was truly necessary to 
complete them ... How much simpler our academic lives would have been, had we at their 
outsets been impregnated with unquestioning belief in a single, standardised paradigm, in a 
handful of universally valid axioms, above all in the magical powers of mathematical 
formulae! 
  
196 
 
Kurt Rothschild’s methods – which shine through in all his essays, with their wealth of ideas 
and their verbal immediacy - were unique in their cogitative approach to argumentation, in 
their critical reflection, and in the almost philosophical way in which he approached and 
investigated a problem from every – yes, every– side. As such, they do not lend themselves to 
imitation. And, indeed, his work has nothing in common with the constant stream of models 
emerging from the narrow axiomatic foundations of contemporary economic orthodoxy, 
models which are then used to ‘explain’ the whole economic, political and social world, 
presumptuously and nuance-free, but in a formally ‘correct’ manner (that is, purely on the 
basis of neo-classical equilibrium models, ignoring the devilish ‘ad-hoc’ hypotheses so 
beloved of Rothschild).  
Yet, since the financial crisis - if not before -, most economists have sensed that the emperor 
of ‘Modern Advanced Economic Theory’ has few, if any, clothes. If, in the past, they had paid 
more attention to Kurt Rothschild’s unfailingly constructive criticism, some problems might 
have been recognised earlier, certain ideas not stretched beyond their limits. And certainly 
some utter nonsense, such as the absurd Real Business Cycle theory, or the theories of rational 
expectations and perfectly efficient financial markets, would never have been taken so 
seriously. 
Kurt Rothschild, we shall miss your words of caution and enlightenment. 
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